Brazil: A long-term commitment with Haiti

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As if the decades of political instability and military meddling, the complacent and misguided neighbourly interventions, the gross underdevelopment, coupled with extreme social and economic conditions and aggravated by the prosperous and deadly drug trade, were not enough, the Caribbean nation of Haiti suffered yet, another blow, with a devastating earthquake on 12 January.

Amidst the disaster stood the United Nations Stabilization Mission on Haiti (MINUSTAH), the force charged with the (ineffectual) improvement of the social and political conditions of the country. MINUSTAH comprises a total of 9,000 military and civilian personnel, and Brazil, with its 1,200, troops took the lead in 2004 of the international contingent, aiming at succeeding where previous United Nations missions or the U.S. (with different agendas, one could argue), failed in the past.

Brazil’s leadership role was not assumed without controversy. At the time, the demanding costs of supporting a long-term military operation on foreign soil were criticized by President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva’s opponents, who pointed out that the social inequalities and disparities Brazil faced (and still faces) are more deserving of funds and political attention than an often-overlooked and distant Caribbean nation, of little geopolitical import.

Nevertheless, Lula da Silva and his closest advisers correctly understood the opportunity presented to the country’s growing aspirations and external objectives by undertaking the leadership role in MINUSTAH. Craving a place among the world’s executive-elite has always been a somewhat dreamy goal for Brazilian foreign policy, but since Lula da Silva took office, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council became the undisputable “obsession” of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Leading MINUSTAH thus became a natural step in the continuous campaign towards Brazil’s Security Council ambitions. Alleging supposedly greater cultural affinities and answering to multiple Central American calls for increased involvement, Brazil then found itself in the position of sending its largest external military expedition since World War II (when nearly 25,000 soldiers fought alongside the Allies in Italy).

Good intentions, however, are not always enough in a widespread crisis scenario. Although in charge of overseeing the doubtful 2006 elections in Haiti (subsequent to the 2004 coup d’état that led to the deterioration of the local situation), the newly-reinforced international forces quickly proved incapable of significantly improving the security and safety of the Haitian people, who continued to endure the plague of organized criminality and drug trafficking together with ineffective and practically nonexistent state institutions.

Nevertheless, when the disaster struck the island in the beginning of January, it was the men and women of MINUSTAH, often criticized for and accused of either passivity towards local violence or excess force when actually addressing it, who constituted the first line of aid to the local populations.

Facing an apocalyptically-devastated Port-au-Prince, the blue-helms suffered their own losses, with their chain-of-command severely incapacitated due to a total of 92 civilian and military casualties, including the former Head of Mission, the Tunisian Héde Annabi and his Principal Deputy, Luiz Carlos da Costa alongside other 20 Brazilians.

Although shocked by this unexpected tragedy, Brazil was quick to respond and immediately sent US$15 million in aid and tons of medical and food supplies, while promising to double its military contingent in order to assure the safety of local aid distribution.

At the end of the day, Brazil was
Can political inclusion lead to reform implementation in Guinea-Bissau?

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It has been almost a year now since Guinea-Bissau’s President and Army Chief were assassinated within hours of one another, plunging the country into fear and uncertainty. The March 2009 assassinations were followed by further political killings in June, and it was not until July that Guinea-Bissau once again had an official, non-interim President, as Malam Bacai Sanhà of the historically dominant Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was elected to the office. Under Sanhà, the country has remained relatively calm, but it is still beset by problems: severe corruption, international drug smuggling, political strife and dire poverty, all of which are interrelated. The ability to combat these economic, political and social ills depends on the ability of the government to form a unified and effective front, something which has previously been lacking.

Toward this end, Sanhà took the unusual step of naming Kumba Yala, his defeated opponent in the presidential election and leader of the opposition Partido para a Renovação Social (PRS), to the State Council, a powerful presidential advisory board. Yala, a former President himself, has long been a leader of the opposition to PAIGC, so bringing him more closely into the governmental fold has the potential to be a great step toward improving the cohesion of the conflict-wracked country and enabling a more active response to the issues plaguing Guinea-Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau remains one of the poorest, most underdeveloped countries in the world, a situation made even worse by the events of 2009, which led to the suspension of foreign aid and the disruption of what little formal economic activity the country possesses. One of the few possible bright sides of the instability during 2009 was that international drug traffickers, who use the West African nation as a transit point to Europe, began leaving the country, as even they prefer some (albeit corrupt) order to anarchy. However, this appears to have been only a short vacation for the traffickers, who have now returned to activity. In late January, the military arrested an Iraqi, a Tunisian, two Germans, and two Bissau-Guineans, one of them a government official, on charges of a conspiracy to smuggle drugs through the country using small aircraft. The fact that a government official was arrested, and that the military, rather than a police force, must be making arrests on drug charges, serves to highlight Guinea-Bissau’s high levels of corruption and correspondingly low levels of government capacity.

In order to combat these ills, it will be necessary for the government to act in a unified, streamlined manner to foster a culture of transparency and legality. A more inclusive government is an important step in this regard, but equally important is greater engagement with the United Nations Integrated Office for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and the European Union’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in the country. The government of Guinea-Bissau has been largely reluctant or ineffective in its attempts to implement these groups’ suggestions, suggestions that could potentially break the country free from the cycle of poverty and conflict in which it finds itself locked.

The SSR project is of paramount necessity for Guinea-Bissau’s advancement. The country is saddled with multiple security agencies with poorly-defined or redundant missions, complacency and outright cooperation of security forces with drug trafficking, an excess of weapons remaining from the 1998-99 civil war, a severely broken justice system, and disgruntled veterans of the war for independence who feel they are not receiving due benefits and recognition for their service. Fixing this mess is an extremely difficult task, but not an insurmountable one, though Guinea-Bissau needs all the help it can get. To this end, the government must initiate greater cooperation with the EU SSR mission, for, as has been seen in Timor Leste and elsewhere, a malfunctioning and fractured security sector that does not reform can lead to renewed strife.

The head of UNIOGBIS has called this a “critical” year for that mission, and...
for Guinea-Bissau more broadly. It is necessary for the country to move boldly away from the conflict of 2009, and also away from its more historical systemic weaknesses. Sanhá’s decision to bring Kumba Yala, and thus the opposition, into closer consultation in the governing process represents a break with the characteristic divisiveness of Bissau-Guinean politics of the past. Now Sanhá must listen to Yala’s suggestions and criticisms, and Yala must push Sanhá forward in taking concrete actions to promote both short and long-term development and stability. While the significance of the partnership between these two men is only symbolic at this time, with luck it will mark a shift toward solutions, rather than only rhetoric, for Guinea-Bissau’s myriad problems.

Marine management: Combating piracy in the Mozambique Channel

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Piracy off the Somali coast has been a serious concern of several international organisations since 2005. When it became a considerable threat to international seaborne trade in the Gulf of Aden, the international community was quick to mobilise and send in the naval cavalry. China, India and Russia dispatched warships to the region and the European Union created a task force, the EU NAVFOR. Their mission was to patrol, obstruct and arrest any form of piracy off the coast of Somalia and around the Gulf of Aden. And yet, piracy as a phenomenon still has not been defeated. Pirates have moved many of their operations out of the Gulf of Aden as a consequence of heavy patrolling by international naval warships. Instead they are targeting vessels coming out of the Mozambique Channel, presenting a problem the Mozambican navy is not yet ready to address.

