Lars Rudebeck, Professor of Political Science at the Unit of Development Studies, Uppsala University, works in the field of politics and development with a focus on democratisation. His main concern lies with the transition from anti-colonial liberation movement to juridically independent state power and subsequent post-colonial transformations. He has followed Guinea-Bissau closely since 1970.

In his study of recent developments in Guinea-Bissau, Lars Rudebeck seeks to investigate how democratic rule emerges and functions in real life. His analysis extends far beyond the multi-party system and election procedures as he discusses contrasts in people’s perceptions of democracy. He assesses their access to influential structures, the roles of civil and political society, of the military, and of international assistance and argues that complex power structures need to be addressed if democracy is to be consolidated.
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Art. nr. D 0758
On Democracy’s Sustainability
Transition in Guinea-Bissau

BY LARS RUDEBECK
One of the overriding goals of Swedish development cooperation is to promote democracy and respect for human rights. Today, when Sweden is expanding development cooperation with some West African countries, the focus will to a great extent be on that goal.

What could be more appropriate in such a context than a study of the process of democratisation in Guinea-Bissau – a West African country whose relations with Sweden date back to the days of the struggle for independence? The present study makes an overall assessment of recent political transition in Guinea-Bissau, including the civil and regional war in 1998-1999, in the light of key theoretical discussions on democracy and development. It represents an interest well beyond Guinea-Bissau, as it raises some very central and critical issues regarding the transition of political systems from one-party to multi-party systems and the role of different sections of society in democratic development. It also explores issues of democratic values and the distribution of power.

It would be difficult to find anyone better qualified to analyse and assess developments in Guinea-Bissau in this light than Lars Rudebeck, professor of political science, teacher and researcher in development studies at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. He has followed Guinea-Bissau closely since the early 1970s, using its experience as a case in his research on historical processes of politics and development. This study makes a most valuable contribution to our understanding of the complexity of such processes.

Stockholm on 1 March 2001

Carin Norberg
Head of Department,
Department for Democracy and Social Development
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The Guinea-Bissau experience illustrates crucial issues in democratisation, both generally and in respect of a particular type of ‘developing country’ – an African country, de-colonised through armed struggle, which subsequently, after 1974, went through various phases of socialist-inspired, state-planned development policies under single-party rule until the mid-1980s when the economy began to be liberalised. From around 1990, the political system was also liberalised and democratisation became possible.

The story of recent developments in Guinea-Bissau vividly illustrates the multiple roles of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society as well as of political institutions. It relates the transition to democracy, and the potential for consolidation. The story also describes the dual role of the military as leaders of the democratic struggle and as destabilisers of re-established civilian rule. It illustrates the dual role of international assistance as indispensable in certain situations – while still undermining the autonomy necessary for democratisation and indeed democracy’s very essence. Furthermore, the story illustrates the contrast between local commitment to democratic elections and actual outcome in terms of national policy and the risk that democratic credibility is lost in a continuous deception of those who support the processes of democratisation. Finally, it brings forward democracy as a two-dimensional concept; involving both cultural notions of justice and legal institutions and access to the power that would make the satisfaction of basic material needs possible for the majority of the people.

It is concluded that the distribution of power is a key factor in development. The equalisation of power is furthermore what democratisation is all about. Failure to implement democracy does not primarily occur because people, for cultural reasons, do not want power to be equalised. On the contrary, the explanation will more likely have to be sought in a complex structure of power which makes it excessively hard for Guineans, as well as for people in many other countries, to make their developmental interests heard and seen even within the newly introduced democratic institutions, despite a strong will to do so.

My account of democratisation in Guinea-Bissau indicates that grassroots citizens of that country are indeed eagerly prepared to get involved in the democratic electoral procedure. Many welcome it, as a possible means of controlling their own developmental resources, hoping it will
help them improve their lives. In so doing, they also demonstrate a basic understanding of the meaning of democracy. One major problem, however, is that they run a great risk of being deceived. Urban ‘civil society’ does demonstrate certain vitality. But whatever exists of civil society in the rural areas stands weak in political terms. In this specific respect, the conditions described in the study of one particular village are likely to be highly representative. There are no politically equal structures or organisations that enable the farming population as a whole to stand up autonomously vis-à-vis the state in the rural areas. Using conceptual language introduced by the Ugandan historian and political scientist Mahmood Mamdani, we may say thus that conditions favouring ‘citizenship’ are still much more rare than conditions pressing people into ‘subjection’.

The lack of internal finance naturally aggravates the two problems of government dependence on the military and on international assistance. Had the democratically elected government been able to pay the soldiers’ salaries and pensions, much of the problem of undue military intervention in Guinean politics could well have been quickly resolved. Paying that price, however, is not an easy task for a destitute government, which brings us to the issues of elected leaders’ responsibilities and international assistance. Responsibly offered aid can obviously be constructive in the process of democratisation, particularly in transitional phases. But enduring dependence upon aid stands in stark contradiction to the principles and practice of democracy. The situation is extreme in Guinea-Bissau, where net official development aid received amounted to half of the country’s entire GNP even before the outbreak of war in 1998. In the long run this is not compatible with what is normally meant by democracy. In Guinea-Bissau, however, the newly elected leaders have so far shown few signs in practice of taking innovative measures together with the citizens in preference to counting on international assistance.

Fair elections, carried by considerable popular support, may well create democratic legitimacy, at least for some time. The Guinean case is a good illustration. But ‘democracy’ is not a one-dimensional concept. On the contrary it is full of meaning. As expressed by some villagers, it may even be strong enough to signify the very search for happiness on earth. The abstractions of democratic constitutionalism require for their concrete realisation at least somewhat autonomous citizens, who are able to exercise a measure of meaningful control over decisions in society. It is decisive therefore, whether or not legitimate ways are opened up, as a result of elections, for ordinary people to be able to exert an influence over the use of available resources – among them international assistance – to meet broadly recognised needs.
Introduction

This is a continuation of my studies of the process of democratisation in Guinea-Bissau during the 1990s (Rudebeck 1996, 1997:a, 1997:b1, 2000, 2001:a. Ref. 1). The story and the analysis are now brought up to the end of the year 2000.

From a methodological point of view we are dealing with a case study, implying a twofold purpose: on the one hand to describe and analyse democratisation specifically in Guinea-Bissau, a small West African country with a rich history of its own; but also, on the other hand, to shed light on democratisation as a general process, a theme that touches key conditions and dimensions of human life and has been high on the historical agenda, world-wide, during the last few decades.

A number of issues – or themes – involved in democratisation are dealt with in the text. Foremost among these are the following:

1. Views and definitions of democracy.
2. Control, by whom, over developmental resources.
3. Contrast between local commitment to democratic elections and actual outcome in terms of national policy.
4. The distinction between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society and their respective roles in democratisation.
5. Military versus civilian power in politics.
6. Democratically elected leaders’ responsibilities and the role of international development assistance.

The idea is not to deal exhaustively at a theoretical level with each one of these themes, one by one, but rather to have them illuminated by a focused account of real events in Guinea-Bissau. The story of breakdown into civil and regional war in 1998-1999 and the difficult return to ‘nor-
mality’ by way of democratic elections in 1999-2000 is told in four chapters. In a following chapter, the same story is retold in the perspective of one particular village. In the final chapter, an attempt is then made to sum up what we have learnt under the headings of themes 2-6, while theme 1 is discussed in its own right in chapter 1. The overriding theme is that of democratic sustainability.

The direct foundations of the account stem from three periods of field study in Guinea-Bissau covering over two months in May and November-December 1999 as well as January 2000. The presentation is based upon direct observations; interviews and conversations with key informants, ‘ordinary’ citizens and knowledgeable foreigners; various kinds of official documents originating both in Guinea-Bissau and within international organisations; Guinean, Portuguese and Senegalese newspapers; and the author’s own knowledge based on several decades of earlier research. Background is taken also from other literature. The material used, in particular the written material, is carefully accounted for, both in the text and in a special bibliography. Some factual information and comments are given in notes. Even the presentation and discussion of the sources contribute to giving a picture of actual conditions in Guinea-Bissau and the transition underway in its society.

Most of the present political parties of Guinea-Bissau also existed before 1998/2000 and have thus also been presented in my earlier analyses of democratisation up to 1996. Parts of that material is used here as well. The Guinean political parties do not produce much elaborate written documentation. What does exist is, furthermore, very rarely used in political practice. Therefore both Guinean and Portuguese newspapers are also used as written documentation of the positions of parties and presidential candidates in the elections of 1999 and 2000. The newspapers include declarations by and interviews with party representatives and presidential candidates as well as descriptive and analytical articles.

Besides all the observations and all the written material mentioned above, interviews and close conversations with a great number of insightful people at all kinds of levels and positions within Guinean society have contributed invaluably to my work.

The sources to which I have had access, taken as a whole, are extremely rich and detailed. The material is close to the concrete unfolding

1. A preliminary report was written in Bissau, Dakar and Uppsala in May and June 1999. It was distributed in Swedish in June and in Portuguese in August (Rudebeck 1999, Ref. 1). Work on the present report was begun in Bissau in December 1999 and was finished in early 2001.
2. The 1999 election programmes listed in the bibliography (Ref. iv) existed for instance only in small and difficultly accessible editions, locked up in special rooms and cupboards. Special copies were produced for the benefit of the author.
of a dramatic period in the modern history of Guinea-Bissau. The documents and the oral accounts clearly reflect the vulnerability of a newly won democracy. Still a certain potential for consolidation is also indicated.

A book by Lars Rudebeck in Portuguese, based upon largely the same material as the present study, is published in 2001 by the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, under the title ‘Colapso e Reconstrução Política na Guiné-Bissau 1998-2000. Um Estudo de Democratização Difícil’.
Before turning to the concrete story of events in Guinea-Bissau, some remarks will be given on the underlying views and definitions of the concepts of democracy and democratisation.

The twofold meaning

A fundamental and persisting dilemma in democratic theory springs from the tension between, on the one hand, democracy conceptualised as a form of rule characterised by *universal suffrage, regular elections and basic civil rights* and, on the other hand, democracy conceptualised as *political equality in actual practice*. Modern political scientists push mostly in the former direction, while ordinary citizens all over the world, in thinking and talking about democracy, seem most often to favour the latter type of interpretation.

There are in principle two ways of overcoming the indicated dilemma. Either one relegates issues assumed by many to be essential to democracy, such as social justice and equality in society at large, to the realm of hypothetical empirical prerequisites (or just correlates), conceptually disconnected from democracy ‘as such’; or one holds that democracy can be meaningfully grasped and conceptualised only in the context of its own realisation in actual practice. In accepting without reservations what is often called a minimalist definition of democracy – i.e. a definition limited to the institutional criteria of universal suffrage, regular elections and basic civil rights – the Swedish writer and political scientist Herbert Tingsten (1945. Ref. i), in his political science role, and U.S. political scientist Samuel Huntington (1991. Ref. i) offer illustrative examples of the former position. The Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen (1981. Ref. i) and the British political scientist David Held (1995. Ref. i) offer, on the contrary, in-
interesting examples of the latter position, according to which people’s equal autonomy “in the determination of the conditions of their own lives” (Held 1995, p. 147. Ref. I) is intrinsic to democracy. Sen is known, among other things, for his ‘entitlement’ approach (Sen 1981, pp. 1-8, 45-47) which is conceptually close to Held’s ‘principle of autonomy’.

3. ‘Entitlement’ is another word for legitimate access to resources people need, if they are to be able to act as autonomous citizens. Entitlements, according to Sen (1981, p. 46) “depend on the legal, political, economic and social characteristics of the society in question and the person’s position in it.” This is another way of saying that entitlements depend both on constitutional rules and on social structure.

4. Important original contributions to this predominant approach have been given by, among others, Samuel Huntington (1991. Ref. 1), Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe Schmitter (1986. Ref. 1) and Adam Przeworski (1995. Ref. 1). In a recent book the Swedish political scientist Olle Törnquist (1999. Ref. 1) provides a systematic synthesis and overview of the main analytical approaches to the study of third world politics and development, adding at the end his own original contribution of how to approach the study of democratisation. The approach favoured by Törnquist emphasises the politics of democratisation rather than civil society as such.

My own striving is to conceptualise constitutional issues and issues of popular or citizen sovereignty/autonomy as two distinct but linked dimensions of actually existing democracy and ongoing processes of democratisation. By viewing democracy simultaneously as institutional norms and relations of power — culture as well as structure — I thus follow the second of the two ways indicated (cf. Rudebeck 1998a, pp. 208-211; 2001a; forthcoming 2001c. Ref. 1).

The predominant type of political science literature on the democratisation processes of the nineteen-eighties and -nineties adopts the minimalist position. Democratisation is most often divided into three stages: those of liberalisation, transition and consolidation. Each one of the stages is characterised by its direction of change and the degree to which the minimalist criteria of democracy are entrenched. Politics is made by actors. Society at large is seen as a set of conditions. An illuminating synthesis and evaluation of this literature is given by Shin (1994. Ref. 1).

In an important essay inspired by classical political economy, the political scientist Yusuf Bangura, originally from Sierra Leone, structures the analysis of democratisation somewhat differently, by systematically relating socio-political systems to forms of economic accumulation (1992. Ref. I). According to him as to most others the process of democratisation as such is, most significantly, about the demilitarisation of the state and its institutions and about democratisation of the rules governing economic and political competition. Various forms of economic accumulation, however, have a lot to do with whether this becomes possible or not. Bangura concludes his argument as follows, in a way that is highly relevant to cases such as that of Guinea-Bissau and many others (pp. 99-100):

3. Important original contributions to this predominant approach have been given by, among others, Samuel Huntington (1991. Ref. 1), Guillermo O’Donnell & Philippe Schmitter (1986. Ref. 1) and Adam Przeworski (1995. Ref. 1). In a recent book the Swedish political scientist Olle Törnquist (1999. Ref. 1) provides a systematic synthesis and overview of the main analytical approaches to the study of third world politics and development, adding at the end his own original contribution of how to approach the study of democratisation. The approach favoured by Törnquist emphasises the politics of democratisation rather than civil society as such.
While it (democracy) is an ideal to be cherished, democracy must make sense to the interests of the contending social groups. These interests do not have to be narrowly defined as economic; they can also be social and political. Linking democracy to the restructuring of the economy allows individuals and organizations to pose the question of democratic governance of democratic resources much more sharply.

‘To seek happiness’

In April 1996, I took part in a meeting in the village of Kandjadja in northern Guinea-Bissau, where the participants discussed the importance to them of the newly introduced democratic system (Rudebeck 1996, pp. 1-3; 1997:a, pp. 1-4. Ref. 1). The meeting had been called by the local representative of the African non-governmental organisation RADI (Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré). The discussion was lively, both young and old, men and women, took an active part. An elderly man pointed out that it was difficult to express the concept of democracy in Mandinga, the dominant language around Kandjadja, which the people of that area share with millions of people in West Africa, far beyond the frontiers of Guinea-Bissau. He and the person interpreting for me agreed that the closest they could come in Portuguese and Creole was: “to seek happiness” (“buscar a felicidade”).

“To seek happiness” is a wide definition of democracy. Quite possibly the answer would have been the same, had a definition of development been asked for. But the definition given fits well with the role ‘democracy’ has achieved in our time as a comprehensive concept for ‘the good society’. The thrust of this locally offered definition is universal. In this particular context, I interpret it to be about human dignity, justice, and common efforts for common purposes. But in order to be able to distinguish democracy as a form of rule from other forms of rule, we need a more specific definition, one that focuses on ways of ruling societies. Could such a definition be universal at the same time? It would be unwise to rule out the possibility.

Universal thrust

One way of defining democracy – as an abstract idea and ideal with a universal thrust – is as follows: a form of rule which guarantees equal shares in the exercise of power within a given society to all adult citizens and which respects si-
multaneously the integrity of minority groups and individuals. Democratisation would then be a process bringing a society closer to such an ideal state. This makes abstract sense. Concretely it does not say much. By being so abstract, the formulation does however offer a vague opening for a broad view of democracy.

To avoid vagueness, it is possible to state, in accordance with the minimalist definition – which can also be called the normal political science definition – that democracy as a form of rule incorporates universal adult suffrage, regular elections, the legally recognised freedoms of speech, association and organisation, and justice bound by law. Democratisation, then, would be change in this direction. From such a definition we may proceed to study how constitutionally democratic rule emerges and functions in real life, and to investigate, in an historical/sociological perspective, what conditions favour or do not favour it and to what extent it does or does not lead to political equality in actual practice. This is my mode of work here.

The ideal-type definition and the minimalist political science definition of democracy are thus different from each other, but not necessarily contradictory. The political science definition is a limited operationalisation of the ideal type. It concentrates upon a small number of institutions which, historically, have been central in forms of rule approximating, in reality, to more ideal notions of equal exercise of power. In practice this means that so-called Western democracy is the point of departure for the political science definition of democracy. To people and countries having been subjected to colonial dictatorship by Western states this may seem very contradictory – which it also is. Still, historically, it is incontrovertibly true that democracy as a form of rule emerged first in the same part of the world which also colonised the so-called third world.

Purely abstractly, the contradictory aspect of this can be overcome with the help of the ideal-type definition, as this encompasses the universal dimension of the notion of democracy: the longing most people have for rule based on justice and human dignity. The political science definition can then be seen as an attempt to specify, credibly and realistically, on the basis of historical experience, the institutional implications of such rule.

Historical experience shows that state rule incorporating universal adult suffrage, regular elections, the freedoms of speech, association and organisation, and justice bound by law, can hardly be consolidated and sustained for long periods without a measure of popular influence and social justice in society as a whole. This is to say that both democratic constitu-

5. Cf. Robert Dahl’s five criteria of political equality: effective participation, voting equality at the decisive stage, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, inclusion of all adults (Dahl 1989, pp. 109-114 and 126-130. Ref. 1).
tionalism and a measure of popular sovereignty or citizen autonomy in society as a whole, beyond the constitutionally defined political system, are required for democracy as a functioning form of rule to become legitimate and enduring.\(^6\)

**From above**

Constitutionalism as rule by law, without democracy, has existed for centuries in the Western historical experience. But the democratisation of constitutionalism by universal suffrage and civil rights for all is a recent outcome of growing popular influence and power in society. In many recent processes of democratisation in the so-called third world, the two basic components of the process have often occurred in almost reverse order. There the democratic aspects of constitutionalism have been introduced from above, although society as a whole has been marked by very limited popular sovereignty. Therefore democracy is still weakly rooted in most of these countries. The case of Guinea-Bissau offers an illuminative example.

For a concept such as democracy to be concretised and applied in practice, it must be linked to the historical roots and cultural notions of each society where it is applied. The Swedish writer and journalist Anders Ehnnmark has expressed this by saying that democracy in Africa ”must be invented in Africa if it is to live there” (Ehnnmark 1995, p. 20. Ref. i). This is not to say that any form of rule can justifiably be called democratic, as long as it fits in with the culture of a particular society. It does mean, however, that the abstract institutions in question must be brought to life in the contexts where they are meant to function, in order for democracy to become legitimate and sustainable. This requires that they are concretised both morally and materially. Inevitably, both cultural notions of justice and sheer material needs are involved – both institutional norms and power over material resources.

**Globalisation – going beyond the national level**

In recent decades the issue of globalisation has begun to enter democratic theory in crucial ways (see, among others, Held 1995. Ref. i). Democracy requires a people of citizens, a demos in the language of classic the-

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6. Note that I use the concept of ”popular sovereignty” in a wide sociological sense, comprising not only the constitutional system but society as a whole.
ory. But the nation-state no longer provides clear definitions – if it ever has – of the people assumed to hold rulers accountable for their acts. People are linked to various territories and often have criss-crossing identities and loyalties. Villagers living in distant areas may be directly affected by decisions made in the metropolises of the world, by decision-makers far out of reach even for the national governments of the villagers in question.