The Mozambique Channel, by geographical chance, offers many small islands and sheltered anchorages where pirates can hide, organize and establish small bases. These islands and small outposts are strategically important, as most of them are very small, flat and inhabited, creating the perfect conditions for a quick hideout where ambushes are naturally preferred. Furthermore, the states of the area lack proper coastal defences, as this region is far less exposed to aerial surveillance than the area to the north of the Seychelles – off the coast of Madagascar – and in the Gulf of Aden.

Because of the pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the Maersk line AE7 service was, for a short period of time, routed via the Cape of Good Hope on its eastbound route to Asia, proving this lane is in fact a viable alternative. Moreover, the Chinese shipping container line has taken a similar action with a joint service. If piracy increases in the Mozambique Channel, it will affect revenues quite considerably. Although the Mozambique Channel is a minor shipping route compared to its Suez counterpart, it still is the source of important funding and revenue to the region as companies like Maersk operate along a number of routes there.

All these were unexpected gains in terms of seaborne trade to Mozambique. UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 2009 reports that when the terminal operating companies sought to expand along the main international shipping routes, countries like Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Libya and Tunisia were not included in the project, due in part to social, political, legal and economic constraints, among which piracy ranks high on the list. This in turn affected trade flows, as an increasing number of ships are now avoiding the Suez canal passage and are taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope.

With pirates moving south while trade is taking the Cape route and passing through the Channel (though going around Madagascar is also an alternative), an increase in pirate attacks would disrupt this commercial trend and leave Mozambique to lose important revenues for its development, which would be, in turn, an impediment to the development of a strong capable navy.

Mozambique is a very poor country, with insufficient resources to foster a capable navy equipped for constant patrolling and possessing adequate intelligence and surveillance systems. Thus, the country has to rely on foreign powers to either patrol its coast or beef up its navy. The latter option has been widely adopted. Brazil, China, Portugal, South Africa and the U.S. have supplied, or are planning to supply, the Mozambican navy with several patrol boats, marine transportation vessels and other equipment. These donations will help Mozambique fight such threats as piracy, illegal fishing, arms and drug trafficking, and the dilapidation of its maritime resources.

The U.S. has also created a new programme, the African Partnership Station (APS) with the ultimate goal of fighting threats at sea, such as the ones mentioned above. With a new branch, the APS East is planned to train and prepare sailors from Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Mauritius, Seychelles and Comoros in order to address issues such as combat lifesaving, damage control, law of war, search and seizure, small boat operations/maintenance and physical security.

But these programs might not be enough if piracy continues to increase and the international community’s response remains slow in the Channel’s waters. The Mozambican navy needs
a strong boost. Agreements and protocols should also be signed with the governments of Madagascar and the Seychelles, in order to create a multilateral triangular patrolling team to prevent further damage and disruption of international seaborne trade in the region.

Piracy does not abide by international law, nor is it represented by an international organization with a clear agenda and a specific mandate. In a world where capital speaks louder than ideas, disruption of international trade is a bigger threat than it is often considered. Worse than classical terrorism, in the sense that it does not have a specific target, piracy – although a branch of terrorism – strikes whenever it can, notwithstanding the targets, be they commercial, touristic or military vessels.

In a region as poor as East Africa, efforts should not be doubled but tripled. If supporting development is the key to fight social and political unrest, then proper security to assure the inflow of capital and people should be the first priority of those who seek to eradicate piracy at sea.

Portugal and ETA: A new pebble in the shoe?

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The Basque Fatherland and Freedom – Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) – is a terrorist organization founded in the second half of the 1950’s that so far has caused close to 900 fatalities. Their struggle is against what they perceive as Spanish oppression of the Basque people and territory, and their final goal is acquiring Basque Country’s independence, along with that of the province of Navarra. The truth is that ETA is the one who oppresses Spain’s civil society through bomb attacks and executions, apart from extorting a ‘revolutionary tax’ from Basque businessmen and instigating public vandalism, or kale borroka.

Like many other terrorist groups born in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s, ETA needs foreign bases in order to maintain a certain level of operational capability, primarily for funding and equipment, escape routes and safe havens. France was a sanctuary for many years and so was North Africa. Nonetheless, since Nicolas Sarkozy was elected President, France has adopted a strong counterterrorism policy in strict cooperation with Spain, making the demise of ETA a national objective. At this point, the Algerian training ground has been long gone. Difficulty in establishing foreign bases, international police coordination, political condemnation, and waves of arrests in Spain have led ETA into a clear decline, taking the organization to its weakest point in history. Therefore, in order to survive, moving to Portugal became the logical outcome; ETA has known Latin American connections, but the operational costs and the risk involved in crossing the ocean are obviously too high.

Even taking the most conservative view, ETA has clearly been present and growing in involvement in Portugal since 2009. Vehicles acquired in Portugal were used in logistical operations and to perform bomb attacks in Spain. Furthermore, Jurdan Martitegui, ETA’s commander, who was arrested in April 2009, was allegedly in Portugal during 2007 for reconnaissance purposes. Incontrovertible evidence of ETA’s new Portuguese presence came in January 2010 when Iratxe Ortiz (on Spain’s most wanted list) and Garikoitz García [who drove a van with explosives and electronic equipment used to build detonators] were arrested in Portugal, respectively in Foz Côa and Torre de Moncorvo. Then, on 4 February, any remaining skepticism about ETA’s footprint in Portugal was erased: a house in Obidos was discovered with close to 1.500 kilograms of explosives. It was used as a bomb factory, indicating that ETA infrastructures, which were in France, may be transferring to Portugal.

Spanish authorities have long considered the idea of ETA operating in Portugal. Since at least 2009, Spain has clearly stated that ETA is operating on the soil of its Western neighbor. The Portuguese authorities always denied these allegations and some even portrayed this claim as nonsense. We now know that the Spanish authorities had a correct assessment. In the last few years, José Luis Zapatero’s government has been clearly trying to make ETA a Portuguese problem, pressuring Lisbon to take action on the matter. It was not easy for Spain to get France seriously on board in the fight against Basque terrorists. France’s traditional hands-off approach on ETA allowed it to set a strong foothold in French territory, making the counterterrorism policies of Spain less efficient. The Spanish knew that they could not let the same thing happen in Portugal.

Still, Portugal has always had a timid approach to ETA. No Portuguese government has ever issued strong political declarations condemning Basque terrorism and, even with today’s undeniable proofs, the Portuguese government remains cautious. Prime Minister José Socrates and Interior Minister Rui Pêreira have barely discussed the issue. When they did, statements were limited to say that investigations are on course and that Portugal enjoys a fruitful cooperation with Spain. However, although the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding two years ago, no joint police force has yet been created.

So far, the absence of a strong and unequivocal political condemnation of ETA’s intolerable methods by Portugal was nothing more than realpolitik: ETA is a Spanish problem and Portugal did not want to make it its own. However, by using Portuguese territory in such
The resumption of policing responsibilities by the Polícia Nacional de Timor Leste (PNLT) was always one of the objectives of the security sector reform (SSR) process in Timor Leste, carried out by the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT).

The Timorese position concerning a significant role of the international community in the SSR process became more inflexible with the constitution passed by the Aliança para a Maioria Parlamentar (AMP), in August 2007, which, from the start, revealed its intent to regain control of the SSR. Thus, José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão’s government refused to sign a Supplemental Arrangement agreement with UNMIT and instead chose to present its own SSR program.

Since then, the government has adopted several measures with the aim of compromising UNMIT’s reform of the PNLT and assuming leadership of the process. For example, the government frequently ignores the results of the certification process of the police, considering officers able to re-enter service who have not been certified by UNMIT.

These actions are in keeping with the attitude of a part of the Timorese political elite that argues that the only way for the country to progress is by making a clean slate of its troubled past. In other words, they wish to ignore the crimes committed against the population during the Indonesian occupation and the 2006 crisis. Thus, several presidential amnesties have been granted to members of the security forces and to individuals close to the political power accused of the crimes. This policy caused a schism in the political elite of the country between those who argue in favor of the concession of amnesties and those who prefer to use transitional justice mechanisms, like those recommended by the "Chegal!" truth commission report.

Instead of helping the national reconciliation process, the amnesties might in fact hinder it. By continuing to be filled with individuals responsible for crimes committed with impunity, the security forces tend to be viewed by the population as a source of threats and not as legitimate agents in the pacification and reconstruction of Timor Leste.

With the objective of further placing the SSR under governmental control, the Prime Minister fused the Defence and Security Ministries into one Defence and Internal Security Ministry, in which he holds office. This change, he argues, is intended to optimize the SSR coordination by placing both the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) and the PNLT under a single authority. Although this initiative might indeed promote the coordination of the SSR activities, it also raises the danger of increasing the politicization of the security sector. Another potentially negative effect of this subordination to a single authority is that it further blurs the distinction between the two security forces.

The legislation drafted during 2009 for the security sector (the National Security Law, the National Defence Law, the Internal Security Law, and the organic law for the PNLT) instead of clearly defining the distinction between the F-FDTL and the PNLT in terms of their respective responsibilities aims to create an “integrated national security system”.

These policies, although they have the potential to solve the lack of coordination and coherence that affected UNMIT’s SSR, do not appear able to remedy the deeper problems of Timor Leste’s security sector. The 2006 petitioners’ crisis had several causes, such as the charges of discrimination between lorumonu (westerners) and lorosae (easterners), the climate of impunity in the security forces, the lack of a clear division of responsibilities between the PNLT and the F-FDTL, and the politicization of the security forces, which led to their fragmentation along political lines.

The new security sector policies do not seem to be able to respond to these deeper problems. There is no indication of measures to alleviate the discrimination between lorosae and lorumonu, the national reconciliation process continues to be crippled by the constant amnesties, there is a growing subordination of the PNLT to the F-FDTL, and the politicization of the security sector has not ended.

In conclusion, neither UNMIT nor the government seems to be able to solve the problems presented by SSR.
and neither seems capable of changing this in the near future. To do so would imply more adaptability from UNMIT and a change of attitude from the Timorese leadership. Only when these two shifts occur can the depoliticization of the security sector and the end of the impunity among the security forces be achieved.

The facts above show beyond doubt that the Lusophone countries lack a concerted strategy in order to guarantee as much continuous representation as possible in the Security Council. Otherwise multiple-representation would have been avoided. At first glance, it might seem that there is some strong argument against diplomatic coordination. Perhaps, one might think, Brazil’s campaign for a permanent Security Council seat would be weakened by doing so. How exactly coordination would do so is a question that remains unanswered. Moreover, with a concerted strategy, it would continue to be possible for Brazil – like other countries campaigning for a permanent seat – to maintain its goal of seeking a non-permanent mandate every five or six years. Thus, the reason why a concerted strategy is missing is an unresolved puzzle, since all Lusophone countries would benefit from it. Rather than a zero-sum game, coordination would result in a non-zero-sum game, in this case benefiting all parties, despite their differences, well beyond their respective transaction costs.

Unlike the Security Council permanent member states – the Permanent Five or P5 – the non-permanent members do not hold veto power. Even so, being a non-permanent member is a source of international prestige and power. Thus, winning a non-permanent seat in the Security Council is a source of pride and status for the office holder, as well as for the other Lusophone countries if it is known that they acted together to guarantee that result. Moreover, besides prestige and status, continuous representation in the Security Council by the Lusophone countries also would be a real source of power. Not just soft power, but also hard power, using Joseph Nye’s distinction. First of all, it would permit greater efforts to safeguard their national interests in the Security Council. After all, having a continuous seat at the table would guarantee that their voice is not only better heard, but also heard all the time. In other words, each one of the Lusophone countries would have always a sympathetic voice in the Security Council willing to advocate for their collective interests.

Second, countries with a continuous presence in the Security Council receive more phone calls than those not at the table. In other words, the Lusophone countries would have an improved capacity to bargain within the United Nations universe, as well as with third parties, in order to guarantee for them the outputs desired.

Third, a continuous Lusophone presence in the Security Council reinforces their resources of power elsewhere. Portugal would be more relevant player in Europe, Brazil in Latin America, Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa, and so on. Thus, the issue of coordination should be raised and, if possible, the strategy should be adopted at the upcoming summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), which will take place this year. In the first place, Angola, Brazil and Portugal should coordinate their Security Council bids and set a clear timetable for candidacies in order to avoid redundancies. Equally important, Angola and Mozambique should be induced to run more often. Angola has been on the Security Council just once and is an increasingly important state in Africa, as well as within the international community. Therefore, a more regular presence in the Security Council would be the logical outcome. And Mozambique has never bid for a non-permanent seat Security Council, although other less influential African states have already held such a seat in the past. In short, there is no reason why both countries should not have a more regular presence in the Security Council.

Adlai E. Stevenson, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in the 1960’s, once said that “the whole basis of the United Nations is the right of all nations – great or small – to have weight, to have a vote, to be attended to”. Today, as before, his words remain true. In light of this, despite
their asymmetries, the Lusophone countries should push forward with a grand strategy aiming at guaranteeing as much continuous representation in the Security Council as possible in order to ensure their mutual benefit.

Lusophone countries ready to accept Obiang dictatorship

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Contrary to the Commonwealth (54 member states) and La Francophonie (56 member states), which include countries whose official language is not the language of the former colonial power, for membership of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) Portuguese as official language is a prerequisite sine qua non. Therefore, when in 2002 Timor Leste became the CPLP’s eighth member, the Lusophone community seemed complete. However, this has changed since Spanish-speaking Equatorial Guinea has appeared on the scene. In 2004 President Teodoro ObiangNguema participated as guest of honour in the fifth CPLP Summit in São Tomé and declared his country’s intention to join the CPLP. Subsequently the CPLP created the hitherto nonexistent status of associated observer, which was unanimously conceded to Equatorial Guinea in 2006. In June 2008 President Obiang attended the seventh CPLP Summit in Lisbon. The CPLP expects to admit the country as a full member state at the forthcoming summit in Luanda this year, provided that the Obiang regime declares Portuguese as Equatorial Guinea’s third official language. In early 2009 Lisbon promised the Obiang regime support for the teaching of Portuguese in his country. Nevertheless, the introduction of Portuguese in Equatorial Guinea is as arbitrary as that of French in 1998, since both languages are not actually spoken in the country. The imposition of Portuguese as official language in Equatorial Guinea is as bizarre as if Guinea-Bissau’s President Malam Bâcai Sanhã suddenly decreed Spanish to be his country’s official language.