The globalisation of decision-making affects people in all countries and all states of the world, although not equally. It is intimately linked to the issue of control over developmental resources. Democratisation in a country such as Guinea-Bissau implies in the first place equalisation of the power to control those developmental resources which can, at all, be controlled from within that country. This in itself is highly significant, as the country is actually full of manifold resources as well as people in need of utilising them.

Still, many resources of importance for Guinea-Bissau cannot be controlled from there, as they are in the hands of outside forces, including donors of development assistance. Even if Guinea-Bissau were to be perfectly democratised internally, the citizens of the country would thus still in several ways be in the hands of decision-makers they could not control. This problem obviously affects debt-ridden, poverty-ridden, economically undeveloped and dependent countries such as Guinea-Bissau worse than it affects better-off countries. Theoretically, it can only be fully resolved by regional and, in the end, global democratisation.

The present study only touches indirectly upon the issue of globalisation in relation to democratisation, most obviously in connection with development assistance. One assumption of the study is, nevertheless, that democratisation within the various countries of the world might, in the long run, also facilitate the growth of democratic relations beyond the national level.
Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, after eleven years of armed struggle for decolonisation against the Portuguese colonial power. Administratively the country is divided into nine regions. Until 1994 it was governed by the only allowed party, PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde), the former liberation movement. After fairly democratic elections in 1994, a multi-party political system had begun to function and some economic progress was beginning to take place.

The peaceful process of political transformation in Guinea-Bissau was abruptly interrupted, however, by civil and regional war in mid-1998. 7

In the early morning of Sunday, June 7, 1998, shooting was heard from the military installations in Santa Luzia in the north-eastern parts of Bissau, the capital city. Fighting spread quickly to the military base near the airport, in the north-western parts of the city. In a radio broadcast the same day, President João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira held the former Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané, responsible for an armed revolt against the legal government.

Two days later, on June 9, spokesmen of Ansumane Mané announced that a military ‘junta’ had been formed. 8 It demanded the resignation of the President in order to create the right conditions, according to the rebels, for democratic elections to be held within sixty days. As the holding of parliamentary elections before the end of 1998 and presidential elections in 1999, as required by the constitution, had been the stated ambition also of the legal government, the real causes and motives behind the uprising did not stand out very clearly at this stage.

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7. For more detailed descriptions and analyses of the outbreak and conduct of the war, as well as more detailed references, see Rudebeck (1998b, 1998c, 1999, 2001a, Ref. 1).

8. In all official documents during the period June 1998 – May 1999 and even afterwards, the term “self-proclaimed military junta” (“la junta militaire auto-proclamée”) is used. In this text I simply write ‘junta’.
The initial impression conveyed by international media, based largely upon both official and officious declarations from Bissau, was that this was a mutiny of a disgruntled group of military men that would in all probability be put down quite rapidly. Very soon, however, the situation appeared considerably more complex. As early as on June 9, the very day of the rebels’ initial declaration, 1,300 soldiers from Guinea-Bissau’s northern neighbour Senegal, were already in place in Bissau at the request of the President to support the few loyalist troops. On the next day, the Senegalese were joined by 400 soldiers from Guinea-Conakry, the neighbour in the south, with even more Senegalese arriving in the following weeks. Thus the conflict was almost immediately regionalised.

The image of a simple mutiny against the legal, democratically elected government was very far from the whole truth. Legality and political legitimacy seem in this case to have been far apart. After the first days of the war, the President appeared politically isolated and abandoned by most of his army, reduced to relying on the military force of the Senegalese army to remain in office, and thus totally dependent upon foreign troops.

The war was carried on primarily by destructive artillery fighting between the foreign forces supporting the government inside Bissau and the rebel forces surrounding the city. About five-sixths of the city’s approximately 300,000 inhabitants fled into the countryside, while thousands of other citizens as well as almost all foreigners escaped abroad, mainly by sea.

The background was that Ansumane Mané, a veteran of Guinea-Bissau’s anti-colonial liberation war, where he served with ‘Nino’ Vieira, had been suspended from his post as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in January 1998. The alleged reason was negligence of controls of the illegal sale of Guinean arms to the rebels struggling for the self-determination of Casamance, the southern-most province of Senegal, across Guinea-Bissau’s northern frontier. The Casamance rebellion had proceeded with varying intensity since the first half of the 1980s. The Senegalese government had been worried for a long time by the ease of the movement of persons and arms between Guinea-Bissau and Casamance. Furthermore, the majority people of Casamance, the diolas, are culturally and historically close to important groups of people in northern Guinea-Bissau.

There were, however, no clear indications that the issue of arms trafficking as such could be traced specifically to the suspended Commander-in-Chief. On the contrary, well-founded suspicions pointed directly to the President himself. This is not to say that Ansumane Mané might not
have been just as deeply involved as ‘Nino’ Vieira himself. The point is simply that the President tried to whitewash himself by turning an intimate collaborator into a scapegoat. A parliamentary commission composed of representatives of all parties had investigated the charges under great secrecy. Its findings were to have been presented to the parliament and the public on June 8. But on June 5, Ansumane Mané was instead suddenly dismissed, and this was followed two days later as mentioned above by the outbreak of fighting at his residence. The public discussion of the commission’s report was thus aborted. It was not resumed until April 1999, when the report was finally published and the evidence incriminating the President made available to the public (*Relatório 1998*. Ref. iii).

Seven weeks of harsh warfare hardly budged the initial front lines. Finally, on July 26, the military and diplomatic stalemate resulted in a provisional truce negotiated by the Portuguese-speaking countries’ organisation (*CPLP, Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa*). After initial rivalry, agreement was reached on cooperation between *CPLP* and the West-African states’ regional organisation (*ECOWAS, Economic Community of West-African States*) on the matter, and the truce was transformed into a formal cease-fire on August 26, 1998, in Praia, the capital city of Cape Verde.

Heavy fighting was resumed on two occasions in October 1998, on 9-10 and 18-21, resulting in decisive military gains for the rebel side and apparently causing President ‘Nino’ Vieira to give up his last hopes of a military victory. Encircled with his foreign protectors in central Bissau – almost empty after the population had fled once again – the President saw no other choice than accepting to meet the leader of the self-proclaimed military ‘junta’.

At a two-day meeting in Banjul, the capital city of the Gambia, ‘Nino’ Vieira and Ansumane Mané failed to agree on conditions for peace despite intensive negotiations. Instead they flew on together in the same plane to Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, where an assembled *ECOWAS* summit meeting chaired by the Nigerian President finally pressured them, on November 1, 1998, into signing a peace agreement.

Under the Abuja agreement, a transitional national unity government with military ‘junta’ representation was to be formed and remain in power, pending elections. The military forces of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry were to be withdrawn, and followed instead by *ECOMOG* (*ECOWAS’
ACCORD ENTRE
LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA GUINEE-BISSAU ET
LA JUNTE MILITAIRE AUTO-PROCLAMEE

Les deux parties au conflit en Guinée-Bissau réunies du 31 octobre au 1er novembre 1998 dans le cadre des efforts de la 21ème session de la Conférence des Chefs d'État et de Gouvernement de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO);

CONTENU DE CE QUI SUIVIT:

1. La réaffirmation de l'accord de cessez-le-feu signé le 26 août 1998 à Praia;

2. Le retrait total de la Guinée-Bissau des troupes étrangères. Ce retrait s'effectuera simultanément avec le déclassement de l'ONU et de l'OPEP qui remplaceront les troupes étrangères;

3. La force d'interposition garantira la sécurité le long de la frontière entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal, maintiendra les parties séparées, et permettra aux organisations et agences humanitaires d'avoir un libre accès aux populations civils affectées. À cet égard, l'aéroport international Oswaldo Vieira et le port seront immédiatement ouverts.

4. La mise en place d'un gouvernement d'unité nationale, qui, conformément aux dispositions de l'accord déjà signé par les deux parties, comprendra, entre autres, des représentants de la junte auto-proclamée;


FAIT A ABUJA LE 1er NOVEMBRE 1998

Pour le Gouvernement de la République de Guinée-Bissau
Président João Bernardo Vieira

Pour la Junta militar auto-proclamada
le Général Ansumane Mané

The Abuja Peace Agreement was signed between President João Bernardo Vieira and Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané on November 1, 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria's capital city. Photo copy of original document.
Six high-level officials witnessed the Abuja Peace Agreement negotiated at the summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, chaired by the President of Nigeria at the time, General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Photo copy of original document.
“peace-monitoring group”) troops, intended to control Guinea-Bissau’s border with Senegal and also, presumably, to act as a force of ‘interposition’ in Bissau. The airport, which had remained under ‘junta’ control throughout the crisis, would be opened, as well as the harbour. The President would remain in office for the time being.

The Abuja agreement was a significant achievement in terms of African peace making, as it offers one of few examples where African leaders manage to settle a regional/international conflict within the continent largely without non-African intervention. In the end the agreement was even implemented to a considerable extent, although only after many delays and two more outbreaks of fighting. The final and decisive outbreak of fighting occurred on May 6-7, 1999. It resulted in the total defeat of President ‘Nino’ Vieira’s forces, in the passive presence of 600 ECOMOG West African soldiers. The President himself was escorted by ‘junta’ commanders to the Portuguese embassy in Bissau where he first found refuge and then also asylum, until he was allowed to leave the country for Portugal one month later.

The victorious ‘junta’ troops undertook to withdraw to their barracks, while the transitional government under Prime Minister Francisco Fadul

After the final military show-down in Bissau on May 6-7, 1999, the artillery-ridden presidential palace with its flagging roof remained abandoned in the centre of the capital - a grim symbol of the defeat of the old regime. Photo: Lars Rudebeck.

It is true that the Portuguese and Swedish diplomatic representatives in Bissau, and initially also the French representative, were instrumental in facilitating this mediation. But it is also true that the Abuja agreement was actually worked out and imposed by the West African regional cooperation organisation, ECOWAS, as such, and most importantly by its most powerful member, Nigeria, upon the personal intervention of its chairman, the President of Nigeria at the time, Abdulsalami Abubakar. See also the account given by the Swedish representative (Andrén 2000, Ref. 1).
continued in office, until parliamentary and presidential elections were finally held on November 28, 1999, and January 16, 2000.

The origins of the crisis

It is instructive to compare the crisis in Guinea-Bissau with what was happening during the 1990s in two other West African countries a little farther south, namely Sierra Leone and Liberia. Civil wars with regional implications were also raging there and West African troops (ECOMOG) were also deployed. Despite superficial similarities, however, there are still important differences between Guinea-Bissau and the two other cases.

Briefly, what had been happening in Sierra Leone and Liberia was that the uncontrolled struggle over gold and diamonds had broken down and demoralised the societies. Politics had lost all significance beyond that struggle, including ethnic significance. The consequences were far-reaching social dissolution and brutalisation. In Guinea-Bissau, the situation was different. Also there the war had been ignited by illegal trade marked by top leader involvement. The coveted merchandise, though, was not gold and diamonds, but arms, which have abounded in the country since the anti-colonial war of 1963-1974.

The attempt by President ‘Nino’ Vieira to divert attention from his own involvement in arms trafficking by suspending his commander-in-chief produced the opposite result to what he had expected. As opposed to what had happened in Sierra Leone, this case of top-level criminality came to function as a catalyst for ‘normal’ political discontent. Frustrated soldiers and officers who had not been paid for long came out in solidarity with Ansumane Mané.\textsuperscript{11} The political opposition sharply criticised the President and the ruling party PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) for misrule, corruption, arbitrariness and oppression. The contrast between this harsh reality and the democratic promises of the first multi-party elections held in 1994 was unacceptable and unbearable.\textsuperscript{12}

The crisis was thus triggered off by what can arguably be called mafia-like behaviour at the top level of the state. But in the eyes of most

\textsuperscript{11} A very sharp letter, dated 28.2.1998, addressed to the parliamentary commission investigating illegal arms trade was published in its entirety in Diário de Bissau (8.4.1998). Ref. viii. According to the newspaper, the letter was backed by 1,500 participants in the anti-colonial war of liberation 1963-1974.

\textsuperscript{12} The mounting crisis is clearly reflected in the local newspapers during the first half of 1998, although few observers then imagined that civil war was around the corner. See articles (Ref. vii) in Diário de Bissau, 30.1.1998, 11.3.1998, 8.4.1998, 15.4.1998, 22.4.1998, 30.4.1998; Bambero, 23.2.1998, 7.4.1998, 17.4.1998, 8.5.1998, 4.6.1998; Pausker, 15.4.1998; Gazeta de Notícias, »
Guineans it was about fundamental developmental problems and about the national leaders’ ways of dealing or not dealing with these problems. At the mass held in the cathedral of Bissau on August 9, 1998, the Bishop of Bissau, Settimio Ferrazzetta, courageously summed up the deep causes of the crisis. Until his death from a heart attack in January 1999, the bishop was one of the most active participants in the peace efforts. He spoke as follows at the mass (Ferrazzetta 1998. Ref. v. Translated by Lars Rudebeck):

This war reveals a great social sin, obvious since years back… The people have to react. The people of Guinea-Bissau are peaceful, they know how to suffer, but only up to a certain point…

Raising the question about the causes of this war, we find the answer in the following points: nobody gives to the mighty the right to be arrogant; nobody shall give to those who are superior the right to be despotic; nobody shall give to the unjust the right to appropriate the property of others; nobody shall give to the rich the right to enslave the poor; nobody shall give to those who wield power the right to take over what belongs to others; nobody shall give to the corrupt the right to kill their enemies.

There was no clear ethnic dimension to the crisis, although many different ethnic groups are represented in Guinean society and although the cultural images held by Guineans about themselves are deeply marked by this multiplicity. The lines of division between those who fought each other were primarily political – for or against the regime that had ruled the country since independence in 1974. It is important to note the significance of democracy in this kind of situation. Before the democratisation of the 1990s it would not have been possible at all to discuss the issue of arms trafficking in public, nor to send open letters to the President on such sensitive issues. It was dangerous even in 1998, but those who had the courage to try were at least acting within a recognized framework of democratic legality. The reinstatement of democracy was thus a top priority in all peace-making efforts after June 7, 1998.

The President realised that his long-lasting power was seriously threatened by the turn of events during the spring of 1998. But his attempt to disassociate himself from his own dealings by turning his partner into a scapegoat ended in his being chased away from power by an open rebel-

» 21.4.1998; all published in Bissau. Much of what they wrote was later confirmed in the parliamentary report on illegal arms trade. The independent papers in Bissau as well as an independent radio station, Bombalão, had received support from Sweden within the “democracy support” programme.
lion of his own armed forces acting under the banner of *Democracy, Peace, Justice*. The feared security police was put down and its leaders were jailed. Not even with the support of the far larger armed forces of the neighbouring countries (in turn quite openly supported by France according to indications), had it been possible to quell the rebellion. On the contrary, the uprising had received continuously growing support in the country throughout the war period.

### The role of ‘civil society’ during the crisis

‘Civil society’ is a much-used concept. For analytical purposes, however, it is diffuse (see *Törnquist 1999*, in particular part 3). Most of those who do use the concept agree at least that it refers to people acting together in the social space existing between the state and the private sphere. It is a question of definition for political scientists whether, for instance, political opposition parties should be included in ‘civil’ or in ‘political’ society. The parliament is part of the state, but the political parties also act in society at large. The civil society concept still has a descriptive value, as all agree that matters of political significance also occur outside the domains of the state.

On several occasions during the crisis, the Guinean opposition parties joined in peace manifestations outside the parliament. These resulted, among other things, in public documents arguing for peace and reconciliation and showing considerable sympathy for the military ‘junta’ side in the conflict (*Partidos Políticos na Oposição 1998; Plataforma de Intervenção Política 1999*. Ref. v). Both documents had been signed by leading representatives of political opposition parties. But in Guinea-Bissau there are also a number of other organisations and groups which belong to ‘civil society’ more clearly than the opposition parties. Besides the very active organisation for human rights, *Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos* (*LGDH*), there are trade unions, various non-governmental organisations (*NGOs*), most of which have an international affiliation, and cultural, religious,
sports and other organisations. Many of these were activated into participating in public manifestations (See Hellström 1995, Ref. i).

On November 25-27, 1998, over 130 organisations of this kind assembled for a three-day meeting at Quinhamel, between thirty and forty kilometres west of Bissau, on ‘junta’ territory. The National Movement of Civil Society for Peace, Democracy and Development (Movimento Nacional da Sociedade Civil para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento) was then formed. According to the list of participants, as many as 149 representatives of 132 different organisations took part (Movimento Nacional da Sociedade Civil para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento 1998. Ref. v).

During the first few months of the crisis a national goodwill commission began to work under the chairmanship of Bishop Settimio Ferrazzetta. The other members were private citizens. The Bishop later also joined the “Joint Executive Commission for the Implementation of the Abuja Peace Agreement”, which included the diplomatic representatives of the European Union, Portugal, France and Sweden, as well as five representatives of the presidential side in the conflict and six ‘junta’ representatives. The goodwill commission was clearly part of ‘civil society’, while the implementation commission belonged within the realm of the state. The presence of foreign diplomats in the latter testifies to the weakness of the Guinean state and the great dependence of Guinea-Bissau on outside forces.15

The role of the parliament

The parliament of Guinea-Bissau, Assembleia Nacional Popular, played an independent and significant role during the crisis. In the midst of civil war and military intervention from the neighbouring countries, it functioned as a forum for the assumption of civilian political responsibility.

As early as in the afternoon of June 9, 1998, on the third day of the

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15. A communiqué from the goodwill commission published in October 1998 (Comissão de Mediação de Boa Vontade, comuniqué 1998. Ref. v) reflects the involvement of the commission in peace efforts in October 1998, after the war had broken out again at that time. Soon after the death of the bishop, but in his spirit, the goodwill commission published a peace communiqué congratulating the belligerents on the truce achieved a few days after fighting had broken out again on 31.1.1999 (Comissão de Mediação de Boa Vontade, peace communiqué, 1999. Ref. v). See also the commission’s letter to Sweden’s chargée d’affaires, 20.10.1998, with copies of important letters to the international mediation commission formed by the officially Portuguese-speaking countries’ cooperation organisation and the West African regional cooperation organisation Ecowas / CEDEAO (Comissão de Mediação de Boa Vontade, letter, 1998. Ref. v). On the work of the implementation commission, see the rules and minutes of meetings (Comissão Executiva Conjunta de Implementação do Acordo de Paz de Abuja (CECLAPA), regulations and record, 1998. Ref. ii).
war, the parliament’s “permanent commission”\(^{16}\) met, reinforced with party leaders and other members of parliament. It adopted a resolution urging the belligerents to cease fighting immediately and to start negotiating. The commission continued in the same vein during the following months.

A decisive step was taken at the extraordinary meeting of the parliament on November 27, 1998. This was a remarkable event. In spite of all the obstacles and difficulties, 78 of the 100 members assembled in the war-damaged new building of the parliament, well aired since most of the windows had been blown out. A large majority of 69 members, including many representatives of the President’s own party PAIGC, passed a resolution “withdrawing” the parliament’s “political confidence in the President of the Republic” and demanding the immediate and unconditional retreat of all foreign troops. There were no votes against (Assembleia Nacional Popular, Resolution no. 6, 1998. Ref. iii; Lusa News, 30.11.1998. Ref. viii).\(^{17}\)

What happened in the Guinean parliament in November 1998 was a forceful action in favour of democratic constitutionality. With hindsight we see that the President never recovered from this firm challenge to his political and constitutional authority.