Both the Obiang regime and the CPLP have claimed historical ties with Equatorial Guinea to justify the membership, since formally the territory belonged to Portugal until 1778 when it was ceded to Spain. However, in the preceding 300-year period, only the tiny island of Annobón (17 km²) was colonized by Portugal. In the early 16th century it was settled with African slaves from neighbouring São Tomé. Therefore, Fá d’Ambô, the language spoken by Annobón’s 2,000 inhabitants, is a Portuguese-based Creole language similar to the Creole of São Tomé. Actually, Equatorial Guinea has many more historical affinities with the Commonwealth. The capital, Malabo, was founded in 1827 as a naval base called Port Clarence by the British to combat the slave trade. Today, with at least 70,000 speakers, the second African language spoken in Equatorial Guinea is Pichinglis, an English-based Creole language closely related to Krio, which arrived with African settlers from Freetown in Sierra Leone during the British presence in Fernando Po that ended in 1858 when Spanish colonization began.

In the mid 1990’s, Equatorial Guinea has become the third-largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, currently with a per capita GDP on par with Spain. However, despite the oil wealth, 77% of the population has remained below the poverty line. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, “the government of Equatorial Guinea has not only failed to curb the endemic corruption, but it has also consistently mismanaged its oil revenue wealth”. Besides, “the government has made some very limited progress on civil and political rights in the past decade”.

Despite its notoriously repressive and corrupt regime, Equatorial Guinea’s future CPLP membership has not been questioned by any political party in Portugal or any other member state, something which would likely occur in the Commonwealth, a sign either of the CPLP’s immaturity, or a need for firmer principles.
Brazil and the CPLP: Discourse and practice

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Introduction
In the last week of September 2008, Brazil established the orthography agreement which standardized the use of language among Portuguese speaking countries. A few days later, Petrobrás lost a bid to Marathon Oil for the extraction of oil in Angola. In mid October, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva complained in Mozambique that the construction of a anti-AIDS pharmaceutical, promised since 2003, was still not under way. In the first instance, the project had been under negotiation for a long time, running into difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic despite being agreed upon in principle since December 1990. According to the former Portuguese ambassador to Brazil, Francisco Seixas da Costa, this linguistic agreement is strategic, because a common writing form would allow the Portuguese language to be internationally recognized. In the second case, the loss was attributed to the greater efficiency of policies implemented by the Chinese government in Africa, even though its presence in that part of the world is more recent than Brazilian presence in Portuguese speaking countries, as well as in other important states such as Nigeria, Senegal, etc. In the third example, fault lies with Brazilian agencies which, after five years of promises, have yet to dispense the necessary resources through Congress. These three events are important indicators of the state of the relationship between the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries – Comunidade dos Paises de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) – partners. One refers to cultural aspects, another to economic interests, and the last to difficulties in implementing agreements.

Prioritizing any of these aspects - such as cultural and linguistic identification - does not necessarily translate into economic and financial advantages. In the Brazilian case, the country’s relationship with its partners has not always been, and perhaps never was, based on obtaining immediate profit.

In broad terms, Brazilian foreign relations may amount to two different kinds of results: there are instances where returns are expected after a certain amount of time, as a result of bilateral and multilateral exchanges; in others, little or nothing is expected in return from Brazil’s partners and organizations, but continued support is demanded, especially when other factors such as historical, cultural, and emphatic links are present. Due to diverse affinities, Portuguese speaking countries have always figured prominently in the agenda of the Itamaraty, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations, although seldom as a high priority. In recent decades, as the bonds between Brazil and Portugal were strengthened during the Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira, Jânio da Silva Quadros and Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco administrations, the possibility of forming a Portuguese-African-Brazilian community was suggested. Along with Ernesto Geisel’s “responsible pragmatism”, the recognition of Angola and Mozambique’s independence in 1975 was a step forward in developing ties with these countries. Similar situations occurred afterwards with José Sarney, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when the CPLP was created.

It must not be assumed, however, that the attention given to these countries by Brazil is similar to that afforded Argentina, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom or France, as well as other emerging powers such as China, Russia, India and South Africa. In spite of the rhetoric of brotherly ties between countries united by History, interactions between Brazil and the CPLP are far from what could be considered privileged relations. In Africa, Brazilian preferences lay in South Africa, Angola and Nigeria. They are the so-called privileged partnerships of this part of the world.

The significance of the CPLP for Brazil
When the CPLP was formed, the Brazilian government showed enthusiasm for the initiative. It recognized the need to create a greater space for these countries: despite having different identities, they have little chance of success when acting individually, especially without Brazilian support.

The efforts made by Brazil’s former Minister of Culture and former ambassador to Portugal, José Aparecido de Oliveira, are widely recognized as being essential in the implementation of the project. In various forums, he re-
peatedly referred to the initiatives for the creation of the CPLP as a mission handed down to him by the government, and his endeavor was crowned with success by the time he left his post in Lisbon. But Oliveira also had reservations about how the Itamaraty behaved towards other Portuguese speaking countries, specifically in its handling of the severe problems plaguing Timor Leste. In addition, he criticized certain sectors of the Ministry's bureaucracy, which he perceived as being petulant. However, the involvement and criticism by former ambassador Oliveira should be considered with caution. Firstly, the main reason Oliveira was invited to occupy the post in Lisbon was because he maintained close ties with then-President Itamar Franco, who was also from the state of Minas Gerais as well as from the same political party. Secondly, Itamar Franco was also nominated to the same embassy in Lisbon as soon as he left the Presidency. As both men did not belong to the diplomatic corps, they fell victim to the Itamaraty's bias against nominating politicians to represent and speak on behalf of the country (a practice nowadays abolished), even in less significant diplomatic posts outside the main international circles, but especially in Europe. 

It is therefore easy to understand why there was little receptiveness by the Itamaraty to Oliveira and Franco's initiatives, the latter being perceived as lacking the ambassadorial skills necessary to hold such a post (first in Lisbon, then in Washington at the Organization of American States). In contrast, the Itamaraty considered that small, oppressed countries like Timor Leste were not worth greater investment, since returns would in the end be modest. Of course, Brazil's diplomatic rhetoric maintained that these countries were important, and should be considered for cultural, scientific and educational agreements, but with limited resources. By the time it was created, the CPLP was already stumbling. Although it was formalized during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government on 17 July 1996, and was the result of a long maturation process that began with the 1989 meeting in São Luis, Maranhão, the reality is that Brazilian foreign policy clearly privileged other areas, affording little space on its foreign relations agenda to secondary countries in the world system. Despite this, the CPLP assumed significant importance in the Chancellery's discourse. This is clear, for example, in the reception offered in Lisbon on 4 December 1996 by Jaime Gama, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the organization's first anniversary on 17 July 1997, at the opening of the CPLP's Ministerial Conference in Salvador da Bahia. At both events, the Brazilian diplomats stated that the CPLP would occupy a position in Brazilian foreign policy matching its special importance, and it would be a force capable of defending, on the basis of consensus, the Lusophone world's common interests. Yet it is the divergence of interests between Portuguese speaking countries – aside from the common goal of promoting Portuguese as an official language within the United Nations – that stands out in the international arena. Each country has always acted in its own manner according to its individual priorities. This led to the modest efforts by Brazil and Portugal to build up the CPLP, unmasked as mere façades by Mário Soares years later. In fact, it is common in official speeches and academic publications about the CPLP to mention the fact that its members belong simultaneously to various multinational organizations, thus making it possible to broaden the interests of this community. However, this potential does not necessarily translate into concrete actions. At the opening of the United Nations' working session in September 1996, the Brazilian representative highlighted the existence (and limits) of the CPLP, saying it was the first time the entity was represented in this forum, with the objective of both promoting common interests and projecting the linguistic, cultural and historic identity uniting its members. Besides this, nothing else was present.
The reality is that Brazilian foreign policy clearly privileged other areas, affording little space on its foreign relations agenda to secondary countries in the world system.

The following year, the only mention of the CPLP concerned Angola: it was stated that “Brazil, in the exercise of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries’ presidency, appeals to the international community, and particularly to the Security Council members, to exert greater and severe vigilance on the peace process in Angola”.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luiz Felipe Lampreia made three other speeches at the United Nations’ opening sessions. In 1998 and 1999, he still referred to Angola and Timor Leste, and indirectly to the CPLP. In his last speech, he mentioned both countries, but in different terms: concerning Timor Leste, he said a new state was emerging under the leadership of envoy Sérgio Vieira de Mello; when speaking on Angola, he denounced the existing persistent conflict, objecting to the “unacceptable resistance by UNITA in obeying international decisions and rights”. In this final year, the CPLP disappeared completely from his speech.

In the last two United Nations General Assembly sessions under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s mandate, the CPLP definitely lost its place. The President himself was present and made the opening speech in 2001, referring very briefly to Timor Leste, while in 2002, the new head of the Itamaraty, Celso Lafer, only mentioned Angola in passing.

Aside from the mentions above, Luiz Felipe Lampreia and Celso Lafer completely neglected the CPLP during their administrations as Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Itamar Franco government, had a keen sense of the international context at the time. In at least two speeches, he mentioned how he understood this changing world to be: globalized, interdependent, but competitive. In the first speech in New Delhi in January 1996 - the same year the CPLP was created - he emphasized that this new context “has generated extreme competition among countries – in particular those who are developing – for foreign investment”. A month later he repeated the same arguments at the Colegio de Mexico.

President Cardoso considered India, South Africa, China and others players of a similar profile to be developing countries capable of opposing larger countries. It was the start of what would later be called selective partnership: a system where countries with little expression or capacity to transform the world, because they did not serve the needs of Brazilian foreign policy in terms of power projection, were automatically excluded.

For this reason the Portuguese speaking nations did not figure into Brazilian priorities. This was hardly unusual. In a context completely distinct from that which marked the world for generations, the government understood that it should take a different approach in dealing with a post-Cold War world.

In this new world, there was space for countries such as Brazil, seen as an emerging power. And from there, the understanding that in this multilateral context, only few would be called upon to play relevant roles.

If Itamar Franco held Portuguese speaking countries in high consideration, it was not a trend followed by Fernando Henrique Cardoso. That is why the great world powers, the emerging nations, and MERCOSUL – due to its particularities and geographic proximity – became priorities.

In the current administration, the visits by Lula da Silva to Africa have demonstrated that it is possible to balance interests, not abandoning those countries which could offer Brazil little in immediate returns. The creation of 35 new diplomatic missions during the Lula da Silva government, 15 of them being in Africa, clearly demonstrates how important Brazil considers relations with developing countries. Even in the Southern Cone, the Brazilian government has maintained what in diplomatic jargon has been conventionally called “strategic patience”, especially with Argentina.

The attention granted to African and CPLP countries is apparent in a few instances throughout the last few years. For the fifth meeting of the organization in São Tomé and Príncipe at the end of July 2004, the Brazilian government financed the event, donating US$500 thousand, as well as providing the necessary communication infrastructure and information technology equipment, which later remained there. At the seventh summit in July 2008 in Lisbon, the importance of bolstering the International Institute for Portuguese Language was emphasized with the goal of standardizing the Portuguese language in mind. On this occasion, the Brazilian government promised efforts and highlighted the importance of this objective. Other evidence of shifting foreign policy priorities includes the Brazilian initiative of proposing MERCOSUL agreements – having already obtained guarantees from its partners in that organization – with the CPLP and ex-
including Portugal, in order to favor economic exchanges and facilitate the importation of products. In this context, Brazil’s concern with the CPLP during the Lula da Silva government has matched the country’s historical conduct, which privileges cooperation over conflict. The attention granted to organizations such as this one has its own special significance, but is relative and proportional to the attention granted to the CPLP on the international scene. Brazil behaves in this tempered way with the CPLP as an institution, as well as with the countries that are part of it. The CPLP must be seen as a group which can support Brazilian aspirations on a broader level. It should never be forgotten that within the CPLP group, Brazil is the partner with the greatest international projection, capacity and aspirations. The presence of Brazil within the organization can be analyzed under two perspectives: on the one hand, it is a way of projecting Brazilian interests, an “instrumentalization” of Brazilian foreign policy aimed at maximizing all its resources and enlarging its capacity to interact with the nations which “command the world”; it is possible, on the other hand, to infer that in spite of this foreign policy “pragmatism”, Brazil also works alongside the CPLP to fulfill global objectives, otherwise difficult to reach individually by any one of the member countries.

Final remarks
Implicit and explicit collaboration has been offered to countries with which Brazil identifies itself historically and affectively, be it by common bonds of language, or because of the ethnic composition of the Brazilian population. As a result, and even before the formalization of the CPLP, attention had been given to the Portuguese Speaking African Countries – Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP). Brazil has always conscious of the fact that along with Portugal on a smaller scale, it is in favorable conditions and can make significant advances towards helping other PALOP members. On the other hand, Brazil is concerned with Africa as a whole, not only because of PALOP and the CPLP, but due to interests directed at countries rich in natural resources and with great markets such as Angola, Nigeria and South Africa, among the more important ones. Brazilian expectations with regard to the CPLP appear to be restricted to cultural aspects, hence the great number of programs in these areas. The economic and strategic returns are relatively small, and therefore should not be considered as the true motivating force behind Brazil’s foreign policy regarding the CPLP. By operating alongside the CPLP countries, and thanks to the fact that its members belong to various other international organizations, Brazil can broaden its influence and scope of action, thus indirectly obtaining results. In adapting to the new context, Brazil’s foreign policy has, sometimes erratically, done nothing more than give continuity to a course of action which aims at improving its international standing, interacting with all actors, both great and secondary powers, by prioritizing one or the other according to circumstance and convenience.

In the current administration, the visits by Lula da Silva to Africa have demonstrated that it is possible to balance interests, not abandoning those countries which could offer Brazil little in immediate returns. In general, the current Brazilian government takes an antiquated “third-worldist” approach to Southern Hemisphere countries that is incompatible with international expectations. There has been much rhetoric, but relatively little effect in terms of global power relations. The government has routinely used a conciliatory discourse, both trying to act beyond its areas of competence, and spreading its influence far from its territory. By trying to behave as an important agent of the international system, it incurs heavy costs without reaching the desired outcomes: the most important issues on the world agenda, which reveal the true capabilities of world powers, – such as conflict in the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear ambitions – are well beyond its real capacity to intervene, be it by acting as an arbiter, helping the countries involved, altering the current situation, or dictating norms of conduct. Brazil’s foreign policy establishment has likewise run into internal problems, among them disagreements between those responsible for decisions in distinct spheres, or close to the Presidency. These differences of opinion have been observed when an actor close to the President takes up a position later reformulated by the Itamaraty in an attempt to clarify its position on an issue or define the country’s position in international arenas. There have been a number of cases in which President Lula da Silva has expressed opinions concerning international themes and realities he does not have sufficient knowledge of. At other times, the Foreign Relations Minister himself has disappointed in his choices and actions. Of course, these choices also depend on the project envisioned by the group in power, both for itself and for
the country. In this manner, the decisions made by the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso were distinct from those taken by his successor, especially concerning the importance of the role played by smaller, less influential countries.