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16. According to article 95 in the constitution of 1996 (Constituição da República, 1996. Ref. ii) the Assembleia Nacional Popular (ANP) has a permanent commission which is supposed to function when the parliament is out of session or has been dissolved. This consists of the speaker, the deputy speaker and a number of party representatives in proportion to the parties’ respective shares of seats in the assembly.

17. See also, for instance, article in Público, 28.11.1998 (Ref. vii), under the heading “Nem um só voto a favor de ‘Nino’ Vieira” (“Not one single vote for ‘Nino’ Vieira”).
On May 14, 1999, only one week after President ‘Nino’ Vieira had finally been overthrown, the Speaker of the National Assembly and prominent member of PAIGC, Malam Bacai Sanhá, was sworn in as interim President of the Republic, pending democratic elections. With minor nuances, this was in accordance with the constitution (Constituição da República 1996; Lei Constitucional, under revision in parliament, 1999. Ref. 11). The adjustments were formalised in a “pact on the political transition” which was formally made between parliament, the fourteen legally constituted political parties, the transitional government and the military ‘junta’. The pact was defined as “the legal frame for carrying the country to constitutional normality” (Projecto de Pacto de Transição Política, article 1.1, draft and final version 1999. Ref. 11). The transitional government under Prime Minister Francisco Fadul continued in office.

All this was not only in the spirit of the constitution but also in accordance with the aforementioned West African and internationally backed Abuja peace agreement of November 1, 1998. The final point of the peace agreement, and the only one which had not yet been implemented, was democratic elections. The November 28, 1999 date for the first round of these elections had paradoxically been set by the reluctant ex-President himself, only a few days before he was forced out. It was confirmed in the transition pact.

The war was thus over. The institutions were in place. On June 6, 1999, President ‘Nino’ Vieira was allowed to leave the Portuguese em-

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18. According to the 1996 constitution, the interim president would only be in office for maximum 60 days (article 71.3). Malam Bacai Sanhá was expected to remain in office from May 14 till after elections beginning on November 28, thus for more than 60 days. It is also clear that the old parliament, elected in 1994, remained in office for much longer than the four years foreseen by the constitution. But there is also an article 94.2 stating that the members retain their mandates until a new parliament has been elected.
bassy for political asylum in Portugal, by way of the Gambia. A document even exists in which he declares that he is prepared to return to stand trial in Bissau in exchange for legal guarantees (Vieira, Declaracão, 27.5.1999. Ref. iii). Politicians and military officers reiterated their agreement on democratic elections and the return to peace. Nobody doubted that this was the will of the people. Nor did anybody doubt that it was also the will of the donors of development assistance.

But the state treasury was empty. The economy was almost paralysed. The donors were sceptical about the capacity of the country to absorb aid. The authority of the state was nakedly dependent on the military might of the victorious military ‘junta’.

The months that followed were marked by a precarious balancing act between the civilian government’s efforts to establish its authority and the military’s stated aim to “remain in the barracks”, in the face of soldiers and officers firmly demanding their pay and in fact also demonstrating at least twice in the streets for that purpose. It is not the intention to go into the details of all this here. Only a few important events and types of events and processes will be described with brief comments.

**Tensions between military and civilian power**

The explicitly stated purpose of the political transition pact was, on the one hand, to secure “the return to constitutional normality, under circumstances characterised by political and institutional stability” (*Pacto de Transição Política*, introduction, p. 1. Ref. iii). On the other hand, “the supreme commander of the military ‘junta’” (“O Comandante Supremo da Junta Militar”), i.e. Ansumane Mané, was given a key position in governmental decision-making by this document. These transitional provisions were clearly not democratic in the constitutional sense.

Basically, the kind of tension we are dealing with here is over the authority and legitimacy of state power. The problem becomes acute when the state is destitute and the military are politicised. What real possibilities to uphold legitimate civilian power exist under such circumstances?

Although Prime Minister Francisco Fadul had initially been a ‘junta’-

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20. The Prime Minister and the President were to keep the ‘junta’ leader informed of their activities (art. 4). Furthermore, several presidential powers, such as the nomination of high officials, grace, commutation of court verdicts, the dissolution of parliament, etc., were to be done with the ‘junta’ leader’s “explicit agreement” (articles 6 and 7).
man in the transitional government, backed by Ansumane Mané, the two men frequently pulled in opposite directions during the period of transition. The Prime Minister was, for instance, highly worried about what he regarded as Ansumane Mané’s manoeuvres to oppose his efforts to modernise the state apparatus in the countryside. According to Fadul this was essential to any serious reform of the state, but links between the 'junta' and the old power hierarchy within the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC stood in the way. Fadul feared that the local bosses, backed by the military, would make it difficult for the opposition parties to reach the rural voters (Interviews with Fadul, 19 and 21.5.1999. Ref. viii).

The transitional Prime Minister’s frustration over the strength of established political structures and hierarchies probably contributed to his decision not to run for any political office whatsoever in the coming elections. He had already withdrawn from public life once, when leaving PAIGC politics in opposition in the early 1990s, to work as a local merchant in the town of Bissorá. Now he was going to withdraw again, once constitutional democracy had been restored (Público, 14.10.1999. Ref. vii).

Party congresses

The interim president, Malam Bacai Sanhá, tried actively to secure a leading position for himself even after the elections, thus moving in the opposite direction, compared to the Prime Minister. On 20 September 1999 he accepted nomination as PAIGC’s presidential candidate in the coming election (Público, 22.9.1999. Ref. vii). The actual party congress had been held two weeks earlier. There Ansumane Mané had intervened as a “common party member” to stop the nomination for party leader of a candidate considered too close to ‘Nino’ Vieira (Lusa, 18.8.1999. Ref. vii). Instead, the ex-President himself together with several other members were formally expelled by the congress from their own party (Diário de Notícias, 6.9.1999; Público, 7.9.1999. Ref. vii).

The largest opposition party at that time, Guinea-Bissau’s Resistance Party, (Resistência Guiné-Bissau)/Movimento Bafatá, RGB, held its pre-election congress before PAIGC at the end of August. The ideology of RGB – or often just ‘Bafatá’ – may be characterized as vaguely liberal with a

21. See also Público, 16, 17 and 20.8.1999 (Ref. vii). A former PAIGC-member of parliament, Roberto Ferreira, told me in an interview 16.12.1999 (Ref. viii), that Ansumane Mané’s, according to Ferreira, illegitimate intervention in the work of the PAIGC congress had in the end caused Ferreira to leave the party.
Christian-Democratic touch in the European sense. The party emerged in exile in Lisbon during the 1980s in opposition to the authoritarian PAIGC regime (Rudebeck, 1996, p. 10; 1997:a, pp. 14-15. Ref. 1). Bafatá is the town in central Guinea-Bissau where Amilcar Cabral, the founder of the original anti-colonial liberation movement, was born in 1924. But even more significantly, the word in the Mandinga language means: “Enough is enough.”

The 1999 RGP congress was stormy and ended in a split of the party. No presidential candidate was nominated, but the party’s parliamentary leader, Helder Vaz, was elected as new party leader. He was reported to have argued in favour of an open and “transparent” party (Lusa News, 27.8.1999; Lusa, 30.8.1999; Público, 1 and 6.9.1999; Diário de Notícias, 2.9.1999; Expresso, 4-9.1999. Ref. vii).

Legality, justice, power

On June 18, 1999 a lawyer by the name of Amine Saad was appointed Attorney General (Lusa News, 27.8.1999; Lusa, 30.8.1999; Público, 1 and 6.9.1999; Diário de Notícias, 2.9.1999; Expresso, 4-9.1999. Ref. vii). Until then, Saad had been the leader of the modernist, liberal opposition party UM (União para a Mudança/Union for Change). Saad is a militant defender of the principle that nobody should stand above the law. Besides trying, in vain, to persuade the Portuguese government to extradite ex-president ‘Nino’ Vieira to his native country, Amine Saad pursued what may be termed a campaign to bring a large number of formerly powerful men and women to stand trial to answer to accusations of corruption and treason under the old regime. In spite of several arrests and much ‘noise’, in the end very little came out of this, and on March 20, 2000 Amine Saad was even fired from his post as Attorney General by the new President (Lusa News, 17.3.2000. Ref. vii).

A closely related legal issue concerned the many individuals who had been held as “prisoners of war” after the final showdown on May 7, 1999. At the end of July, as many as up to 600 were still in prison, but in March 2000 the number had been brought down to around 90 (Lusa News, 23.7.1999; Diário de Bissau, 15.12.1999; Lusa News, 15.3.2000. Ref. vii) and the process of releasing prisoners continued. If the prosecutors really were unable to present binding proof of guilt, the release of the prisoners is of course a victory for the rule of law. On the other hand, many observers are quite convinced of the guilt of several of the accused. This, however, also applies to many who were never brought to court. The relevant ques-
tion of a ‘truth commission’ on the South African model was raised but never moved beyond the stage of loose discussion.

**Constitutional conflict**

The question of how Guinean a person has to be in order to hold high state office is an old bone of contention in the internal politics of Guinea-Bissau. When Luís Cabral, the first President of independent Guinea-Bissau, was deposed by ‘Nino’ Vieira in a coup on November 14, 1980, it was held against him that his father had been a Cape Verdean immigrant and his mother was born Portuguese, although he himself had lived in the country all his life. The idea was that both parents of the President had to be born in Guinea-Bissau. This was said to be a ‘popular’ demand. But the truth is that such a rule could hit many quite ‘common’ Guineans hard in a region where modern, colonial, state frontiers cut straight across old cultural and economic lines of division and unity.

On July 7, 1999, anyway, a two-thirds parliamentary majority passed a constitutional amendment stating that, in order to be president, speaker of the national assembly, president of the supreme court, prime minister, attorney general, or commander-in-chief, it would not suffice to be a citizen of Guinea-Bissau. Both parents would also have to be of Guinean birth (*Lusa News*, 8.7.1999; *Lusa*, 20.7.1999. Ref. vii). This would not only have excluded Ansumane Mané, an immigrant from the Gambia, but also Prime Minister Fadul and Attorney General Saad, both of whom are partly of Lebanese origin. The Prime Minister quickly requested the President to veto this “shamefully anachronistic and unacceptably discriminatory” proposal (Fadul, *Lei de elegibilidade*, letter to the President of the Republic, 7.7.1999. Ref. iii). On October 2, 1999, the National Assembly revoked its earlier decision (Communiqué from the National Election Commission, quoted by *AFP*, 2.10.1999. Ref. viii).

The interest of this incident lies in the light it sheds on the tension sometimes surfacing between ethnic African nationalism on the one side and the principles of modern, secular constitutionalism and the rule of law on the other. It also illustrates how tempting it may be for some politicians to try to exploit ethnic and populist arguments in situations where the citizens are desperate and vulnerable. The non-populist outcome, this time, resulted perhaps from a combination of political sophistication and the fact that most citizens had more fundamental problems to worry about.
Preparing elections

On 5 May 1999, I interviewed Higino Cardoso, the chairman of the National Election Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições/CNE), in his office near the port of Bissau (Cardoso, 5-5.1999. Ref. viii). With mild humour, Cardoso indicated his almost empty office, adding that at the moment the Commission was completely broke. There was no electricity for the air conditioning and the winds were therefore blowing refreshingly from the river through the open window. The Commission could not even afford petrol for its cars, Cardoso said.

Gradually, however, after President ‘Nino’ Vieira’s defeat, preparations for the elections gained momentum. At the end of July, Higino Cardoso gave assurances that the November 28 date was “irreversible” (Lusa News, 22.7.1999. Ref. vii). Voter registration began in August and was finished throughout the entire country before mid-September. Financially, the operation was mainly paid for by Sweden, with Portugal supplying various kinds of material support (Lusa, 31.8.1999. Ref. vii). By mid-October, funds promised by the European Union and the Netherlands had also been received, and the situation seemed to be under control. On November 12, the results of the voter registration process were presented in the form of detailed tables of numbers of registered voters for every village and administrative unit upwards. Altogether 502,678 people were recorded in the tables and duly classified by age group, sex, literacy, etc. They were said to represent 91.2 per cent of the population entitled to vote: all aged 18 or more (Recenseamento Eleitoral – 1999. Dados definitivos, parts 1-3, 1999. Ref. vi).

In the end, the complicated registration procedure had thus been carried out with considerable skill and success. But from a democratic point of view, it is a serious weakness that Guinea-Bissau was so completely dependent on foreign funds for this. After all, democracy is about autonomy and people’s rule, and not about foreign financing.

What did the citizens do?

Among the citizens, a distinction can perhaps be made between ‘less ordinary’ and ‘more ordinary’ ones, besides the active politicians. The ‘less ordinary’ ones would then be those actively involved for instance in the various citizens’ organisations whose role was described in Chapter 2. The ‘more ordinary’ or just ‘ordinary’ ones would then be all the others.

In ‘civil society’ a large conference for “national reconciliation”, called
Reconciliation Comes by Justice – this was the message of the “national reconciliation conference” held in Bissau on August 13-15, 1999, according to the front page of the August 17, 1999 issue of the Bissau newspaper Banobero. (“Banobero” is a creole word meaning both “messenger” and “he who talks too much”.) Copied from Banobero, 17.8.1999.

by LGDH, was held in Bissau on August 13-15, 1999. Three hundred delegates worked for three days. Among other things they asked the President to veto the proposed law to forbid Guineans with foreign-born parents to hold high office. In their final resolution, the delegates also recommend-
ed the military ‘junta’ not to intervene in the internal affairs of the political parties, emphasising that the return of the soldiers to their barracks before the election would have to be “total” (Jornal de Notícias, 17.8.1999. See also Público, 16.8.1999, and Banobero, 17.8.1999. Ref. vii).

It is worth noting, too, that Ansumane Mané, who had been invited, never appeared at the conference, while the interim President of the Republic gave the opening speech, emphasising among much else that the November 28 elections were “an indispensable step in order for the country to return to institutional normality”. 22

The ordinary citizens of Guinea-Bissau – living in villages, small towns and various residential areas of Bissau – struggle continuously for their daily survival under conditions most of them find totally unacceptable and which, even before the war, were close to the bottom of UNDP’s tables for “human development”. In the 2000 Human Development Index, based upon partly preliminary statistics from 1998, Guinea-Bissau is ranked at 169 of a total of 174 countries. If the statistics are correct, this means that the average life expectancy at birth was 45 years; adult literacy was 37 per cent, while the share of the population of school age actually going to school was 34 per cent; and per capita purchasing power of gross domestic product (a highly insecure calculation) would have been just below one fifth of the average for all ‘developing countries’ and around one thirty-fifth of the ‘developed country’ average (Human Development Report 2000, table 1, p. 160. Ref. 1. The so-called “Purchasing Power Parity”, PPP, for Guinea-Bissau is reported in this table to have been 616 PPP dollars per capita in 1998).

It is of course a crucial question, if or to what extent people living under such circumstances are actually able or prepared to care about politics, however democratic. In the case of Guinea-Bissau we may note that many people actually do care, in spite of the conditions indicated by the UNDP index. There are many signs of this – ranging from insights, demands, and expectations constantly articulated in interaction between people and which cannot be documented in figures, all the way to the election statistics we shall be looking at in the following chapters. Only two specific indications, directly related to the institutionalisation of democratic rule, will be mentioned here.

One is the fact that voter registration, in spite of material difficulties, could be carried out with such success as was the case, during a few weeks

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22. The reconciliation conference and the speech of the interim President of the Republic are reported in Diário de Notícias, 14.8.1999; Público, 14.8.1999; Banobero, 17.8.1999; Jornal de Notícias, 17.8.1999. The longest quotes from the speech are found in Diário de Notícias, 14.8.1999 (Ref. vii).
in August and September 1999. In the post-war social situation of Guinea-
Bissau, where so many old political authorities had been shaken and the
demand for system change (“mudança”) was on everybody’s lips, and most
likely also in the hearts of many, this could hardly have been done with-
out the active support of local people.

The second indication is the manner in which the elections themselves
were organised. To a very great extent this was the work of local people,
taking the responsibility for the functioning of the elections upon them-
m-selves. Altogether 1,875 voting stations were organised all over the coun-
try. The five to six people actually in charge of each one of these on elec-
tion day did receive some remuneration for their work, but unpaid citi-
zens did all other practical work.

23. The president of the voting station was paid 25,000 CFA (approximately 35 US dollars), while the
other four or five officials received 20,000 CFA (approximately 28 US dollars) each. The electoral
law (Lei Eleitoral, 3/98, article 55.2. Ref. 11) states that there are to be six officials in charge. In
practice, in 1999 and 2000, the actual number was most often five.
The election campaign was lively but peaceful. It took place throughout the country during most of November 1999. In the last few days of the campaign there was a festive mood in the capital in connection with the rallies of the different presidential candidates. One journalist wrote that the whole of Bissau resembled an outdoor discotheque (Diário de Notícias, 26.11.1999, Ref. vii). Finally, election day dawned on 28 November. Early on Sunday morning people throughout the country assembled at the voting stations, almost 2,000 in all, in villages and urban areas. Voting was to begin at seven o’clock.

The elections and the results

Most voting stations consisted of a simple table, outdoors, for the five or six voting officials, with chairs or stools and space for the supervisors representing the parties and the presidential candidates. Beside the table there was a room in a house or a specially erected booth where, without being observed, the voters could mark the parties and candidates of their choice on the voting papers and then fold the ballot papers. Prior to this they had been ticked off on the electoral register. The voters could then place their two ballots, one for the parliamentary election and one for the presidential election, in the transparent, square-shaped ballot box made of plastic, in full view of the voting officials. Finally all the voters had one finger marked with indelible ink so that they could not cheat and vote once more.

24. See also Diário de Notícias, 24 and 27.11.1999, Lusa News, 26.11.1999 (Ref. vii) on the peaceful atmosphere in Bissau on the eve of the elections.
25. The ballot boxes were made of transparent plastic, approximately 5 (height) x 3 x 3 decimetres. They were of Canadian manufacture and had been donated by Portugal.
Advertisement for “The Perfect Ballot Box” – produced in Canada and provided as Portuguese development assistance for the elections held in Guinea-Bissau 1999–2000.

Photo copy of original advertisement. Picture reproduced with the permission of CODE Inc. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
"Democracy is in your hand. VOTE" – widely distributed poster calling the citizens of Guinea-Bissau to vote for their president and parliament on November 28, 1999. Photo: Lars Rudebeck.
Just over eighty UN election observers, of whom ten were Swedish, were spread all over the country during the election. In a generally worded communiqué, dated the day after the election, all the observers stated that “the elections have proceeded in accordance with the electoral law in force in Guinea-Bissau, in a climate of civic spirit, order, transparency and honesty”. The problems mentioned are that a large proportion (“une bonne partie”) of the voting stations opened late and that requisite materials were not available at several places (Communiqué conjoint des observateurs internationaux, 29.11.1999. Ref. vi). This had the effect, among other things, that several voting stations had to stay open on Monday, November 29 in order to give all voters a chance to vote.

The Swedish observers’ report appeared two and a half weeks later. It is more exhaustive and contains more detailed criticisms of practical and organisational aspects. However, the overall picture given is positive: “The elections took place in a transparent and peaceful atmosphere and one can hope that the result will be respected by all parties concerned.” (Report from the Swedish Observers’ Mission to the Presidential and Legislative Elections in Guinea-Bissau, 16.12.1999. Ref. vi).

In reality, behind these communiqués, which tended to gloss over the situation somewhat, there were a number of problems and a certain amount of drama. Among other things, some voting officials around the country took part in a strike for higher pay than agreed. It lasted up to midnight on November 27, which is perhaps the main reason why voting in many places started so late the following morning. Nevertheless there is nothing in this that takes away the credibility of the final result as a whole.

Table 1 shows the published results of the parliamentary election for the entire country in 1999 in a comparison with the results of the election held in 1994. (All the names of the parties are given in full and translated in the glossary found at the end.)

In table 2 we can see the results of the presidential election held concurrently. In this election, Koumba Yalá, the candidate of the Party for Social Renewal, PRS, won a clear victory and thereby laid the foundation of PRS dominance in both the legislative and the executive branches of state power. But he was nevertheless a long way from the 50 per cent of

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26. Interview with election observer Gustaf Eneroth, with the participation of several other Swedish observers, 2.12.1999 [Ref. viii]. There are indications that the threats of strikes and boycotts were coordinated in an attempt to obstruct the election. See also Diário de Notícias, 28.11.1999 [Ref. vii]. Since the border was unexpectedly closed four days prior to election day in order to guarantee order in the country, I was obliged to spend election day itself in Lisbon and did not arrive in Bissau until 1.12.1999. My observations are therefore indirect, as they are based in the first place on interviews and conversations with the Swedish election observers.
the votes that, under the rules, are required for victory in the first round. The ground was therefore paved for a decisive second round between him and the candidate of the old regime, Malam Bacai Sanhá.

Table 3 compares the presidential elections of 1994 and 1999. Together with table 1, it shows the changes in the visible political landscape between those two years.

We see that the old regime party, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC, which ever since 1974 had been merged with the state and the military forces, was reduced to being just one among many other political parties in the election in 1999.
Now let us look behind the tables to obtain a better understanding of the political implications of the changes.

Table 2. Results of the first round of the presidential election held on November 28, 1999, proportions of the 417,992 votes cast (rounded-off) and number of votes obtained by each candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>% vote</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koumba Yalá (PRS)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>143,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>86,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faustino Fudut Imbali (independent)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Gomes (independent)</td>
<td>6 (6.2)</td>
<td>26,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>João Tatis Sá (independent)</td>
<td>6 (5.8)</td>
<td>24,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abubacar Baldé (UNDP)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubacar Rachid Djaló (LIPE)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joaquim Baldé (PSD)</td>
<td>2 (2.1)</td>
<td>8,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador Tchongo (independent)</td>
<td>2 (1.7)</td>
<td>6,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Catengul Mendes (FLING)</td>
<td>1 (1.3)</td>
<td>5,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamadú Uri Baldé (PRP)</td>
<td>1 (0.9)</td>
<td>3,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonieta Rosa Gomes (FCG/SD)</td>
<td>1 (0.7)</td>
<td>2,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank votes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid votes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>417,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3. Comparison of the proportion of votes (rounded-off) received in the first round between the different presidential candidates in the elections of 3 July 1994 and 28 November 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1994 % vote</th>
<th>1999 % vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC’s candidate</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koumba Yalá</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank + invalid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party system and the political parties

It is not possible to distinguish between the political parties in Guinea-Bissau by studying their party programmes. The slogans of all the parties are almost identical. The programmes and other documents listed at the end of the text (Ref. iv) demonstrate very clearly that all the parties claim to stand for democracy, justice and human rights, as well as a market economy that is socially accountable. The new slogan in 1999, common to all parties, was *mudança*/change. Any discernible differences tended to concern social and cultural/ethnic roots, financing, historical ties between leaders and supporters, and the personal qualities of the leaders.

The elections in 1999 and 2000 brought no changes in these regards. Of the thirteen parties participating in the election, all but two had taken part in 1994. Of the fourteen parties that participated in 1994, eleven also took part in 1999. Three parties had joined forces with a fourth that was still in existence. In other words the party system as such was unchanged right up to election day in 1999. On the other hand, the decisions made by the voters on election day did lead to the creation of a new system, since the formerly predominant party, PAIGC, now became just one of many parties. The largest parties were now the Party for Social Renewal, PRS with 38 mandates and Guinea-Bissau’s Resistance Party, RGB/MB with 29 mandates. From now on, no single party had control of parliament.

The only new parties in the 1999 election were the National Union for Development and Progress, UNDP, the Party for Renewal and Progress, PRP, and the Social Democratic Party, PSD. All three are small. UNDP was formed in 1997. During the war of 1997/98 it was regarded as an ally of ‘Nino’ Vieira.27 It has an extremely vague ideological image. During a formal interview at party headquarters I was told, for example, that the party stood for “change” and that it wanted “to get young people and women to participate in politics” (interview with Fanca Sami, UNDP, 19.5.1999. Ref. viii). The party received three per cent of the votes in the 1999 election and one mandate in Parliament, representing a constituency in the eastern region of Gabú.28

The PRP, a splinter group from the Guinean League for Ecological Protection and Development, LIPE, i.e. Guinea-Bissau’s green party, was also formed in 1997. This small new addition (0.9 % of the votes) does not imply a system change but is an illustration of an important feature of the

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27. The formation of the party was reported in Diário de Bissau, 16.12.1997 (Ref. vii). There it is described as a challenge to PAIGC rather than anything else.
28. The fact that it was in Gabú that UNDP won most votes tallies with a comment I heard – that it was a “Fula party”. The Moslem ethnic group Fula are predominant in Gabú.
Ballot paper for the parliamentary election of November 28, 1999, showing in clear colours the names and symbols of twelve of the thirteen parties competing for seats in the Assembleia Nacional Popular (ANP). When finally alone in the booth, the voter was supposed to put a mark in the square of her or his preferred party before putting the ballot paper in an envelope and then sealing it. Probably because it did not run in the capital city, for which this ballot paper had been produced, the name and symbol of one of the thirteen participating parties, PRP, does not appear. Still the PRP won altogether 3,692 votes in the whole country, according to the final count. *Copied from original ballot paper.*
system as such, namely that many of the parties revolve around individual politicians, in this case a rival, Mamdû Uri Balde, to the leader of LiPE whose name is Bubacar Rachid Djaló. Otherwise there were certain alliances and mergers between the small parties. 29

The third new party in the 1999 election, PSD, won three seats in the National Assembly and was thus more successful than the two other ones. It was formed as early as in 1995, as a breakaway-group from RGB. It is led by a teacher of pedagogics and educational official, Joaquim Balde, who also scored two per cent of the total vote in the first round of the presidential election.

The following is a short summary of the outcomes of the changes that had occurred between 1994 and 1999. Among the 13 parties which participated in the election on November 28, 1999 there were the three large parties introduced above (PRS, RGB/MB and PAIGC); one small party Union for change, (UM) which on account of its modernist character nevertheless plays an important role; a very small party which nonetheless has a potentially important role since its leader is a woman, Guinean Civic Forum (FCG-SD); and eight small parties of which the green party (LiPE) and one other party, Guinea’s National Liberation Front, FLING are, for historical reasons, the most “special”, while the other six are mainly expressions of their leaders’ personal ambitions. Of the eight small parties the two “special” parties, LiPE and FLING and two others United Social Democratic Party, PUSD and Party for Renewal and Progress, PRP are not represented at all in the new parliament. The same applies to FCG-SD.

Let us now supplement the picture with details on significant features of three of these parties, beyond the information already given in the preceding chapters on the former governing party, PAIGC, and the former largest opposition party, RGB/MB.

Three particular opposition parties

**The Party for Social Renewal, (Partido da Renovação Social), PRS – the party of the new President**

PRS was formed in 1992 during the first years of democratisation. It is largely based on Koumba Yalá’s personal appeal, mainly among young people and the unemployed in Bissau and among the Balanta people, one of the two largest ethnic groups in the country (about one fourth of the

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population). In the 1980s Koumba Yalá was responsible for the internal education of party cadres in PAIGC. His political profile is outspoken and radical. But, in practice, he does not stand for any different policies than the others. During the period 1994-1999 Koumba Yalá and his party lay surprisingly low, although in 1994 he had been very close to defeating ‘Nino’ Vieira in the decisive round of the presidential election.\(^{30}\)

There is nothing in the PRS programme that clearly shows priorities between different objectives and how these are linked to each other in the general democratic and popular welfare vision that is depicted. The following contains some illustrative quotations from the eleven-page introduction to the “Comprehensive government programme” of October 1999 (PRS, Programa Sumário de Governação, pp. 1-2. Translated by Lars Rudebeck. Ref. iv):

PRS has an in-depth knowledge of society and maintains that the development and prosperity of the people constitute the ultimate goals of its vision. This makes it necessary:

- To immediately eliminate the effects of the political and military conflict that devastated the country for a period of eleven months.
- To introduce governance rooted in a pluralistic democratic system that stimulates the citizens to participate actively in making fundamental decisions.
- To introduce a mechanism which is appropriate for the development of human capital, by promoting an education system of high quality.
- To implement sustainable economic growth.

With PRS, Guinea-Bissau will be a well-governed country in which social peace will prevail and where the division of powers will permit the transparent exercise of powers and the rational utilisation of public property.

The citizens will be guaranteed fundamental freedoms, transparency and justice.

The corresponding documents of RGB/MB (adopted at the party congress at the end of August 1999) and PAIGC (adopted in October 1999) are more extensive and elaborate. But even these documents also mainly consist of enumerations of desirable goals and very little that specifies or analyses how the goals in question are to be achieved in practice (RGB, Programa Político, 1999; PAIGC, Programa Eleitoral, 1999. Ref. iv).

\(^{30}\)These manoeuvres are also described in greater detail in the longer Portuguese language version (Rudebeck 2001a. Ref. iv). Cf. also my earlier descriptions of the parties (Rudebeck 1996 and 1997a. Ref. iv).
The Union for change (União para Mudança), UM
The fourth largest political party, UM differs from the others in the sense that its profile contains a greater degree of social analysis. It is not so much that the general objectives of the party are any different from those of the other parties, but its objectives are presented in a more specific and more discursive way. The party is small but, since it attracts comparatively well-educated persons, it nevertheless plays an important role in the work of parliament. With the aid of two different documents totalling 18 pages, the UM presented prior to the election a concise and coherent vision with concrete proposals for measures to improve the situation in the country. This programme, which was called the “programme for the future”, was based on the following points (UM, UM – União para a Mudança. Um futuro para a Guiné-Bissau, 1999, p. 1. Translated by Lars Rudebeck. Ref. iv):

• Organise the state
  1. Administrative reform
  2. Make funds available
  3. Diminish the role of the state
  4. Fiscal control and tax collection

• Strengthen the capacity of young people and adults
  1. Adult education
  2. Regional technical high schools
  3. Water, energy and health care for all

• Create wealth
  1. Roads in rural areas, irrigation canals on the rice fields
  2. Credits, education, information
  3. Facilitate the work of the farmers
  4. Processing of raw materials

In an interview which I made in May 1999 with the leader of UM at that time, Amine Saad (19.5.1999. Ref. viii), he emphasised that, in the UM’s analysis, the rule of law and democracy are seen as major causes of development. Saad explained that if the state is organised in such a way that justice between citizens is guaranteed, this will facilitate productive work and consequently development. He regarded the much-discussed patron-client system in developing countries principally as a consequence of the paternalism of the western countries.
The Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy (Fórum Cívico Guineense-Social Democracia), FCG-SD

The Guinean Forum for Citizens is the smallest of all the parties. In the parliamentary elections of 1994 it received only 494 votes (0.14 per cent) in the entire country – all from Bissau. Five years later the number of votes had increased to 3,262 (0.75 per cent) – of which only 598 were cast in Bissau and instead almost twice as many (1011) in Gabú, a Muslim dominated region in the eastern part of the country. This is an interesting trend for a party whose main distinctive feature is that it is led by a female lawyer, who conducted her studies in law in Brazil. The party was founded in 1991 by Guineans resident in Brazil – but with the aim of influencing developments in their home country. Antonieta Rosa Gomes has been the leader of the party ever since then. She was a presidential candidate in the elections of both 1994 and 1999. In contrast with the results in the parliamentary election, the number of votes cast for her in 1999 in the presidential election decreased by almost 50 per cent compared to 1994. In 1994 she received 5,509 votes (1.79 per cent) and in 1999 only 2,986 votes (0.7 per cent).

It is difficult to conclude anything very specific from these figures on the electoral significance of the fact that the leader of FCG-SD is a woman. It is true, though, that in her presidential campaign, Antonieta Rosa Gomes did try to convey a special message to female voters. She emphasised, for instance, that being a woman she would do all she could to prevent another war from erupting (interview in Diário de Bissau, 25.11.1999. Translated by Lars Rudebeck. Ref. vii):

“We have just come out of a war in which the lack of sensitivity of the deposed President contributed to the war becoming as bad it did. As a woman I felt this strongly. If I were elected, I would not make war. My major preoccupation is that there will not ever again be bloodshed in Guinea-Bissau.

Rosa Gomes referred also to the United Nations and “the world”, who according to her wanted to support women in taking up “key positions in society”. Having a woman as a president, she continued (same source), would help to “revolutionise the mentalities”:

For when women see a woman in the presidency who works seriously, who meets the expectations, who worries about the living conditions of our soldiers in order to safeguard stability, who supports the women who never did get any support although they always supported others, who
supports children because she herself is a mother, who helps the youth not only with balls to play with and shirts but also by creating posts for professional work.

... 

I want to help women with concrete projects, whether in agriculture for women who live in the countryside, or in the towns for unemployed women. Projects that will help them get out of the difficult situations in which they find themselves.

It seems fair to conclude that Rosa Gomes’ reasoning includes certain feminist features. In the democratic, multi-party electoral panorama of Guinea-Bissau these are quite unusual.

The presidential candidates

It is interesting to compare the two elections in 1994 and 1999 also with regard to presidential candidates. Superficially the impression of system change can then be greater. In fact only three candidates participated on both occasions: Koumba Yalá (PRS), Bubacar Djaló (LPE) and Antonieta Rosa Gomes (FCG-SD). To put it in a somewhat different way, only three of the twelve candidates who stood for election in 1999 had also participated in the election of 1994 or, conversely, three of the eight who had stood for election in 1994 also participated in the election in 1999.

But despite the relatively large turnover of individuals, the similarities at system level are much greater than the differences. The range of ideologies was exactly the same in 1999 as it was in 1994. The only parties with their own, clearly discernible, ideological profiles were the green party (LPE) and the party with certain feminist features (FCG-SD). Both these parties were represented by the same presidential candidate on both occasions. Otherwise it was still the same leading opposition candidate as in 1994 and, in many ways, the same governing party as in 1994, although ‘Nino’ Vieira was out of the running. The two main candidates were still surrounded by a number of other candidates, with person-centred party organisations behind them, each of whom merely appealed to a small proportion of the electorate. The proportions of blank and invalid votes were also much the same (12-13 per cent) on both occasions.

All the same – apart from the major difference that at the end of the day, in 1999, PAIGC’s candidate was the loser – three important differences can be noted.
Ballot paper for the first round of the presidential election which took place on November 28, 1999. The ballot shows in clear colours the names and pictures of all the twelve candidates running for the presidency. *Copied from original ballot paper.*
Firstly, 1999 saw the participation of a presidential candidate of a type which had not been seen at all in 1994. His name is Faustino Imbali. He is a highly educated sociologist and an author of scientific works that focus on development problems. Up to 1999 he had remained outside politics but had held high positions in the fields of education and research, for example he was a member of the management of Guinea-Bissau’s social science research institute (Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa), INEP. Imbali participated as an independent candidate for the presidency in 1999. With his professional background he is bound to have attracted voters who supported UM in the parliamentary elections. His election manifestos were reminiscent in organisation and profile of UM’s manifesto, quoted above (Presidential Election Campaign of Imbali, Manifesto de Boé, 1999; Vota Faustino Fudut Imbali, 1999. Ref. iv). The fact that he belongs to the country’s largest ethnic group, Balanta, may, moreover, have given him an advantage in the voting. He won seven per cent of the votes and came third in the first round of the presidential election.

Secondly there was another independent candidate, Fernando Gomes, who came fourth with six per cent of the votes cast. He also represented something new compared to 1994. In 1991 Gomes formed Guinea-Bissau’s Organisation for Human Rights, LGDH. He was chairman of this organisation up to the election campaign. His election manifesto naturally had demands for justice and human rights as its point of departure.

The third difference was that the leader of ‘Bafata’, Helder Vaz, refrained from participating in the presidential election. Instead he encouraged his supporters to vote in the best way they could to ensure the defeat of the PAIGC candidate.

Both Faustino Imbali and Helder Vaz were later to be given senior posts in the new multi-party government which was eventually formed in February 2000, Imbali as deputy Prime-Minister and Vaz as Minister of State with special responsibilities for the economy and regional development (Diário de Bissau, 22.2.2000. Ref. vii).31

Participation in the elections

As early as in 1994, in the first multi-party elections held in independent Guinea-Bissau, the actual number of registered voters corresponded approximately to some 65% of those persons entitled to vote, i.e. persons over the age

31. Actually Faustino Imbali was later even to become Prime Minister, on March 30, 2001, in charge of a minority government supported mainly by PAIS (Lusa, 31.3.2001. Ref. vii). This, however, is a story not covered by the present study.
of 18 years. Of these almost 89% voted in both the parliamentary elections and in the first round of the presidential elections. This, in turn, corresponded to slightly less than 60% of all inhabitants of voting age.

Participation in the elections of 1999 was higher than in 1994 as far as the number of persons entitled to vote is concerned, but somewhat lower as a percentage of the number of persons registered to vote. Thus, as the official statistics only showed participation in relation to the number of registered voters, they concealed the fact that real participation had actually gone up between 1994 and 1999.

On the basis of the same method of calculation that I used in the 1994 elections, some 85% of those entitled to vote were registered in 1999. According to the figures of the National Election Commission as many as 432,604 voters actually voted in the parliamentary election and 417,992 in the first round of the presidential election – corresponding to 86% and 83% respectively of those registered to vote (Comissão Nacional de Eleições, 25.1.2000. Ref. vi). In relation to those entitled to vote, these figures give real participation rates of 74% and 72% respectively. Such rates are extremely high for comparable countries. Participation was also evenly distributed throughout the country.

Despite the fact that the figures for participation in the election are very high, they are not unrealistic. As far as the elections as such in 1999 in Guinea-Bissau are concerned, these figures strengthen the picture of democratic credibility.

32. See Rudebeck (1996, p. 17; 1997a, pp. 23-24. Ref. i). The approximate estimate that some 65% of those who were entitled to vote registered for the election in 1994 is based on two other estimates, namely that Guinea-Bissau’s total population in 1995 was about 1.1 million and that 37% of the population, i.e. 627,000 people, were under 20 years. These figures can be found, for example, in Imbali et al. (1996, pp. 4-5. Ref. i). They are credible. The figure 65% for registered voters of the potential total figure of those entitled to vote is therefore realistic.

33. There is no completely exact information on Guinea-Bissau’s population in the year 2000. All available information, including the information contained in the note above, are estimates based on the population census of 1979. The Human Development Report 1999, table 16 (Ref. i) gives 1.1 million for 1997 with an estimated annual rate of population increase of 2%. This would mean approximately 1.2 million (1,167,125) in 2000. My own very rough estimate of the number of people entitled to vote, i.e. those over 18 years, is based on the assumption that these equal the proportion over 20 + 1/10 of those who are under 20 (according to Imbali et al. 1995, Ref. i). This is a rough estimate but not unrealistic. The outcome is 584,400 people entitled to vote in the elections of 1999/2000. The figure is somewhat higher than that given in the 1999 election census. There (Recenseamento Eleitoral – 1999. Dados definitivos, part 1, p. 1. Ref. vi) it is stated that the number of persons with the “capacity to vote” in 1999 was 559,954. However, for the sake of comparability my estimates were made in the same way in both 1994 and 1999/2000. It is possible that the population is somewhat larger than 1.2 million. A figure of 1.3 million is sometimes seen. It is not at all inconceivable that this is more correct, but no one knows for certain.
In a long-term perspective it can prove to be important that a female presidential candidate participated in the first round of the presidential election in both 1994 and 1999, regardless of the fact that the proportions of
votes cast for her were very small on both occasions. It is also possible that, in certain respects, democratisation can make the social effects of structural adjustment less brutal for women, for example. But so far this is mostly hypothetical.