If decisions made by Fernando Henrique Cardoso were criticized, his successor suffered equal criticism on issues such as forgiving debt in Latin American and African countries and recognizing China as a market economy, while not receiving anything in exchange for such generosity. Other high-profile incidents in the country include suffering losses when running for high posts in the World Trade Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Labor Organization, or making dubious choices, such as supporting the defeated candidate to head UNESCO, receiving the President of Iran, or disputing influences in Haiti.

The great powers allow little space for other actors to participate in great international decisions, integrating themselves in a group that truly determines the political, economic and military-strategic trends in the world. Brazil intends to become a part of this highly selective circle of countries, and despite not yet possessing many of the necessary capabilities to join such a group, it will tenaciously continue to pursue this goal.
Timeline of Events

Angola

1 February (Luanda): The French Ambassador to Angola, Francis Blondet, announced that Interpol issued warrants for the arrest of the attackers who targeted the Togo football team in early January. The ambassador briefed Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma on the measures taken by the French government after the Cabinda incident.

2 February (London): Angola’s US$4 billion bond sale is expected to perform poorly, selling only one quarter to half of its total, after it received weak ratings from international agencies.

3 February (Luanda): The Constitutional Commission approved Angola’s new Constitution after amending some articles in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s recommendations. One of the changes implemented was the necessity of including in the legislative elections’ ballot papers the name and image of the party’s leader, who, in case of the party’s victory, becomes President.

3 February (Luanda): After returning from Addis Ababa where he represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the 14th Summit of the African Union, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, known as “Nandó”, was appointed as the country’s first Vice-President. Former Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma was appointed Speaker.

3 February (Luanda): Completing his cabinet appointments, President José Eduardo dos Santos named Carlos Alberto Morais as the country’s Finance Minister, Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos, Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos and Economy Minister Manuel Nunes Júnior kept their posts. Bornito de Sousa, former head of the Constitutional Commission, is now Territorial Administration Minister. Both Carlos Feijo, head of the President’s Civil Staff, and Gen. Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Jr., known as “Kopelipa”, were appointed Ministers of State.

4 February (M’banza Congo): Angola’s Social Welfare Minister, João Batista Kussumua, chaired the main events celebrating the 40th anniversary of the national armed liberation struggle in Angola, the first in a Portuguese colony, which had immediate consequences for the downfall of São João da Ajudá, Diu, Damão and Goa, and later on the other Portuguese African possessions.

5 February (Luanda): After the passage of the new Constitution, President José Eduardo dos Santos announced that general elections will be held in 2012, when the current Parliament’s mandate ends.

10 February (Luanda): UNITA’s leader, Isaías Samakuva, justified his party absence from the Constitutional vote as a protest against a “coup”. He appealed to Angolans not to give up on democracy.

12 February (Luanda): After swearing in the government, President José Eduardo dos Santos presided over the first cabinet meeting. The 2010 State Budget was discussed, as well as the contract between the government and Ernst & Young, an international consultancy. The firm will assist the government in improving financial management in the Central Bank and the Credit and Saving Banks. The President also announced he would pass a new law against corruption and embezzlement.

14 February (Luanda): Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos announced that Angola and Congo created common mechanisms to fight terrorism. These measures are intended to address the Cabinda rebel cells operating in both countries.

16 February (Luanda): An International Troika on the Great Lakes delegation – composed of US, EU and AU officials – met Assunção dos Anjos to discuss the role Angola can play in diffusing tension in the eastern DRC.

16-18 February (Cabinda): The MPLA presented its 2010 political agenda in Cabinda, the province that saw a rebel attack against Togo’s national football team bus in January. The discourse against corruption was prominent, as well as the announcement of a US$350 million credit line to spur agricultural development.

18 February (Luanda): Angola’s Public Prosecutor, João Maria de Sousa, announced that, so far, 18 people have been detained in a €74 million embezzlement case in the country’s National Bank. The majority of the detainees are low-level officials and most of the public funds have been retrieved.

18 February (São Paulo): Brazilian oil company Petrobrás announced it found oil in two wells off Angola’s coast. Italy’s ENI also announced two other findings.

22 February (Luanda): Eight years have passed by since the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA’s founder and historical leader. Justino Pinto de Andrade, a leading university professor and political commentator, postulated that while UNITA did transform itself from a rebel group into a political party, like any other political organization, “it can disappear”. Eduardo Chingunji, a former UNITA member and a Savimbi supporter said he considers UNITA today to be “fragmented and without vision”.

22-26 February (Luanda): Portuguese Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Valença Pinto visited Angola under a defence cooperation agreement signed between the two countries, which dates back to 1978. The Portuguese officer met his Angolan counterpart, General Francisco Pereira Furtado, the country’s Defence Minister, Cândido Van-Dúnem, and visited the Benguela and Cabinda provinces.

23 February (Luanda): Although it had been previously announced, the government, through the National Housing...
Brazil

2 February (Paris):
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the Global Zero Summit, meant to discuss the phasing out of the world’s nuclear weapons.

3 February (Lisbon):
Brazilian cement maker Votorantim reached a deal to buy a 17.3% stake in its Portuguese counterpart Cimpor.

4 February (Brasília):
After seven months waiting for the U.S. Senate to confirm his appointment due to Democrats’ and Republicans’ differences in Congress, new U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, Thomas Shannon, delivered his credentials to President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva.

4-5 February (Buenos Aires):
Celso Amorim met with Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner to discuss bilateral ties between the countries and an upcoming visit by the Brazilian President. Later, and together with Industry Minister Miguel Jorge and Finance Minister Guido Mantega, Amorim held talks concerning regional trade issues with their Argentinean counterparts.

10 February (Lisbon):
Brazilian conglomerate Camargo Correa reached a deal to buy a 22.17% stake in Portuguese cement maker Cimpor.

10 February (Brasília):
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, alongside State Secretary Gunnar Wieslander, visited Brazil, where they met with representatives of Swedish companies in the country and with Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim. Bilateral cooperation, development in the region and support of Haiti, as well as climate change and the global economic crisis, were among the issues discussed.

11 February (Brasília):
Brazil’s Justice Minister, Tarso Genro, resigned to run for governor of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in the upcoming elections later this year. He was replaced by Luiz Paulo Barreto.

11 February (Brasília):
José Roberto Arruda, governor of the federal district of the capital, Brasília, was arrested accused of taking bribes from companies seeking public works contracts, potentially hurting the right wing’s chances in the general election this year.

11 February (Brasília):
President Lula da Silva held a telephone conversation with his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao on bilateral ties, as well as BRIC cooperation and economic and trade ties.

11 February (Brasilia):
Brazil formalized guidelines for a US$830 million retaliation against U.S. cotton subsidies, granted by a World Trade Organization ruling last year. Possible retaliatory measures include suspension or limitation of intellectual property rights locally to imports from the U.S., and temporary blockage of royalty remittances related to intellectual property.

12 February (Santiago):
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim travelled to Chile to meet with his counterpart, Mariano Fernández, and newly elected President Sebastián Piñera. Commercial links between the two countries were the main topic addressed.

16 February (Madrid):
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the EU-Brazil Ministerial Meeting for Political Dialogue, led by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. Other than bilateral issues, the possibility of signing a trade deal between the EU and Mercosur in May during the next EU-LAC Summit was the main topic in the agenda. Afterwards, Amorim also met with Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith to discuss bilateral ties and coordinate aid efforts in Haiti.