On the other hand we can obtain a simple answer to the simple question of whether the democratic electoral system led immediately to more equitable representation for women than the undemocratic system where only one single political party had been allowed to participate. Purely statistically, the answer is no. Table 4 above is totally unambiguous on this point.

The proportion of women in parliament was reduced considerably by democratisation. In the last undemocratically elected parliament of 1989 there were 30 women among the 150 members, i.e. 20 per cent. Then, as earlier, the national assembly had been filled on the basis of a top-down method by indirect one-party elections, in which the voters first appointed regional assemblies from PAIGC’s one-party lists and where the members of these assemblies then, in turn, selected from among themselves the persons who were to sit in parliament (Marché Tropicaux, 9.6.1989 and 28.7.1989. Ref. VII). It is not surprising that the leadership, if it so wanted, could produce a fairly large proportion of women in such a process. When the process became freer, the proportion of women in the national assembly declined rapidly to 9 per cent in 1994 and, in the 1999 election, to less than 8 per cent.

Table 4. Proportion of women of the total number of members elected to the National Assembly, ANP in 1989, 1994 and 1999, absolute figures and per cent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Absolute Figures</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>30/150</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9/100</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8/102</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sammanställning om kvinnor i offentliga positioner i Guinea-Bissau (Specification of women in public positions in Guinea-Bissau, Swedish Embassy, Bissau (Ref. III), telephone interview on 7.6.1996 with Francisca Maria Vaz Turpin, member of ANP for RGB/MB; complete list of those selected to ANP 1999, Diário de Bissau, 14.1.2000. (Ref. VII); Inger Callewaert, Lund, helped me to determine the names that were names of women among those elected in 1999.

34. Antonieta Rosa Gomes received 1.54% of the votes in 1994 and not more than 0.7% in 1999. In absolute figures this was a decline from 5,599 to 2,686 votes.

35. Some time after the election of 1994 one of the women elected for the PAIGC (Nharebate Nanceia Intchasso) became a minister in the government. She was later replaced by a man, which led to the proportion of women in the ANP falling from 9 to 8 per cent.
As we have seen, the participation as such of a woman-led political party – the Guinean Forum for Citizens-Social Democracy, FC-GSD – in the multi-party elections did not have any apparent effect on the number of women elected to political office. Nor is it likely to have had any noticeable effect on the overall participation of women as voters, considering the meagre results from a statistical point of view attained by FC-GSD. Quite possibly, however, the participation of FC-GSD as a political party and Antonieta Rosa Gomes as its presidential candidate might well have had long-term attitudinal effects in Guinean society, although this cannot be known on the basis of the material now presented.

The only certain conclusion that we can draw from the comparison presented in table 5 is that the transition from an undemocratic to a democratic election procedure is not, in itself, a guarantee for a larger proportion of women in the national assembly.\textsuperscript{36} This is possibly something to think about. But it is far from sufficient as an answer to the question of how democratisation and the emancipation of women are connected in a wider context.

\textbf{The process of transition continues}

It is true that the PAIGC did not obtain more than 15 per cent of the votes in the election on November 28, 1999. But the outcome of the presidential election had not yet been determined. During this time the interim government and the old parliament remained in office. The new transition period lasted up to January 16, 2000,\textsuperscript{37} despite the fact that electoral legislation clearly prescribes a period not exceeding one month.\textsuperscript{38} The most important reasons for the delay were the problems experienced by the National Election Commission in financing the second round\textsuperscript{39} and the

\textsuperscript{36} It is known, for example, that the introduction of female suffrage in countries such as Sweden and Germany after the First World War was statistically correlated with successes gained by the conservative parties that had been opposed to democratisation in this form. See Tingsten (1993, pp. 36 ff. Ref. 36). Tingsten’s analysis of these apparently paradoxical relationships clearly shows that they cannot be used as a basis for simple conclusions on what democratisation can lead to. Cf. Phillips (1995) for a modern, feminist, political science discussion of the politics of fair representation.

\textsuperscript{37} The date of the second round of the presidential election was announced by Prime Minister Fadul himself and not by the national electoral commission, which would have been the normal procedure (Diário de Bissau, 16.12.1999. Ref. viii).

\textsuperscript{38} The second round shall take place “within 21 days of the publication of the results of the first vote”. The date shall, in turn, be made public “between 7 and 10 days after the voting has ended.” (Lei Eleitoral para o Presidente da República e ANP, article 113 and article 96 respectively. Ref. vii.)

Christmas and New Year holidays as well as the end of Ramadan.

During the entire period between the two rounds of the presidential election, the political temperature was high in Guinea-Bissau. PAIGC gathered its strength to retain the presidency, if possible. The newspapers, radio and TV were full of accusations and counter-accusations of corruption and abuse of power.

**The soldiers demonstrate**

On December 8, 1999 the city awoke once again to the sound of army vehicles on the streets in the city centre. The schools sent home those children who had already arrived with their exercise books. The shops closed. Car owners hurried to put their cars in safety so that they could not be taken over by the soldiers. Groups of citizens gathered on street corners in quiet and anxious conversations. Military vehicles and soldiers in uniform dominated the streets, but the soldiers were apparently unarmed (own observations).

The soldiers claimed that they had not received their agreed wages for a long time, 18 months according to certain sources (Nô Pintcha, 10.12.1999. Ref. vii). But they wore new, well-pressed uniforms, looked strong and healthy, and did not give the impression of material distress. In other words the army could not have been totally destitute.

In the evening of December 8 it was possible to see on TV how large boxes of banknotes were loaded, under guard, into army vehicles outside the office of the West African Bank (Banco de África Occidental, BAO) for further transportation to the military base at the airport. These were CFA banknotes from the French-controlled West African currency union of which Guinea-Bissau had been a member since May 1997 (CFA = Communauté Financière Africaine). The following day everything was normal in Bissau once again, at least on the surface. Those children who had a place in school went there, shops opened, private cars were back on the streets.

**The final round approaches**

Some days before the election the opposition leaders unanimously encouraged their supporters to vote for Koumba Yalá and, above all, against PAIGC’s candidate, the interim president Malam Bacai Sanhá (Público, 10.1.2000; Lusa News, 10.1.2000. Ref. viii).

On Friday January 14 the two met in a live TV debate. If the outcome of the election had been determined by the arguments presented in this debate, Malam Bacai Sanhá would most likely have become the president for the new five-year period. With the aid of convincing examples he spoke of the need for system change and decent development policies
under responsible leadership. Koumba Yalá was not in form and not pre-
pared to participate seriously in the exchange of opinions. But only a small
minority of electors have access to TV and, in all probability, most of them
had already decided how they would vote anyhow. Koumba Yalá’s nor-
normally direct and intensive method of addressing the electors had already
been successful in meetings and discussions around the country, without
TV. His bright red Balanta knitted cap (used also by the Papel ethnic
group) that he wore during the entire election campaign, even with tie and
jacket, symbolised his popular touch.

There was no campaigning on the Saturday before the election. The
voters were given the opportunity to reflect and consider.

Ballot paper for the second round of the presidential election which took place on January
16, 2000. The ballot shows in clear colours the names and pictures of the two candidates
who had won most votes in the first round, thus qualifying for the decisive second round.
These were Koumba Yalá and Malam Bacai Sanhá. (Note that here the winning candidate’s
first name is spelled “Kumba”. This spelling was rarely used in 1998–1999. However, later in
the year 2000, for one reason or another, it became the most commonly used spelling. In
this work I have decided to retain the spelling most often used in Guinea-Bissau at the time
of the events described and analysed.) Copied from original ballot paper.
Final Round of the Presidential Election and the New Government

CHAPTER 5

The result

The election result was an overwhelming victory for the opposition candidate. Malam Bacai Sanhá’s balanced image did not save him from a devastating defeat. However, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC and the power system in the country were affected more than the interim president in person was. A very large number of voters who were Moslems, like Malam Bacai Sanhá, or who did not belong to Koumba Yalá’s ethnic group, the Balanta, nonetheless voted for Koumba Yalá, a Catholic and a Balanta – despite religion and despite ethnic affiliation. The demand for mudança/change thus had an impact throughout the entire electorate.

Table 5 summarises the results of the presidential election of January 16, 2000 for the entire country.

In the second round, 72 per cent of the registered voters and 62 per cent of those entitled to vote participated in the election. This can be compared to the high figures of 83 per cent and 72 per cent respectively in the first round. The most probable explanation for the decline in participation is that the voters were tired of voting and felt fairly certain that Koumba Yalá would win anyway, which he also did. The low participation in the coastal and island region of Bolama/Biljagós is a strong manifestation of the general tendency in the second round.40

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40. This time I worked myself as an election observer for the UX in sub-sector/administrative district no. 2, Biombo, in constituency no. 9, Quinhamel, in the region which is also named Biombo, some 60 kilometres roughly west of Bissau, towards the coast. Here there were 23 polling stations. During the two days immediately prior to the election my colleague, Joseph Essombe Edimo, legal adviser to the OAU’s Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in Banjul, Gambia, and I were present at the preparations in the whole area. See Rudebeck (2000 and 2001b, Ref. 1) for a detailed analysis of our observations.
On January 20, 2000 Malam Bacai Sanhá officially admitted defeat in the presidential election at a press conference in Bissau. He was critical of some details of the election but assured those present that he respected “the verdict of the ballot box, this expression of the will of the people”. In addition he is reported to have said, among other things (Diário de Bissau, 22.1.2000. Ref. vii).

I will continue to make a contribution through PAIGC and I shall remain a presidential candidate until I win.

On the same occasion PAIGC’s party leader, Francisco Benante, made the following statement (same source):

If Bacai Sanhá is penalised due to mistakes made by the former PAIGC leaders, I feel that justice has not been done and the people have not made a good choice.

However, this time the will of the people carried more weight than the will of the PAIGC leader. The election was over. Now all that remained was for the newly elected president Koumba Yalá to be installed in office and to appoint a prime minister who then would form a government.
New prime minister, new parliament, new president, new government

President appoints prime minister before inauguration

According to the constitution it is the duty of the formally installed president to appoint the prime minister. This shall be done after the president has obtained the views of the political parties represented in the national assembly (Constituição da República, 1996, article 68: g. Ref. ii). Koumba Yalá ignored these rules and, on January 24, 2000, appointed Caetano N’Tchama as his new prime minister after a decision had been made by the Party for Social Renewal, PRS, alone. This resulted in a triumphant first page headline in Diário de Bissau “The PRS government’s first unconstitutional blunder”.41

However the hasty nomination was accepted by political opinion without any major problems. The new prime minister is a lawyer and had, until then, been Minister of the Interior in the interim government. He was considered to be close to PRS but was not active in party politics. The

41. “Primeira gaffe inconstitucional da governação do PRS” (Diário de Bissau, 26.1.2000, Ref. viii). See also Lusa News (24.1.2000, Ref. vii) which points out N’Tchama as Prime Minister.
most severe criticism levelled against him was that he not only belonged to the same ethnic group as the president-elect, but was also related to him by family ties. During the presidential election campaign, Koumba Yalá had even resided in Caetano N’Tchama’s house in Bissau.

The newly elected parliament is opened
On January 28th 2000 the newly elected parliament was officially opened (Público, 30.1.2000. Ref. vii). The event which attracted most attention was that the PRS allowed their candidate for the post of speaker, an architect named Jorge Malú, to be elected with the support of PAIGC’s votes in an open contest against Helder Vaz, the leader of RGB/MB, after the two largest opposition parties had failed to agree on the speaker.42

The president is installed in office
The election result had undoubtedly given a great deal of popular legitimacy to Koumba Yalá as president. Even the inauguration ceremony itself, on February 17, 2000, was carried out as a type of national festival. Koumba Yalá, dressed in his red cap, swore the presidential oath in front of an audience of 25 000 spectators, not in the parliament building but in Bissau’s largest sports arena, a modern stadium in a suburb in the southwest part of the city. Most prominent among the foreign guests were the Presidents of Nigeria, Gambia and Cape Verde and the foreign minister of Portugal.

In his inauguration address Koumba Yalá promised that he would function as “the President of all Guineans”, with “total respect for the constitution and the principles of democracy” (Diário de Notícias, 18.2.2000; Público, 18.2.2000. Ref. vii). He also praised the efforts of the military junta for restoring democracy and applauded the junta leader and Commander-in-Chief, Ansumane Mané, without touching upon the delicate issue of what was going to happen to Ansumane Mané’s position as a type of extra president (“Co-Presidente”), now that the transition to constitutional democracy had been completed. Ansumane Mané had even tried to give official status to his unusual position as “Co-President” by opening an office directly opposite the President’s office with a large notice on which it was clearly stated “Office of the Military Junta’s Highest Commander, Co-President” (“Gabinete do Comandante Supremo da Junta Militar, Co-Pres-

42. One particular guest who received attention at the inauguration ceremony was the ambassador of France, François Chapellet. France thereby indicated its intention to renew its presence in Guinea-Bissau after the violent events of May 6-7, 1999, when French soldiers and diplomatic staff had, in practice, been chased out of the country and the French cultural centre had been burnt down as President ‘Nino’ Vieira was overthrown.
dente”). In a statement made directly after the election one month earlier, he had nevertheless pledged “loyalty and obedience” to the democratic state (Lusa News, 25.1.2000. Ref. vii).

The government is formed and installed
The final step in the long process leading to the restoration of constitutional democracy in Guinea-Bissau was taken on February 19, 2000. Then the President officially appointed the already-appointed prime minister. He soon announced the names of the persons who would initially be members of his government, and thereafter the government took office on the same day.

In the days prior to this it had become clear that the framework of the government would be based on a coalition between the two largest opposition parties, The Party for Social Renewal, Partido da Renovação Social, PRS and Guinea-Bissau’s Resistance Party, Partido da Resistência da Guiné-Bissau – Movimento Ba-Fatá, RGB/MB in which the latter party
would have four ministerial posts including the above-mentioned special post for the party leader, Helder Vaz, as State Minister for Economy and Regional Development (Lusa News, 18.2.2000. Ref. vii).

When the list of ministers was presented on February 19, it contained the names of 24 persons, including several who were not members of a political party and at least one person who had formally been active in the leadership of the Union for Change, União para a Mudanca, um. A defeated presidential candidate, Faustino Imbali, was appointed deputy Prime Minister, as mentioned above. Ansumane Mané’s closest man in the military junta, commander and colonel Veríssimo Correia Seabra, was appointed Minister of Defence, until further notice.

The new Prime Minister announced that his government would mainly concentrate on four tasks: to clarify the responsibilities of the different sovereign bodies in relation to each other; to implement a basic reform of the public administration; to stimulate the economy; and to give attention to the social sector (Público, 20.2.2000. Ref. vii).

On February 23, in a special statement, the UN Security Council welcomed the return of Guinea-Bissau to constitutional government and encouraged all donors to provide assistance to the country “as soon as possible” (Lusa News, 24.2.2000. Ref. vii).

The military junta and the government

After the presidential election, Ansumane Mané had repeated his promise to obey the constitution but, at the same time, it was clear that the question of how the military power was to be tamed by the civil power did not give Koumba Yalá any real peace of mind. On February 27 he appointed Ansumane Mané as the President’s “assessor”, with the rank of minister, in issues relating to defence and security. Three other assessors were also appointed at the same time (Diário de Notícias, 28.2.2000. Ref. vii). Ansumane Mané refused to accept the appointment, with the argument that as commander-in-chief he should be “neutral”. He also remarked that the president had not contacted him before making the ap-

43. Diário de Bissau (22.2.2000. Ref. vii) contains detailed information on the composition of the government. Apart from Helder Vaz, three other party leaders were also included in the government. These were Antonieta Rosa Gomes of FCG-SD as Minister of Justice, Abubacar Rachid Djaló of LUP with the responsibility for trade and handicraft, and Joaquim Balde of PSU with the responsibility for culture, youth and sport. Thereby the coalition was extended far beyond PSD and PSD/UM. Two of the members of the government were women. One of these was the above-mentioned Minister of Justice. The other was given the responsibility for the labour market and poverty reduction. Her name is Filomena Mascarenhas Tipote.

44. Iancuba N’Djai, on a post as the Minister for the rehabilitation of soldiers into society and for poverty reduction.

45. See also an exhaustive article in Diário de Notícias, 1.4.2000 on the UN Security Council’s positive assessment of the situation in Guinea-Bissau after February 19, 2000.
pointment (Diário de Notícias, 29.2.2000. Ref. vii). The uncertainty was thus as great as before.

Later, in March, the President made a new attempt. This time the entire leadership of the military junta, sixteen persons in all, including Ansumane Mané, were formally appointed as members of the government. This original and unexpected move came after the Gambia’s foreign minister had been in Bissau to mediate between the two leaders (Diário de Notícias, 23.3.2000; Público, 25.3.2000. Ref. vii). It seemed that the “Co-President” accepted this manoeuvre. But it did not contribute to making the government efficient and strong. Thirty-eight members are a very large number of members, particularly if sixteen of them also have unclear responsibilities. This lack of clarity was not improved by the fact that, in an interview in the beginning of May, the foreign minister, Iaia Djaló, explained that the sixteen senior military officers were, in fact, not really ministers. It was merely a question of recognising their high position. “In other words the regalia are the same, so it makes no difference...” (Diário de Bissau, 5.5.2000. Ref. vii).

These unusual manoeuvres clearly demonstrate that the burning question of the relationship between civil and military power still remained unanswered – in constitutional practice as well as in political reality.
**Large government, little activity**

The government was consequently very large. On the other hand its activity was very limited and the shortcomings existing in society with regard to schools, medical services, energy supply, water etc., were as great as before. During May, public criticism grew against the passivity of the government. This was reflected, for example, in a growing number of critical articles in the newspapers as well as through press conferences and declarations made by opposition parties, including the former governing party, PAIGC (see, for example, *Diário de Bissau*, 3.5.2000, 10.5.2000, 17.5.2000, 18.5.2000, 19.5.2000; *Banóbero*, 4.5.2000, 19.5.2000. Ref. vii).

**Growing tensions during the first few months of the democratic regime**

**Human and civic rights**

Soon there were negative indications within the field of human and citizen rights. Two journalists employed at the state-run television company were, for instance, suspended from work and jailed on May 27, 2000, after one of them had spoken critically of the situation in the country in a TV programme. On the following day, Fernando Gomes, former leader of the human rights organisation, LGDH and presidential candidate in 1999, was also jailed. Since the elections, Gomes had become the leader of a new social democratic political opposition party, the Guinean Socialist Alliance, ASG, with strong declarations in respect of human rights on its party agenda. He had expressed sharp criticism of the government. All of these three arrests were reported by the media to have been carried out by governmental order. On May 29, the three were released on bail, after strong public criticism from journalists and politicians, and on May 30 the two TV-journalists were allowed to return to their jobs (*Amnesty International*, 17.5.2000 and 31.5.2000. Ref. v; *Diário de Bissau*, 17.5.2000; *Lusa News*, 29.5.2000; *Diário de Notícias*, 2.6.2000. Ref. vii).

The outcome of this affair has two faces. On the one hand, it testifies to the continuing vitality of urban civil society, in terms of the existence of a critical public opinion that was not scared into silence. On the other hand, however, the new government’s way of reacting did not strengthen its democratic credibility.

**The unresolved issue of military and civilian power**

The most serious single crisis that occurred during this period was set off by the ever-hot issue of military versus civilian state power. It began this
time with the Chief of the Navy, Mohamed Lamine Sanhá, being simply fired from his post by the President of the Republic on the suspicion of having arbitrarily released a South Korean fishing ship held in Bissau for illegal fishing in Guinean waters. The full constitutionality of this presidential measure was more than doubtful, but although Lamine Sanhá refused to resign, the President held on to his decision.

The situation grew seriously tense in mid-May 2000, with the Chief of the Navy being physically protected by his military colleagues. After a meeting between the Prime Minister and a number of high military officers on May 15-16, the situation calmed down. Lamine Sanhá remained fired (Diário de Bissau, 3.5.2000; 9.5.2000; 10.5.2000; 11.5.2000; 17.5.2000; 18.5.2000; Banobero, 12.5.2000; 19.5.2000. Ref. vii). This can be regarded as a provisional victory for civilian power. A further sign in the same direction was the fact that a military parade planned to take place on June 7, 2000, the second anniversary of the outbreak of the military uprising, was cancelled. According to military sources cited in the Portuguese daily Diário de Notícias, this was because the government could not afford to pay for the parade. The same source, however, also emphasised that the military had no intention of creating new tensions (Diário de Notícias, 8.6.2000. Ref. vii).

The situation now calmed down, temporarily, but the underlying tensions remained.
Democratisation in the Village = ‘Change’?

Kandjadjja – one village among thousands

As a result of political elections, citizens at all levels of society are drawn into the democratisation process, if in no other way than by the registration of voters. The practical preparations for elections and their implementation also activate many people at the local level. Whether this is decentralisation of political power or not is a completely different matter. What is decisive from the point of view of power is whether the elections, in practice, have the effect that the citizens jointly formulate their wishes, appoint their representatives and demand accountability, or whether the elections mainly have the effect that the leaders mobilise their supporters to legitimise and promote the leaders’ own interests. In this respect Guinea-Bissau is not alone in the world in inclining more to the latter than the former. But, in Guinea-Bissau as in other places, there are features of both. These features are difficult to capture in quantitative terms and therefore the method of using an illustrative case study can be of great assistance. Such a case study follows below.

There are almost four thousand villages of varying size in Guinea-Bissau. I have had the opportunity to follow one of them ever since 1976. We shall obtain our material from this village. The village is called Kandjadjja and is a normal Guinean village, similar to thousands and tens of thousands of other villages in rural Africa. I have described it many times before. The directly visible changes take place slowly, but life and history do not stand still.

46. In Guinea-Bissau the name of the village is usually spelt Candjadja, which is the Portuguese spelling. When transcribing from Mandinga, however, which is the predominant language in the area, as well as when writing in Guinean Creole, it is common to use the letter K for the k-sound. I therefore continue to use the K, as I have always done, although this is not the official usage.
Cattle is of great importance in many respects to the villagers of Kandjadja, representing both security and prestige. The area is largely untouched by government development policies. Since the 1980s, the forest road leading to the village has deteriorated, the state school has been closed and the state-employed village nurse has been withdrawn. Photo: Lars Rudebeck.

With its thousand or so inhabitants Kandjadja is one of the larger villages in Guinea-Bissau. It is the main village in an administrative section that also includes twelve smaller villages spread out in the forest south of the river Farim, which flows westwards towards the sea. The whole section can have some 4,500 inhabitants. The area is situated in the administrative sector of Mansabá, in the Oio region, in the northern part of Guinea-Bissau. As the bird flies it is not more than twenty-five kilometres north-west to the border with Senegal, where the politically unsettled province of Casamance begins. From Kandjadja to the sleepy regional capital of Farim there is a bumpy road, twenty kilometres long, through the forest in a north-easterly direction. Bissau is some one hundred and ten kilometres to the south, including twelve kilometres of track road through the forest before reaching the main road between Farim and Bissau.

47. The villages in the section are (with official spelling): Candjadja, Dabocunda, Corinto, Sabalacunda, Ninjobaia, Colissari, Mandina, Breco-ba, Breco-rim, Salinto, Madina Saladala, Tambato, Djebacunda.

48. The figure has been calculated in the same way as for the whole country in Chapter 5 above. The point of departure is the number of persons entitled to vote in the section in 1999, which was 2,209 voters (Mansabá, sector, constituency no. 7, II, detailed record of the second round of the presidential election 16.1.2000. Ref. vi). It is naturally uncertain whether the average age distribution for the whole country is also applicable in Kandjadja. This is merely an assumption for the sake of the example. But if the age distribution is the same and if the other assumptions in note 135 are also applicable to the Kandjadja section, then its population in September 1999 would have been 4,536 inhabitants.
The Moslem Mandinga people dominate in Kandjadja, but there are also ‘animist’ Balanta and Moslem Fula in the section. The main village is entirely Mandinga and thus its religion is Islam. The livelihood and economy of the people is based upon agriculture in a wide sense of the term, pursued with simple techniques on the basis of proven methods and certain handicrafts. The former state-owned store passed into private ownership in 1986, as a result of the structural adjustment reforms sweeping over Africa at that time in accordance with World Bank and International Monetary Fund prescriptions. Simple consumer goods are found in the store, but the purchasing power in the village is very limited. The state school was closed in 1989, as the government gave up its earlier ambitions in the field of public education. Since then there has only been the Koranic school. The two finest houses in the village, with outer walls of white plaster, are in fact the mosque where the Koranic school is held and the house where the imam (the Moslem priest) lives.

In recent years cashew nuts have been the most important source of cash income. Previously it was groundnuts. Sometimes an enterprising villager takes other products, for example onions, all the way to the large Bandim market in Bissau.

During the civil war in 1998-99 the area around Kandjadja was not af-

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49. I have described these effects of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment in some detail in earlier writings (see Rudebeck 1992, with full references to even earlier writings. Ref. 1).
fected by any direct acts of warfare. But the war and the crisis had still been felt, mainly through the refugees coming from Bissau. The large family I know best told me that, from time to time, they had had up to thirty different relatives staying with them as refugees in their simple houses. Now the supplies had been emptied, including the seed for sowing the following year, and the people themselves were very tired.

A paradox

*Mudança* /change was required. I learnt that another word for *mudança* was democracy – actually a synonym in this context. Democracy, I was told, was supposed to have come through the repetition of the 1994 elections. But those elections had already been democratic. And see what happened… Democracy did not seem to have helped. What could one do?

Politics in Kandjadja is characterised by a paradox. The village and the whole area are, in practice, untouched by government development policies. Since the beginning of the 1980s the population has been left to itself. In an interview made as early as in 1986, I had been told that “they (the state) have left us in a hole”. The same could just as well have been said in the year 2000. The forest road leading to the village was in worse condition in that year than it had been in 1976. As mentioned above, the state school had been closed in 1989. The state-employed village nurse had disappeared in 1980.

Still, for all that, PAIGC, and the state power under PAIGC control up to the end of 1999, have always been able to count on political support from the area where Kandjadja is situated. Even in the multi-party elections of 1994 – the first time it was possible to vote against PAIGC – the outcome was very distinct. Then PAIGC received 59 per cent of the votes compared to 38 for the entire country. In the final round of the 1994 presidential election in the village, ‘Nino’ Vieira received as much as 90 per cent (66 per cent in the constituency of Mansabá of which Kandjadja is part) compared to 52 per cent in the entire country (Rudebeck 1996, pp. 18-22; 1997a, pp. 26-32. Ref. 1).

The general explanation provided locally for the paradox is that “this is an *‘antiga zona libertada’*/an old liberated area”, i.e. an area controlled by the PAIGC as early as in the anti-colonial war between 1963 and 1974. But this, today, is not a real explanation. It is rather an indirect way of saying that the only political contacts that exist between the people in the village and the politicians in the capital go through PAIGC. As will be further explained below, there are no other channels that seem to be realis-
tic from the perspective of the people and there are no other politicians whom they feel they know. This does not mean that they are satisfied with the state of things. The demand for change is as strong in Kandjadja as in other places in the country. But when the citizens voted in 1994 it was nevertheless clear that, after all was said and done, most people felt less reluctant to cast their vote for PAIGC than for any of the other parties.

We will soon return to more specific explanations of the paradox in Kandjadja. Let us see first what happened in November 1999 and in January 2000. What did the voters in the village think of the political parties, five and a half years after the first multi-party elections in the country – and, in addition, with a devastating civil war in between? Did they still want to vote for PAIGC? Did they believe in the promises made by the opposition? What did they feel about the opposition’s leading presidential candidate, Koumba Yalá? This account is based on visits and interviews made in May and December 1999 and January 2000.

The parliamentary and presidential elections at village level, November 1999

As in several other places in the country, voting was delayed in Kandjadja on November 28.50 According to the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja, the ballot box had arrived late. He was also chairman of the section’s committee of support for PAIGC and had kept precise notes. According to his notes, voting in the village had started at 3.52 p.m. and, in agreement with the rules, had ended at 5 p.m. Since this was too little time for everyone to have a chance to vote, the voting had continued on Monday between 7.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.51

The reason for the considerable delay in the arrival of the ballot box was most probably the threat of strike mentioned above. Demands for an increase in pay made by certain voting officials had also caused problems the day before. It was therefore impossible for the equipment to arrive on Sunday morning. When the voting finally started, everything proceeded very calmly and in an orderly fashion. According to the chairman of the section this was only “to a certain extent” due to civic awareness, since the parties, in his view, had not taken the trouble to make it clear what they represented and the voters consequently could not really know what they

50. In the section there were five other polling stations besides the one in Kandjadja, namely in the villages of Mandina, Djebacunda, Corinto, Madina Saladala and Solinto.
51. Interviews on 4 and 11.12.1999. During the latter interview the chairman consulted the notes he had made on election day.
were voting for. Still they had taken everything calmly and turned up in force to vote, but apparently without great expectations.

Despite the fact that Kandjadja is situated off the beaten track in the forest with very poor communications, several political parties had visited the village before election day to mobilise voters. The constituency of Mansabá, of which Kandjadja is a part, elects three members (deputies) to parliament (Assembleia Nacional Popular/ANP). PAIGC’s candidates were well known in the area and had promised to work for schools, health services and road construction if they were elected. Even “Helder Vaz’s people” from ‘Bafatá’ (RGB/MB) had visited the village, as well as representatives of “Abubacar” (UNDP) and “Bubacar” (LIPE). Only one party leader and presidential candidate had visited Kandjadja during the election campaign before November 28. This was Victor Mandinga from AD. On the other hand Koumba Yalá’s party, PRS, had not shown up at all in the village. This was generally explained by the fact that he is “Balanta”, while Kandjadja is “Mandinga”.

The votes were counted in the village under the close supervision of the representatives of the different parties and were then taken to Mansabá where they were included in the votes for the entire constituency. The results for Kandjadja are shown below in tables 7-9.

Let us start with table 6. This table refers to the election held in 1994 and compares the results of the first multi-party elections in Kandjadja with those for the entire country. As can be seen, the difference is quite small and it would have been even smaller had we had access to the 1994 figures for blank and invalid votes in the village.

If we proceed then to table 7, which gives the corresponding comparison for the parliamentary elections in 1999, the difference between Kandjadja and

| Table 6. Comparison Kandjadja/whole country, election to ANP, July 3, 1994, per cent, rounded off |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| **Kandjadja** | **Whole country** |
| Vote % | Vote % |
| PAIGC | 59 | 38 |
| Other parties | 41 | 44 |
| Blank + invalid | * | 18 |
| **Total** | **100 %** | **100 %** |


* This information is lacking in my material from 1994.
the entire country is, on the contrary, very great. Election opinion in the
country as a whole had changed considerably. A large proportion of the
voters had quite simply abandoned PAIGC, which now only received 15 per
cent of the votes in the entire country. But, in Kandjadja, the former gov-
erning party could still win 40 per cent of the 432 votes cast there (as com-
pared to 33 per cent in the entire constituency of Mansabá).

In other words, in spite of everything that had happened in the coun-
try, the voters in Kandjadja still showed almost unshaken confidence in
PAIGC in the election in 1999. The two most important, specific explana-
tions I have been able to find for this are the following: (1) PAIGC’s candi-
dates for the constituency’s mandates in parliament (ANP) were well-known
in the village, and (2) there was a direct personal link to Malam Bacai
Sanhá’s campaign office. This link consisted of the fact that a “son of the
village”, who had been a teacher in the state school in the 1980s, worked
in the 1999/2000 election campaign for Malam Bacai Sanhá’s wife in the
PAIGC’s national campaign secretariat.

Table 8 shows that the distribution of party sympathies in Kandjadja
was different from the whole country, not only with regard to PAIGC but
also in other ways. For example, in Kandjadja UNDP was the second
largest party with 34 votes of the 432 votes cast – before both PRS and
‘Bafata’. According to information received, UNDP’s success was achieved
by donating “a little medicine” and a new mat to the mosque.

According to information from several sources, which cannot be ver-
ified due to election secrecy, all, or almost all votes cast in favour of the
opposition party, PRS, were cast in Kandjadja-Balanta, a small neigh-
bouring village, administratively part of the main village and situated a
couple of kilometres south of it. There all the inhabitants are Balanta, are
not Moslems, eat pork, like to drink palm wine, speak a completely different language from that spoken in the main village, and are tempted by the idea of asserting their cultural identity by voting for \( \textit{\text{pal}} \) and its presidential candidate. As opposed to the nation-wide distribution of votes which was clearly influenced both by non-ethnic and ethnic factors, we have here a very clear-cut example of ethnic voting.

It is interesting also to see in table 8 that as many as eleven of the thirteen parties actually succeeded in obtaining at least a few votes in an isolated village such as Kandjadja. Only \( \textit{\text{fsg-sd}} \), the party of the female presidential candidate, Antonieta Rosa Gomes, and \( \textit{\text{pu}} \), the party of the recently deceased former prime minister, Saúde Maria, failed to obtain any votes at all in the village. In the presidential election, however, Rosa Gomes did obtain one vote of the 436 found in the ballot box.

The pattern in the presidential election is similar to that in the parliamentary election.\(^\text{52}\) Koumba Yalá even received exactly the same num-

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Table 8. Results of the election to the National Assembly, ANP in Kandjadja, November 28, 1999, number of votes and rounded-off percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGB</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIPE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLING</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blank + invalid</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>432</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (1) The figures noted by the local voting official, filled in by the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja in a copy of the official form, on the basis of the voting official’s own information directly from the polling station, 28 and 29.11.1999 (Kandjadja. Ref. VI), checked against (2) hand-written material from the deputy elected in 1999 for PAIGC in constituency no.7, Mansabá (Kandjadja. Ref. VI).

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\(^{52}\) No table included here. See, for such a table, my longer Portuguese-language version (Rudebeck 2001a. Ref. 8). The following information on the results of the first round of presidential elections is based upon what the local chairman told me while consulting his own handwritten notes, in turn checked by me against the handwritten tables given to the National Electoral Commission for the entire sector of Mansabá.
ber of votes as PRS, corresponding to 8 per cent. On the other hand Malam Bacai Sanhá received considerably more than PAIGC – as many as 313 votes, which corresponds to 72 per cent of the vote. This is considerably more than the 20 per cent he reached in the whole country. It is also the same pattern as in 1994, when ‘Nino’ Vieira was much more successful in the village than in the country as a whole. In other words the impression that Kandjadja stuck to old political habits, as opposed to the rest of the country, was even stronger in the presidential election.

The ethnic, cultural factor that seems to explain why most voters from Kandjadja-Balanta vote for PRS and Koumba Yalá works also in the opposite direction, as only very few voters in the main village voted for the “Balanta party”.

At the local level there is furthermore a concrete conflict that, according to the villagers, was of great significance for electoral behaviour in 1999/2000. Traditionally one of the tests of manhood of young Balanta is to rob cattle from neighbouring villages. During recent years several households in Kandjadja-Mandinga have suffered from this cultural tradition – or criminal habit, depending on how one sees it. It had even gone so far that the villagers kept their cows locked up at night, out of fear of the cattle thieves from the neighbouring village. Anger at this insecurity contributed to creating negative feelings for the PRS and scepticism about its presidential candidate with the Balanta cap, regardless of how much they agreed with him on the need for mudança. “Perhaps Koumba Yalá doesn’t like us?”

However, the conflicts over cattle and other material and cultural differences do not prevent the inhabitants of the two villages from having normal social relations, which can, on the surface, appear uncomplicated and even friendly. People from the Balanta village do their shopping, for example, in the store in the main village; they vote there; and until 1989 their children went with the Mandinga children to school there.

Second round of the presidential election at village level, January 2000

We can be brief with the second round of the presidential election. As everywhere else in the country, the situation was much more straightforward this time. It was for or against one of the two candidates: Koumba Yalá versus Malam Bacai Sanhá. They could both be seen on the ballot paper, one with a red Balanta cap and the other in the same type of patterned West Africa knitted woollen cap as the historic leader of the anti-
colonial liberation struggle, Amílcar Cabral, used to wear in his time. All one had to do was to go behind the screen and mark the preferred candidate.

Participation in the election was somewhat lower than in the first round. Then 92 per cent (436/474) of the registered voters had participated in the election. Now participation declined to 86 per cent (410/474). But this was still much higher than in the country as a whole, where average participation declined from 83 per cent of the registered voters in the first round to 72 per cent in the second.

But what is most exceptional in Kandjadjá is the result itself – it deviates dramatically from the trend in the country as a whole. I have already pointed out a number of different explanations that reinforce each other. Let us summarise them:

• Kandjadjá is an “old liberated area”, i.e. there is a historical tradition.
• There are few obvious differences between the parties’ programmes, ideas or proposals, and therefore the voters have to rely on personal impressions and local authorities.
• The people are not aware of any other channels “upwards” than The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC.
• Personal contacts are made either directly or through important persons in the village with PAIGC’s representatives in parliament and other important authorities.

Table 9. Results of the second round of the presidential election in Kandjadjá, January 16, 2000, numbers of votes, per cent (rounded off) of the 410 votes cast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of votes</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC)</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koumba Yalá (PRS)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank votes</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid votes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protests</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>410</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Registered voters (474) who did not vote | 64 | 14 %

**Source:** Hand-written material from the PAIGC’s elected deputy in 1999 in constituency no. 7, Mansabá. This is based in turn on information received directly from the 51 polling stations on election day 16.1.2000 under the supervision of the PAIGC supervisor for the whole constituency, who is also the chairman of the section committee for Kandjadjá (Kandjadjá. Ref. VII).
• There is an ethnic, cultural factor speaking against The Party for Social Renewal, PRS and Koumba Yalá, reinforced by acute problems with cattle thefts.
• There is a direct link to Malam Bacai Sanhá via a respected “son of the village.”

There was also a special event, which, according to several people I spoke to, had made a strong impression on the villagers. On January 10, fairly late in the evening, after dark, on the Monday before election Sunday, the interim President and presidential candidate Malam Bacai Sanhá arrived to Kandjadja and held a meeting in the middle of the village. He had come from the north, from Farim, the regional capital of Oio. He stood in the headlights of cars and spoke to the villagers and answered their questions for half an hour. Among other things he said that if he was elected president he would help the people in Kandjadja section with water supplies, schooling and health care. The message, I was told, had been received with a “certain amount of trust”. Malam Bacai Sanhá had worn his Cabral cap. There had been a great deal of interest. When the meeting was over, he had continued his journey south in the night to a larger place called Olossato.