17 February (Lisbon):
Brazilian cement maker Votorantim raised its stake in the Portuguese Cimpor to 21.2%, as it vies with Brazilian rivals for control of the company.

20 February (Brasilia):
President Lula da Silva’s chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, will be the presidential candidate for the left wing Workers’ Party (PT).

22-23 February (Cancun):
President Lula da Silva attended the Rio Group Summit, where proposals to create a new Pan-American organization, without the participation of the U.S. or Canada, were analysed. Lula da Silva also held a meeting with Mexican President Felipe Calderón where possible mutual investments and a free trade agreement between the two countries were addressed.

23 February (Washington):
Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to discuss the ongoing bidding competition to modernize Brazil’s air fleet, in which Boeing is interested.
23 February [Lisbon]:
CSN’s offer to buy 33.3% in Portuguese cement maker Cimpor has failed, receiving only 8.5% of shareholders’ backing.

23 February [Brasília]:
The acting governor of Brasília’s federal district, Paulo Octávio, resigned over a corruption scandal, possibly damaging the campaign of José Serra in the next presidential elections.

23-24 February [Havana]:
President Lula da Silva visited Cuba, where he met with former President Fidel Castro and his current counterpart Raul Castro. Bilateral economic and trade relations were the topics in the agenda.

25 February [Port-au-Prince]:
President Lula da Silva travelled to Haiti to meet with his counterpart, René Préval, to assess the destruction of the recent earthquake and identify the more pressing aid needs, while promising US$100 million in Brazilian assistance.

25-26 February [San Salvador]:
President Lula da Silva visited El Salvador where he met with President Mauricio Funes and signed a series of agreements concerning economic, agricultural, health and development issues.

26 February [Rio de Janeiro]:
An American aircraft carrier, the USS Carl Vinson arrived in Brazil as part of a public relations campaign to win a multi-billion-dollar contract to supply Brazil’s air force with F/A-18 Super Hornet jet fighters.

Cape Verde

5 February [Luanda]:
At the end of his one-week visit to Angola, Cape Verdean Minister of Environment, Rural Development and Marine Resources, José Maria Veiga, announced that his country was interested in cooperating with Angola on coastal management and production of environmental legislation.

11 February [Havana]:
Cape Verde’s Parliament President, Aristides Raimundo Lima, visited Cuba, where he met his counterpart, Ricardo Alarcón, and the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, Ricardo Cabrisas. Bilateral ties, the training of specialized personnel in the tourism sector, the struggle against poverty and unemployment and the pursuit of sustainable development were the topics addressed.

Guinea-Bissau

2 February [Paris]:
President Malam Bacai Sanhá remained in a Paris hospital after undergoing further medical exams, thus missing the 14th Summit of the African Union.

2 February [Bissau]:
Former Public Order State Secretary Mamadu Saico Djaló was formally accused in a trial involving the disappearance of 674kg of cocaine from the Public Exchequer vaults in 2006.

2 February [Bissau]:
Joseph Mutaboba, head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), stated that 2010 will be a “critical year for the UN in Guinea-Bissau” and that the organization’s bodies will need to implement a common strategy in the country to assist it in strengthening stability and economic development.

5 February [Bissau]:
Parliament requested former Prime Minister Aristides Gomes, who has been living in Senegal since President João “Nino” Vieira was assassinated in March 2009, to answer before a Committee over the 2006 missing cocaine case. Aristides Gomes said he already contributed to investigations at the time and that he would only return to Guinea-Bissau under protection.

7 February [Bissau]:
After visiting Mauritania, Portuguese Secretary of State for Portuguese Communities Abroad, António Braga, visited Bissau to discuss bilateral relations and to gather votes in order to gain a seat in the UN Security Council for 2011-2012. Bissau-Guinean officials affirmed that they would support the Portuguese bid.

8 February [New York]:
Maria Luísa Viotti, the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, announced the mission’s conclusions to the UN. She stated that some slow has been made in the political and economic aspects of the country’s recovery, but still there is a need to enact SSR legislation and improve conditions to foster private investment. Guinea-Bissau’s Foreign Minister, Adelino Mano Queta, affirmed that his country has been improving, but urged continued support. The Peacebuilding Commission approved draft conclusions and recommendations.

9 February [Bissau]:
President Malam Bacai Sanhá returned from Paris where he received further medical treatment. No details were given on his condition.

11 February [Lisbon]:
Judiciary Police Director Lucinda Barbosa reported that investigations of the March 2009
assassinations of Nino Vieira and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Tagmé Na Waé are evolving positively thanks to cooperation with the Portuguese Judiciary Police and the North-American FBI. However, the key witness, Nino Vieira’s wife, has not yet been interrogated.

11 February (Bissau):
Former President and defeated 2010 presidential candidate Kumba Yala will join the Presidential State Council after being appointed by President Malam Bacai Sanhá.

16 February (Bissau):
President Malam Bacai Sanhá sacked Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Óscar António Barbosa and Minister of Agriculture Carlos Mussa Balde. Higino Lopes Cardoso, the National Electoral Commission chairman, was appointed for the former post and Barros Banjai Bacar to the latter. These moves came after Kumba Yala’s party, the Partido da Renovação Social, suspended relations with the government and accused Óscar António Barbosa of diverting state funds.

16 February (Bissau):
The EU declared it will direct €20 million to combat drug trafficking in West African countries. This move followed announcements by those countries, including Guinea-Bissau, that they would strengthen the “war on drugs”.

17 February (Bissau):
Spain announced it will support Guinea-Bissau’s budget with €1.5 million in aid. This support will help the country to repay some debts. Spain also stated it would pardon 50% of Guinea-Bissau’s debt.

17-18 February (Lisbon):
Initially scheduled for December, President Malam Bacai Sanhá’s official visit to Portugal was centred on attracting Portuguese private investments to his country. The President heralded the political and economic stability in his country, a message he also transmitted in meetings with his Portuguese counterpart, Cavaco Silva, Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates and the Parliament Speaker, Jaime Gama.

19 February (Bissau):
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior received the EU’s representative, Franco Nulli, to discuss the holding of a donor’s round table. The government wanted it to take place by April, yet the EU prefers to postpone it to guarantee the attainment of tangible results.

19 February (Bissau):
After meeting the Prime Minister, UN’s representative in the country, Joseph Mutaboba, confirmed that former Navy Chief of Staff Bubo Na Tchuto remains in the UN’s office. Mutaboba stated his organization’s role in this case is only to be a facilitator.

20 February (Bissau):
Following rumours of internal instabilities affecting the higher military hierarchy, Guinea-Bissau’s High Military Council issued a statement reaffirming that the Armed Forces are alert against any internal or external factors that may jeopardize the country’s stability, whilst it advocates coordinated efforts to guarantee a successful SSR within a democratic regime.

24 February (New York):
The UN’s International Narcotics Control Board released its annual report, where it once again points out Guinea-Bissau as a major drug traffic hub between Latin America and Europe.

26 February (Praia):
Guinea-Bissau adopted a national plan of action for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, which supports increased participation of women in decision-making, in national and regional peace consolidation mechanisms, in UN peace operations, in ongoing political processes and the peace consolidation agenda in the country, and in political affairs.

4 February (Washington):
The World Bank approved a US$80 million dollar loan to Mozambique to help implement the government’s programme for energy access and development.

10 February (Maputo):
A study done by MISA-Mozambique on behalf of UNESCO on the landscape of media development in Mozambique concluded that although the country possesses a political and legal framework that is generally favorable to freedom of expression, constraints still persist in the practical application of media-friendly laws and policies.