The chairman of the section emphasised to me that this was the first time ever in Kandjadja’s history that the President of the Republic had visited the village. On the other hand, he underlined, Koumba Yalá had not visited the village at all.

Thus, on second thoughts, perhaps the voting behaviour of the people of Kandjadja is not so difficult to understand. On the contrary, in the concrete context of prevailing conditions, of which the villagers are well aware, there may well be a type of rationality in it. If so, what are the implications for democratisation and democracy? We will return to these issues in the final chapter.

‘Civil society’ at village level

Four years ago I wrote about ‘civil society’ in Guinea-Bissau and Kandjadja (Rudebeck 1996, pp. 31-35; 1997a, pp. 44-50. Ref. 1). At the overall level I summarised by pointing out that there are in principle two ways of increasing the opportunities for citizens to assume responsibility in society. One is that the state draws back, while the other is that the institutions of the state are democratised. The strategic issue for democracy is how the two approaches can supplement and support each other. In its
political practice, so far, the Guinean government has tried to avoid the issue of how far the state can withdraw in favour of civil society without large groups in the population ending up completely without access to common resources. However resilient and patient rural Africans may be, there are still limits to how far such policies can be pursued without breaking the bonds of society.

In Kandjadja, before 1990, the same had been true as almost everywhere else in the rural areas, namely that one-party rule had made it impossible in practice for voluntary organisations to participate in development work, if they did not have the direct support of the state and the party. But in 1990, the first year of democratisation, something new occurred in the village. Representatives of RADI (Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré) started to visit Kandjadja and to encourage the population to start programmes to develop local farming based on their own traditional forms of organisation.

In the beginning, RADI met with considerable response from the people. But my conclusion in 1996 was nonetheless hesitant in respect of power equalisation. The example of Kandjadja clearly demonstrated how the shortcomings and even the absence of the state in developmental work had created a vacuum, as well as deep popular disenchantment. This in turn had opened up chances for an organisation such as RADI to strike a chord of strong response within civil society. Thanks to democratisation this became legal.

Still it was difficult to see how continued development in the area, and its coordination with Guinea-Bissau and West Africa as a whole, would ever be able to gain momentum without the presence of more dynamic state power than up to now. Despite democratisation in the constitutional sense and despite RADI, the vacuum was as great as before.

1999/2000: RADI and ‘civil society’

Four years later, the situation had not improved, as far as the state was concerned. It is true that democratic elections had been held according to the rules, as we have seen above. But there was not much to indicate that local government was on its way to become more dynamic than before, whether in the short or in the medium run.

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53. RADI is an African NGO/voluntary organisation for culture-based development work in agriculture. The countries that are represented through their local (national) organisations are Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Congo. See brochure Le RADI. Ce qu’il est et ce qu’il veut (Ref. v) and Hellström (1995, pp. 36-37, Ref. v). A document entitled Projet d’appui aux associations rurales de la Région de Oio pour leur reconnaissance légale-juridique (1995, Ref. v) provides information on RADI’s organisational structure in the Oio region.
Against this background, what had happened to RADI and civil society? Had the organisation succeeded in making good use of the trust it had gained among the people?

RADI had built up a training centre in the forest seventeen kilometres east of Kandjadja, near the village of Djalicunda. The centre is very ambitious, built with local materials. It has its own source of fresh water and even computers that work with the aid of solar cells. Local varieties of seeds are cultivated under conditions that take the environment into ecological consideration. Those working at the centre in Djalicunda are locally recruited Guineans. It is intended that courses shall be held there and that farmers in the area shall be inspired to use modern farming techniques that pay due respect to traditional working methods and to the environment. The potential is great. The work is still in its infancy.

According to a written report made in 1999, the key concept of RADI’s theory is cooperation with the people (Rapport d’activités et d’exécution financière du projet de renforcement institutionnel GW006031 au profit de RADI/Guinée-Bissau, mai 1997 à avril 1999, 1999, pp. 6-7. Ref. v. Translated by Lars Rudebeck):

In Guinea-Bissau there is real potential to develop the rural sector, since there is still land available to extend areas under cultivation, and there are possibilities to intensify cultivation, to diversify forestry, to extend local fishing and to increase the herds of cattle. But it is important to note that a strategy to exploit all these possibilities requires more than technical investments. It is necessary to make great efforts to stimulate the interest of the rural population, to train, to organise and reorganise, to improve the motivation of the technicians – all with the aim of getting the parties involved in the rural areas to assume more responsibility and to strengthen the position of women. RADI/Guinea-Bissau’s support for development of the local communities has focused on this approach.

Another report describes food support provided through RADI to twenty-seven villages in the region of Oio that received refugees during the civil war in 1998/99, in the Mansabá sector, among others (Rapport d’exécution technique et financière du solde de projet GW006011, dans le cadre d’un programme d’appui d’urgence aux populations victimes du conflit armé en Guinée-Bissau, dans la région d’Oio, RADI, 30.4.1999, pp. 2 and 4. Ref. v).

Kandjadja is not among the twenty-seven villages listed in the report. This is possibly due to the fact that support for RADI’s work seems to have declined in Kandjadja during the second half of the 1990s. It is clear that opinions in the village on RADI are quite divided. Some villagers work ac-
tively with the organisation and have succeeded in benefiting from it. Others, however, express strong dissatisfaction with RADI’s work and find that it focuses more on the organisation’s own needs than on the needs of the local people (interviews, December 1999 and January 2000).

**Private and public in politics**

Such difficulties as just mentioned are common in what has come to be termed ‘civil society’ with its various voluntary organisations. The problem is not restricted to Guinea-Bissau. It has general relevance. Often the problem has its roots in private and personal interests. When the political process focuses upon and reaches into such conflicts, it will very easily take the form of ‘patron-client relationships’ rather than democratic organisation. Both citizens and leaders take advantage of the opportunities available to them to promote their short-term interests. As far as the citizens are concerned, in situations of material poverty, it is principally a question of day-to-day survival, while for the politicians it is more a question of power resources. As long as the citizens cannot discern any concrete reasons to assume that public, collective action actually might help them survive and improve their lives, the likelihood is great that they will continue to turn to their patrons, even under the guise of the constitutionally democratic system or through various civil society activities – not so much because they trust those patrons but because they do not see any realistic alternatives.

This looks like an impasse, at least in the short run. In the somewhat longer run, the negative dynamics of such a situation are not sustainable. Both the development necessary for people to survive in acceptable ways and their readiness, as well as their capacity, to support their patrons’ power are undermined. The example of Kandjadja is instructive in both of these respects – by clearly demonstrating how little the local people get in return for their political support and by indicating limits to their patience. In their view, the support offered by them in a democratic process to the old ruling party as well as to RADI is far from unconditional. So far, however, their self-perceived, short-term interest has not incited them to new forms of politicisation, beyond participating in multiparty elections.
CHAPTER 7

Democratisation and control over developmental resources

The final words of the preceding chapter bring up the problem of democratisation and development seen together, as it materialises in Guinea-Bissau and other countries marked by mass poverty. Abstractly formulated, this is the key developmental problem of how to make needs and resources meet. For that problem to be resolved, needs must be defined and existing resources must be put to use. This is a three-dimensional task involving culture as well as economy and politics. The more equally distributed the power to define needs and to control relevant resources is, the more democratic is also, by definition, the society in question, and the greater the chance that existing resources will be used in accordance with the developmental needs of the many. This goes to the core of the conceptual theme of democracy and democratisation in relation to development, as discussed in chapter 1. Let us link up more concretely here by way of also considering the second theme: that of control over developmental resources.

Culture and politics

It is a commonly held view in the ‘development community’ and more specifically within the modernisation school of development studies and among present-day neo-institutionalist, culturalist and history-oriented students of post-colonial reality (cf. Rudebeck 1994; Leys 1996. Ref. 1) that political culture in ‘developing countries’, and today most particularly in Africa, is more marked by patron-client relations and corruption than in ‘developed’ countries and that this, as such, would in turn somehow explain the undeniable facts of uneven resource control and deficient economic progress. In a recent and much acclaimed political science study,
two European researchers, Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, while discussing lack of development in Africa even go as far as suggesting that “development as we conceive it might in effect not be the priority for a majority of Africans” (Chabal & Daloz 1999, p. 125. Ref. 1). Although themselves eagerly denying that they put forth “an outdated ‘cultural’ interpretation of present-day Africa” (p. 101). Chabal and Daloz do indeed state (p. 100) that “…seemingly dishonest attitudes are, in large measure at least, the result of particularistic and communitarian codes of conduct which have little to do with the notion of the public good.” The authors no doubt intend their analysis to account for a complex socio-economic, political and cultural structure which in the end results both in political systems marked by patron-client relations and in little development. The cultural argument nevertheless risks coming close to tautology, by tending to explain political inefficiency (clientelism and corruption) with culture marked by – clientelism and corruption.

The question here is not whether the line of division between public and private is more diffuse in the political cultures of most African countries than, generally, in for instance Western Europe and North America. It most probably is. The question is how far this kind of argument takes us in explaining lack of development. Patron-client relations and corruption as such certainly have not prevented economic development in other parts of the world, whether, for instance, historically in the West or in modern Asia.\textsuperscript{55}

By concentrating – or appearing to concentrate – the explanatory effort to cultural variables, the question of power in society is avoided. But the distribution of political power is a key factor in development. Its equalisation is furthermore what democratisation is all about. True enough, an inherited culture of client deference to patrons obviously supports unequal power and thus does not facilitate democratisation. But in accordance with Max Weber’s classical sociological perspective, culture is more fruitfully analysed as the ‘switchman’ between interest and action than as an overall explanation of society as such (see on this Rudebeck 1994; 1998:a, specifically pp. 212-215 and 219. Ref. 1). Culture provides values, images and

\textsuperscript{54} The argument is developed as follows [p. 101]: “We are merely highlighting those aspects of that ‘moral economy of corruption’ which are best explained by the successful adaptation of existing social practices to the demands of a modern economy [larger markets, the use of paper money, modern telecommunications, etc.].

We are not dealing with antiquated practices on their way to extinction but, much more realistically, with codes of conduct which are at the heart of modern economic activities… Hence, what we are inclined to label as corruption is in reality a complex of behavioural patterns which are key ingredients of the continent’s modernity.”

\textsuperscript{55} Cf. the following methodological remark by Mamdani (1996, note 2, p. 293, Ref. 1) on “the mode of domination” as an explanatory variable: “My point about clientelism is that it is more an effect of the form of power than an explanation of it.”
frameworks for interpreting reality. But when necessary to daily survival, even democratically minded persons bow to patrons, however reluctantly. Our explanatory efforts need to be pushed beyond the surface recognition of the factual existence of such behaviour. What material forces or interests and political structures do actually obstruct democratisation?

**Control over developmental resources**

As discussed at the end of Chapter 2, control over many developmental resources of importance for Guinea-Bissau is in the hands of outside forces. Such inequality tends to be reinforced under the conditions of today’s globalisation. It is quite possible, however, that even control over such developmental resources which actually can be locally and nationally managed under globalisation, will for a long time to come continue to escape most people in Guinea-Bissau and many other countries. If so, democracy will in other words have turned out to be thinly and incompletely implemented. In most cases this will not be because people, for cultural reasons, do not want power to be shared. Quite the reverse, the explanation will much more likely have to be sought in a complex structure of power which makes it excessively hard for Guineans in general to make their developmental interests heard and seen, even within the newly introduced democratic institutions, however much they would have liked to be able to do so. The ‘solution’ then, for instance for the people of Guinea-Bissau, would thus be to gradually change that structure in a more democratic direction through a long and difficult process of social and political struggle.

As my own observations of democratisation as well as the outcome of the 1999/2000 elections in Guinea-Bissau indicate, grassroots citizens of that country are indeed eagerly prepared to get involved in the democratic electoral procedure. Many welcome that procedure as a possible means of controlling their own developmental resources and do their best to implement it, in the hope that this will help them improve their lives. In so doing, they also demonstrate a basic understanding of the meaning of democracy.

What chances are there that they will not be deceived again?

**Democratic commitment**

We have just noted that local commitment to democratisation was considerable in Guinea-Bissau in 1999/2000. What about the national level?

It is probably a telling indication of only conditional commitment that so much of the electoral effort was allowed to depend on foreign finance.
This ties up with the question of the role of development assistance in democratisation to which we will return briefly, at the very end.

With regard to leadership commitment to democracy as such, a pessimistic view was offered by the Guinean sociologist, Carlos Lopes, in an interview published in the Portuguese daily newspaper *Público* in November 1999, shortly before the elections. “There are no democratic projects” was the heading of the article. According to Lopes, all presidential candidates running in the elections were either populist or autocratic (Lopes 1999. Ref. 1):

> Once again we shall see how the usurpation of Guinean resources is legitimised…

> There are no democratic projects in these elections, as there is no democratic culture within the parties, and as none of the candidates (for the presidency) have any ‘track record’ of democracy, which is true of all of them, from the most intellectual to the most radical. And I know them all personally.

At least in the short run, and possibly also in the longer run, there are few signs contradicting Lopes’ pessimistic analysis. During the first few months after the elections, when hopes for change were high, this was instead fully supported by the new government’s weak leadership and by continued confusion between military and civilian power, as shown at the end of Chapter 5.

The observation just made refers to the way the political system works in a structural sense. There are of course a number of individuals who try to resist these pressures, often at great personal risk and sacrifice. Nevertheless, their efforts so far have little effect in respect of the way the system operates. It is a key argument of the present study that this has to do with interests linked to economic and political power.

As far as the democratic commitment of grassroots citizens is concerned, a clear potential, but no more, for such politicisation of civil society on common developmental interests, necessary for the undermining of the patron-client system in politics, was indicated in connection with the elections. After the elections, however, there was little encouragement for those who had taken the public interest dimension of the campaign seriously. Without a minimum of hope and support for those citizens who are prepared to assume responsibilities – whether by discussing public issues, by voting, by running for office, or by any other means – the new democratic institutions will have no meaning. This leads us on to the issue of ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society and the distinction between the two.
We have seen in chapters 3 and 4 that considerable strength was manifested by what is called ‘civil society’ during the civil war and the following period of transition to civilian rule by elected politicians. Actors in ‘civil society’ – together with ‘political society’ in the form of parliamentarians and political parties acting independently of the government – contributed very significantly to undermining the authority of president ‘Nino’ Vieira. All this sets Guinea-Bissau in a category quite different from that of many other African countries where military coups and civil wars raged in the 1990s, not least the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia.

It appears thus that some of the crucial institutions supportive of democracy in Guinea-Bissau do have a latent force that should not be underestimated. Can this force be sustainably mobilised also in times of peace and ‘normality’? The outcome of the May 2000 attempt to suppress independent criticism referred to in Chapter 5 indicates that this may not be impossible. On that occasion, which is not unique, the democratic forces of civil society were able to resist.

Still, in the longer run, urban civil society, however vital, cannot alone sustain democracy in predominantly rural countries such as Guinea-Bissau. It is therefore a negative sign in the context of democracy that whatever exists of civil society in the rural areas is so weak in political terms. In this specific respect, the conditions described in my study of the village of Kandjadja are likely to be highly representative. No structures or organisations based upon the notion of political equality, enabling the farming population as a whole to stand up autonomously vis-à-vis the state exist in the rural areas. Only under historically exceptional circumstances – most importantly the struggle for liberation from Portuguese colonialism during the years 1963-1974 – has it been possible for joint political projects transcending local or cultural/ethnic interests to gain political support in the rural areas, by supplementing, combining with, or even in some instances by supplanting traditional networks of personal and social relations.

Using the Ugandan historian and political scientist Mahmood Mamdani’s conceptual language in his path-breaking study *Citizen and Subject* on political and economic relations in rural versus urban Africa, we may say that conditions favouring ‘citizenship’ are still rarer in Guinea-Bissau than conditions pressing people into ‘subjection’ (Mamdani 1996). It is Mamdani’s thesis that the rural people in Africa most often are ‘subjects’ rather than ‘citizens’ and that the historical roots of this are to be found in the
colonial powers’ inclination to control the rural areas by way of traditional structures of power. The *indirect rule* of the British exemplifies this very clearly, but the pattern was not limited to the British colonies. The colonial state was “bifurcated”, Mamdani writes (pp. 16-18), meaning that in the countryside it relied on customary – ethnic – rule, while limited citizenship was introduced in the modern urban sector. This split continues to mark post-colonial Africa and to limit any democratisation in Africa so far. To reach more deeply, democratisation would thus, among other things, have to involve doing away with the customary power of local chiefs in the rural areas, which is in turn linked to the post-colonial state through clientelist, non-civic structures. The example of Kandjadja is very illustrative in this respect, as shown in Chapter 6.

More concretely, change in the direction of deeper democratisation may result from the self-organisation and legal regularisation of independent political and economic associations, reaching beyond local issues, among the people of the rural areas. This has not occurred in Kandjadja, in spite of the active presence there of an unusually vigorous local *ngo*. The short-term self-interest of the local citizens as perceived by themselves does not yet incite them to new forms of politicisation, beyond participating in multiparty elections.

**Military versus civilian power**

In the interview mentioned above (1999. Ref. 1), Carlos Lopes also brought up the issue of military versus civilian power, which has been a recurring theme in my account of democratisation in Guinea-Bissau. His specific point was that the military…

> will certainly ask for a price to be paid for their intervention… There is always a price to be paid…

Even in this regard, Lopes’ pessimism has turned out to be realistic, at least in the short run. We saw in Chapter 5 that the initial period of the new democratic regime was marked by a distinct inclination of the military to hold on to state power and hence by recurrent crises in political relations between Brigadier (General) Ansumane Mané and President Koumba Yalá.

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56. Both the titles Brigadier and General (even Brigadier-General) are found in the written material on Ansumane Mané. At least after the reinstatement of constitutional democracy in 2000, the most correct title is probably Brigadier.
The lack of government finance was intimately tied up with military discontent, as much of the problem of undue military intervention in Guinean politics might well be resolved, if the government merely found itself able to pay the soldiers’ salaries and pensions. “There is always a

Back to the Barracks – The President’s Appeals and Guarantees – this is the front-page headline of Banobero, 11.6. 1999, showing the military parade that commemorated the first anniversary of the uprising of June 7, 1998. Copied from Banobero, 11.6.1999.
price to be paid…”, as Lopes says. Paying that price, however, is not an easy task to carry out for a government devoid of finance.

This brings us to the two final themes of elected leaders’ responsibilities and international assistance, which will now be commented upon jointly.

Elected leaders’ responsibilities and international development assistance

For democratic government to be sustainable, it is essential that ordinary citizens are not left without realistic hopes for improvement and without support from the leaders they have elected into office. This obviously puts a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of those leaders to provide the electorate with examples of democratic citizenship. If they fail in this regard, democratic credibility will be undermined, in Guinea-Bissau as anywhere else. As blatantly illustrated by the example of Guinea-Bissau, not even extreme levels of international assistance will make it possible in the long run for political patrons to secure their positions when political credibility fails.

Foreign assistance is a natural supplement to national resources in difficult situations such as that of Guinea-Bissau. Responsibly and sensitively offered assistance can obviously be constructive in the process of democratisation, particularly in transitional phases. It was even critical at certain moments of the sensitive period of preparing the elections, when the Comissão Nacional de Eleições claimed it would be paralysed unless aided from abroad.

Nevertheless, enduring dependence upon assistance stands in stark contradiction both to the principle and to the practice of democracy, particularly when reaching as extreme heights as in Guinea-Bissau, where net official development assistance received in 1998 amounted to just over half (50.5 per cent) of the country’s entire GNP (Human Development Report 2000, table 18, p. 221. Ref. 1). The meaning of democracy is nothing more and

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57. Swedish development assistance in support of independent news media contributed for instance significantly to democratisation in Guinea-Bissau all through the 1990s (see Rudebeck 1999:b. Ref. 1).