11 February (Maputo):
Daviz Simango, the leader of the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM), the country’s third largest political party, has dissolved the MDM Political Commission less than a year after it was set up.

15 February (Maputo):
Mozambican Prime Minister Aires Ali received representatives of a coalition of tiny extra-parliamentary opposition parties, calling themselves the “G-12”, who urged him to adopt a policy of austerity to guarantee resources for key sectors for the country’s defence and development.

16 February (Maputo):
Fiónna Hal, head of the European Union election observer mission, released a final report praising the organisation of the October elections in Mozambique, but condemning serious incidents of fraud, notably the significant number of polling stations that claimed an impossibly high turnout.

21-22 February (Maseru):
Mozambican President Armando Guebuza chaired a SADC security and defence meeting, aiming at resolving the political crisis ongoing in Lesotho.

25 February (Lisbon):
Portuguese State Secretary for Treasury and Finance Carlos Costa Pina announced that his government approved the creation of a US$124 million fund to support investment in Mozambique, in the context of negotiations to deliver control of Cahora Bassa dam to Mozambique.

27 February (Maputo):
Former Transport Minister Antonio Munguam-
be, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his involvement in the theft of nearly US$2 million in the country’s biggest corruption case to go to trial.

Portugal

3–4 February (N’Djamena):
Foreign Minister Luís Amado travelled to Chad, where he met with his counterpart, Moussa Faki, and President Idriss Déby. Bilateral relations, including aeronautical cooperation, assessment of the situation in Darfur and the results of the EU-Africa Summit in 2007 were amongst the issues addressed. Amado also met with the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to the country, Victor Ângelo, and visited the peacekeeping forces and a refugee camp, both in Eastern Chad.

4–5 February (Bamako):
Luís Amado travelled to Mali to meet with his counterpart, Moctar Ouane, and President Amadou Toumani Touré, in order to reactivate existing bilateral protocols involving cooperation and tourism. Regional integration and EU-Mali relations were also addressed.

4–5 February (Istanbul):
Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the informal meeting of NATO’s Defense Ministers.

5 February (Ougadougou):
Foreign Minister Luís Amado travelled to Burkina Faso, aiming at strengthening bilateral relations in meetings with his counterpart, Youssef Ouédraogo, and President Blaise Compaoré. EU-Burkina Faso relations and regional integration were also addressed.

5 February (Óbidos):
Portuguese police seized several tons of explosives, together with bomb-making equipment at a house, supposedly being used as a base by Basque separatist group ETA.

8 February (Dakar):
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho travelled to Senegal to hold meetings with his counterpart, Said Djinnit, Minister for Foreign Affairs Maitre Madické Niang and President Abdoulaye Wade. Both parties signed a Memorandum of Cooperation and a Cultural Agreement.

8 February (Berlin):
Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie travelled to Berlin to meet with Germany’s Minister of State Werner Hoyer and Secretary of State for European Affairs Wolf-Ruthart Born. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the upcoming issues of the next European Council meeting were the main topics addressed.

8 February (Maputo):
Secretary of State for Treasury and Finances Carlos Costa Pina announced, at the end of his 3-day-visit to Mozambique, that Portugal would make available in two months a credit line of €90 million.

10–11 February (Maputo):
Secretary of State João Gomes Cravinho travelled to Maputo to enhance bilateral relations with Mozambique. He also held meetings with Prime Minister Aires Ali, Minister for Foreign Affairs Oldemiro Baloi, Minister for Planning and Development Aíuba Cuereinea, and with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Henrique Alberto Banze.

11 February 2010 (Lisbon):
Portugal’s Parliament passed the general guidelines of the 2010 budget.

11 February (Brussels):
Portugal’s Prime Minister, José Sócrates, attended the EU’s Heads of State and Government Summit. Greece’s economic situation was the main topic. José Sócrates reassured his peers that Portugal’s economic problems were not comparable to Greece.

12 February (Lisbon):
Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze held meetings with the Speaker of the Parliament, Jaime Gama, and his counterpart, Foreign Minister Luís Amado. Bilateral and EU-Georgia relations, as well as NATO and regional issues, were among the topics covered.

14 February (Lisbon):
Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva announced that Portugal would participate in the next European Union Training Mission, designed to help reform Somalia’s security forces.

15 February (Brussels):
The EU’s Finance Ministers reached a decision to appoint Portuguese Central Bank Governor Vítor Constâncio as European Central Bank Vice-President.

18 February (Washington):
The International Monetary Fund declared that Spain and Portugal’s fiscal challenges are not as severe as those faced by Greece, reinforcing the message that Madrid and Lisbon have been delivering to the world’s financial markets.

18 February (Lisbon):
Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his Libyan counterpart, Moussa Koussa, in order to address the recent “visa” crisis, between the African country and the Schengen Zone states.

21–22 February (Brussels):
Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council, where the situations in Haiti, Iran and Niger, as well as recent elections in Ukraine, were assessed. Lourtie also participated in the General Affairs Council, where the preparation of the next European Council was the main topic.

21–23 February (Lisbon):
Moldovan Parliament Speaker and acting President Mihai Ghimpu visited Portugal where he met with Parliament Speaker Jaime Gama, President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado. Bilateral relations and Moldova’s European integration process were the main topics.

22 February (Brussels):
The European Commission authorized Portugal to prolong its guarantee program for banks until the end of June.

23 February (Lisbon):
Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah travelled to Portugal where he met with his Portuguese counterpart, Luís Amado. The discussion topics focused on bilateral relations, EU-GCC relations, energy issues and the Middle East peace process.

23–27 February (Rabat):
Portuguese Parliament Speaker Jaime Gama visited Morocco, where he met with the main opposition leader, Mustapha Mansouri, Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri and Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi.
24-25 February (Palma de Mallorca): Portuguese Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the EU Informal Defense Ministers Gathering, which included a special session with ministers from five Maghreb countries.

26-27 February (Manzini): Foreign Minister, Luís Amado travelled to Swaziland where he met with the local Portuguese community, with his counterpart, Lutfo Dlamini and King Mswati III. Bilateral ties, CPLP relations and regional issues were amongst the main topics of discussion.

28 February (Maseru): Luís Amado visited Lesotho, where he met with local Foreign Minister Mohlabi Kenneth Tsekoa to address bilateral relations and regional issues.

São Tomé and Príncipe

8 February (Lisbon): The Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe, Rafael Branco, during his one-week working visit to Portugal, called for Portuguese oil company Galp Energia to be involved in oil and gas exploration in his country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

18 February (Washington): The U.S.’s Financial Action Task Force issued a report highlighting São Tomé and Príncipe, alongside Pakistan and Turkmenistan, as countries that continue to have deficiencies in their systems for countering money laundering and terror financing, although not with the same gravity as Iran, North Korea, Angola, Ecuador or Ethiopia.

25 February (Luanda): Manuel Vicente, president of Angola’s state-held Sonangol, announced that the oil company is interested in exploiting oil reserves in São Tomé and Príncipe, probably in a joint investment by oil companies from the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, including Brazilian Petrobrás and Portuguese Galp Energia.


13 February (Malé): President José Ramos-Horta visited the Maldives and met with President Mohamed Nasheed and other state dignitaries.

19 February (Lisbon): Timor Leste Foreign Minister, Zacarias da Costa met with his Portuguese counterpart, Luís Amado, and Portuguese President, Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

Reading List