58. Guinea-Bissau’s percentage was higher in 1998 than that of any other country in the world, except São Tomé e Príncipe. The average for the “least developed countries” was 8.4 per cent. According to Human Development Report 1999 (table 15, p. 195), aid received by Guinea-Bissau amounted to 48.3 per cent of GNP in 1991 and 49.7 in 1997, which goes to show that the figure for 1998 was far from exceptional. Most probably the statistics upon which it was based predate the outbreak of war in 1998, indicating that the ratio of aid to GNP has even risen since then.
nothing less than the rule by the people of their own affairs. This obviously is not compatible with external rule of key decisions on how to use internal resources. Nor is it compatible with leaders using development assistance as an easy way to run away from their responsibilities.

People managing their resources together, according to agreed rules, in order to achieve commonly accepted goals, is a credible way of achieving such improvement of life and society as is most often called ‘development’. In Guinea-Bissau, however, available indications are that the newly elected leaders rather played the opposite game during the first year of revived democracy, hoping for international assistance but showing few signs in practice of taking innovative measures together with the people. Such innovative measures would have to include serious support to self-organisation in the countryside as well as practical measures of professional training and community-based self-help projects in education, health and economic improvement, in both urban and rural areas. The difficulty lies in making democracy work in such a way that elected officials are effectively held accountable when not doing what all know needs to be done.

Not having any real levers of power in their hands, in spite of the existence of constitutional democracy in their country, the Guinean people may still find some reason for limited hope in the thought that their leaders themselves probably have more to lose than to gain from continuing to block further democratisation and thereby development. Will this insight provoke the leaders themselves into acting more responsively and innovatively?

**Concluding remark**

Fair elections, with considerable popular support, may well create democratic legitimacy, at least for some time. The Guinean case is a good illustration. But ‘democracy’ is a concept full of meaning. As we saw in Chapter 1, to some people it is even strong enough as a concept to signify the very quest for happiness on earth. It is therefore absolutely decisive if legitimate ways will be opened or not, as a result of the 1999 and 2000 elections, for ordinary people to influence the use of available resources – including international assistance – to meet broadly recognised needs.

This is what the two-dimensional conceptualisation of democracy in terms of institutional norms and relations of power is all about. The abstractions of democratic constitutionalism require for their concrete real-
isation at least somewhat autonomous citizens, able to exercise a measure of meaningful control over decisions in society. Otherwise democratic legitimacy will be weak or lost. But when facing the state, citizens’ self-determination also requires constitutionalism, legality, to survive over time. The two dimensions are strongly linked to each other. Neither one of them may be sustained on its own.
Postscript on political developments until the end of the year 2000

About half a year after Koumba Yalá’s final victory in the presidential election, as the major parts of the manuscript for this study were being finished, there were still no signs of political renewal. The course of events since then and up to the end of the year 2000 confirms the analysis and conclusions presented above.

After reaching a deadly height at the end of November 2000, the conflict between civilian and military state power lost some of its edge. At best this could result in a clearer and thus more stable situation than before. But the goal orientation of the political leadership remained diffuse all through the year 2000, in spite of all solemn declarations and promises given. Many observers, furthermore, thought that politics were becoming more ethnic than before, as the President and the Prime Minister were seen as favouring their own non-Moslem group, Balanta, at the expense of Moslems and among them Mandinga, Ansumane Mané’s ethnic group (see, for instance, Costa Dias. Ref. 1; reprinted in Gazeta de Notícias, 11.12.2000. Ref. vii).

In early September 2000 the President fired the five members of the government representing Guinea-Bissau’s Resistance Party, rgb. Only two weeks later, however, he was forced to take them back into the cabinet (Diário de Notícias, 7.9.2000; Público, 7-9.2000 and 17.9.2000. Ref. vii). This weakened the position of Prime Minister Caetano N’Tchama, who had been the driving force behind the move. Nevertheless the Prime Minister managed to hold on to his office still for some time.59 Nor did the tug-of-war between the democratically elected President and Ansumane Mané show any signs of diminishing. The latter persisted in seeing himself as the “Military Junta’s Highest Commander, Co-Presidente”. As late

59. On March 19, 2001, he was finally dismissed by the President (Lusa, 20.3.2001. Ref. vii).
as in August 2000 a journalist reported that the sign showing this text remained intact on the office-building opposite the President’s office (Diário de Notícias, 17.8.2000. Ref. vii). At the end of October the two leaders flew off together on an unexpected rapid visit to the President of Nigeria, presumably for mediation (Diário de Notícias, 26.10.2000. Ref. vii). But nothing seemed to help. At mid-November the conflict was brought to a head.

The impression is that Ansumane Mané, the victor of the civil war, was unable or did not want to accept the slowness of constitutional power and the lack of enterprise on the part of the government. Instead he challenged the President and the Government by arbitrarily appointing himself first Commander-in-Chief (Chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas) and a few days later Supreme Commander (Comandante Supremo das Forças Armadas), the latter being the post constitutionally reserved for the President. This provocation ended on November 23, 2000 when troops loyal to the government captured, without major difficulties, the military base close to the international airport of Bissau where Ansumane Mané had entrenched himself. The former leader of the military ‘Junta’ escaped with a small group of men to the countryside around Quinhamel, some 50 or 60 kilometres roughly west of the capital.60

Meanwhile seven leading politicians of the opposition had been jailed. They were accused of having supported Ansumane Mané in an attempted coup d’état. The legal evidence was weak or non-existent and in early December they were all released on the condition that they reported twice a week in person to the public prosecutor’s office (Diário de Notícias, 5.12.2000. Ref. vii). It is true, though, that at the beginning of the crisis the leaders of the two political parties UD and UNDP had made public declarations in support of Ansumane Mané and blaming President Komeba Yalá for the crisis. The PAIGC leader had expressed himself in the same vein, although somewhat more cautiously (Lusa, 20.11.2000, 22.11.2000. Ref. vii).

On November 30, 2000, one week after his escape, Ansumane Mané was killed under unclear circumstances, in the village of Blom,61 by a group of soldiers loyal to the government. According to the official ver-

60. These dramatic events were reported in detail, day by day, by Diário de Notícias and Lusa from mid-November until December 10, 2000. Also Público reported regularly. The latter’s internet-publishing, was, though, less easily accessible due to changes in routines at the time in question. The local press also gave detailed reports and comments. The main headline of Diário de Bissau 21.11.2000 was “Ansumane Mané takes over the post of Commander-in-Chief”. Diário de Bissau was published thirteen times during the period 21.11.2000–4.1.2001. During the same period Banobero appeared once, on 13.12.2000, and Gazeta de Notícias three times, 1,12, 11,12 and 26.12.2000.

61. This was one of the villages where I functioned in January 2000 as a UN election observer for the second round of the presidential election. Cf. the first footnote of Chapter 5 above, as well as the illustration on p. 65.
sion he had been tracked down by the soldiers but had refused to surrender and thus been killed in action. According to other reports he was brutally killed only after capture (see, for example, Diário de Bissau, 12.12.2000; Gazeta de Notícias, 11.12.2000; Banobero, 13.12.2000; Expresso, 16.12.2000. Ref. vii). Two days later, on December 1, Ansumane Mané was buried without official honours but followed by thousands of citizens to his final place of rest at the Moslem cemetery of Missirá on the north-western outskirts of Bissau.

What are the implications? In his New Year’s message to the nation for the year 2001, President Koumba Yalá spoke of the need for a “plan of economic, social and financial recovery” resting upon a “solid platform of understanding between the state, the trade unions and private initiative” (Diário de Bissau, 4.1.2001; Lusa, 31.12.2000. Ref. vii). All can agree on this. But who is to decide on the substance? The citizens have hardly received more power and influence than before through the dramatic events that shook Guinea-Bissau toward the end of the year 2000. The civilian politicians, however, have undoubtedly received another chance, as military power has lost its radiance through the death of Ansumane Mané.

62. The circumstances of Ansumane Mané’s death and burial are reported in Diário de Notícias, 1.12, 2.12, 5.12, 10.12.2000; Lusa, 30.11, 2.12, 4.12, 7.12, 10.12.2000 (Ref. vii). No. 308 of Diário de Bissau, which presumably should have appeared between 1.12 and 7.12.2000 is missing in my collection. Presumably it gives full coverage of Ansumane Mané’s funeral.
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_Le RADI. Ce qu’il est et ce qu’il veut, presentation brochure for Réseau Africain pour le Développement Intégré (The African network for integrated development/RADI), Dakar (undated)._

Biombo, Comissão Regional de Eleições. Computer list of voting stations and districts in the sub-sector of Biombo (in the sector of Quinhamel) with information on the number of registered voters, signed by the regional chairman Marcos da Cunha Junior, Quinhamel, 29.10.1999.

Biombo, sector 2 (sub-sector), constituency no. 9. Record completed by the UN’s election observers (Joseph Essonde Edimo and Lars Rudebeck) for all 23 voting stations in the sub-sector in the constituency, second round of the presidential election, Biombo, 16.1.2000.


Comissão Nacional de Eleições (National Election Commission). The Commission’s unpublished material on the parliamentary elections and the first round of the presidential election 3.7.1994 and the second round of the presidential election 7.8.1994, Bissau, 1994. Important parts of this material were made available to me in Bissau in April 1996.


- Partial report on the results of the presidential election 28.11.1999 with distribution of votes by candidates, region and constituency, 8 of 29 constituencies, Bissau, 2.12.1999.


- Results of the first round of the presidential election 28.11.1999 with distribution of votes by candidates and regions, Bissau, 9.12.1999.

- Results of the first round of the presidential election 28.11.1999 with distribution of votes by candidates, regions and constituencies, Bissau, 11.12.1999.


- Results of the first round of the presidential election 28.11.1999 with distribution of votes by candidates and regions, Bissau, 25.1.2000.

Communiqué conjoint des observateurs internationaux, Premier tour de l’élection présidentielle et élections législatives du 28 Novembre 1999 en République de Guinée Bissau, communiqué issued jointly by the election observers who represented: “Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie – ACF; Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA); Communauté des Pays de Langue Portugaise (CPLP); Angola; Cap-Vert; Côte d’Ivoire; États-Unis d’Amérique; Mozambique; Pays-Bas; Portugal; Suède;” (the signatories are given here in the language of the original text) Bissau, 29.11.1999.

Comunicado Conjunto dos Observadores Internacionais sobre a 2.a volta das Eleições Presidenciais de 16 de Janeiro de 2000 na Guiné-Bissau, comunicado issued jointly by the election observers who represented (countries and organisations are given here in the language of the original text) “Organização da Unidade Africana (OUA); Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa; Organização Internacional da Francofonia (OF); Côte d’Ivoire; Estados Unidos da América; Gâmbia; Hollanda; Portugual; Suécia; Federação Internacional das Ligas dos Direitos do Homem (FIDH); membros das ONG’s internacionais na Guiné-Bissau;” Bissau, 18.1.2000.

Correio Guiné-Bissau, Bissau, 30.7.1994. Special issue with the results of the parliamentary election and the first round of the presidential election 3.7.1994. The figures are the same as in the material published by the National Election Commission.

- 19.8.1994. In this issue of Correio Guiné-Bissau the results of the second round of the presidential election of 7.8.1994 were published. This information is not as detailed as the National Election Commission’s unpublished internal data but does not conflict with these data.


from  (– Handwritten material from the election supervisor locally appointed by
– Copy of the form (white), which should be completed for the first round in the parliamentary
sector/constituency
Lusa News, presidential election
the first round of the presidential election
Mansabá sector, constituency no.
Mansabá sector, constituency no.
the local voting officials and was drawn up during the days immediately after November
Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, elected
officers’ figures,
chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja, Suleimane Turé, based on the returning
presidents, Farim,
Handwritten letter from local voting officials
with a request for support from international election
observers, Farim, 1999.
Kandjadja. Copy of the form (brown-yellow), which should be completed for the first round in the
presidential election by the local voting officials at each voting station, here completed by the
chairman of the section committee for Kandjadja, Suleimane Turé, based on the returning
officials’ figures, 28.11.1999.
– Copy of the form (white), which should be completed for the first round in the parliamentary
election by the local voting officials at each voting station, here completed by the chairman of
the section committee for Kandjadja, Suleimane Turé, based on the voting officials’ figures,
28.11.1999.
– Handwritten material from the election supervisor locally appointed by PAGC in Kandjadja (and
then approved by the National Election Commission), 3-7-1994.
from RGR/MBR. The protest had the result that RGR/MBR received a 29th mandate at the expense of
AD (PCD-PR) whose number of mandates decreased from four to three.
Mansabá sector, constituency no. 7. I. Detailed record of the results of the parliamentary election and
the first round of the presidential election 28.11.1999 for the voting station in Kandjadja (no. 81), in
Mansabá sector/constituency 7, Oio region. The record is hand-written, is based on reports from
the local voting officials and was drawn up during the days immediately after November 28 by
Mansabá sector, constituency no. 7. II. Detailed record of the results of the second round of the
presidential election 16.1.2000 for 51 voting stations, including Kandjadja, in Mansabá
sector/constituency 7, Oio region. The record is hand-written, is based on reports from the voting
officials and was drawn up by Manuel Serífo Nhamadjo, elected PAGC member for Mansabá
28.11.1999, during the days immediately after January 16.
and districts (“círculo e distrito eleitoral”); part 3, breakdown of the electorate by age groups;
Ministério da Administração Interna, Instituto Nacional de Estatística e Censos, República da
Guiné-Bissau, Bissau, 12.11.1999.
Report from the Swedish Observers Mission to the Presidential and Legislative Elections in Guinea-Bissau,
November 28, 1999, signed Aida Arago-Lagergren, Lars Boberg, Ing-Marie Berglund, Richard
Bombomba, Gustaf Eneroth, Charles Fox, Lars Lagergren, Roger Segerlund, Gunder Söderbäck,
Voting papers for the parliamentary election 28.11.1999 and the first and second rounds of the
The Perfect Ballot Box, advertisements and directions for the assembly of “strong, collapsible, affordable,
re-usable, transparent and absolutely tamper-proof” ballot boxes, the transparent Canadian
ballot boxes which were made available through Portuguese assistance for the elections of 28.11.
VII. Newspapers and news agencies followed with some regularity and single issues of certain other newspapers and magazines

*AFP/Agence France Presse* (Paris), individual news items.


*Diário de Notícias* (Lisbon): http://www.dn.pt/, 1999–. The most important material on Guinea-Bissau in *Diário de Notícias* during the period in question are articles signed by the journalist Luís Naves. The names of other journalists also appear, while a large number of articles are unsigned. In order not to overburden the notes, all articles and news items are only referred to with the name and date of the newspaper.

*Expresso* (Lisbon), individual issues.


*Jornal de Notícias* (Lisbon), individual issues.

*Le Soleil* (Dakar), 27.1.2000.

*L’Info* (Dakar), 26.5.1999.


*Nô Pintcha* (Bissau), during the 1990s, individual issues during 2000 (published irregularly). The name means “forward” in Guinean Creole.

*O Defensor, Orgão de Informação do Estado Maior General das Forças Armadas* (Bissau), no. 5, year 6, November 1999; no. 7, year 7, September 2000 (published rarely and irregularly).

*O Público* (Lisbon): http://www.publico.pt/, juni 1998 –. Much of the most important material on Guinea-Bissau in *Público* during the period in question are articles signed by the journalist Jorge Heitor. The names of other journalists also appear, while a large number of articles are unsigned. In order not to overburden the notes, all articles and news items are only referred to with the name and date of the newspaper.


*Voz de Bissau* (Bissau), May 1995–1996 (was not published after 1996).


VIII. List of persons at different levels and positions in Guinea-Bissau, from central government and parties to civil society and local village associations, including expatriates with knowledge of the country, who have contributed to the author’s knowledge and insights through conversations and/or formal interviews, 1998–2000.63 Dates given refer to formal interviews.64

Aaby, Peter. Director of Projecto de Saúde-Bandim, Bissau.


Beiga, Victor. Bissau.

Callewaert, Inger. Sociologist, Lund University.

Camará, Aminata. Bissau.

Cardoso, Carlos. Historian, social scientist, INEP, Bissau, and Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE (Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa), Lisbon.


Cuesta Dias, Eduardo. Anthropologist, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE, Lisbon.

Cue, Wendy. IFAD, Bissau.


Djaló, Bala. Bissau.

Einarsdóttir, Jónína. Anthropologist, Reykjavik, formerly Guinea-Bissau.


Essombe-Edimo, Joseph. Legal advisor, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, OAU; Banjul.


Ferreira, Roberto. Member for PAIGC in the parliament which was elected in 1994, went over to support the opposition party PPR after PAIGC’s party congress 31 August–8 September 1999. Arlanda airport, Stockholm, 3.6.1999 and Bissau, 16.12.1999.

Folkesson, Rolf. Programme officer in the Department for Democracy and Social Development, Sida, Stockholm; former Swedish chargé d’affaires in Bissau.


Gamhlangson, Geir. Paediatrician, Reykjavik; previously active for many years in Guinea-Bissau.

63. Unless otherwise stated, the position of the interviewee refers to the point in time of the interview. No attribute at all means that the person in question has mainly contributed in his/her general role as insightful observer or participant. The author is solely responsible for his interpretations of these conversations and interviews.

Gomes, Fernando. At that time chairman of LDH (Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos/Guinean league for human rights), later candidate in the presidential election 28.11.1999, and chairman, after the elections, of new political party, ASG, founded by himself. Bissau, 18.5.1999.


Holmgren, Christer. Projecto de Saúde-Bandim, Bissau.


João, Mamadú. Sociologist, director of NEP, Bissau.


Lopes, Irénio Nascimento. Bissau.


Nilsson, Lars. Programme officer at the Swedish Embassy in Guinea-Bissau, July–December 1999; previously worked for a long time for Save the Children, Bissau; January–August 2000 sole employee at Sida’s office in Bissau.


N’Tchama (Intchama), Caetano. Minister of the Interior in the interim government; at the time of the interview spoken of as a possible Prime Minister in the coming government, took office as Prime Minister on 19.2.2000. Bissau, 19.1.2000.


Proença, Helder. Representative of PAIGC, inter alia former Minister of the President’s Office and Parliamentary Affairs. Bissau, 21.5.1999.


Saad, Amine. Chairman of União para a Mudança (UM) at the time of the interview. Bissau, 19.5.1999.

Sambu, Imbary. Ex-soldier in Guinea-Bissau’s army; administrator, TAP, Bissau.


Schiefer, Ulrich. Sociologist, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE, Lisbon.


REFERENCES

Tia Odette. Bissau.
Turé, Djibril. Kandjadja.
Turé, Lamine. Kandjadja.
Turé, Seku. Kandjadja.
Turpin, Bill. Bissau.
Valente, Julia Simão. Bissau.
van der Drift, Roy. Anthropologist, INEP, Bissau.
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Guinea-Bissau is located in West Africa, between Senegal in the north and Guinea-Conakry in the south. The country is among the smallest in West Africa but there are still several vegetation zones. Its surface covers 36,125 square kilometres and the population is about 1.3 million. The climate is tropical with a period of rains lasting from June to October. Rivers wind through the low and forested coastal areas. Further inland the landscape changes into savannah in the east and north-east, while turning more tropical in the south. About 300,000 people are reported to live in Bissau, the capital city, and surrounding area. Other towns are small. Thus about 75 per cent of the population live in the countryside. About 57 per cent are estimated to be below the age of 20.

The largest ethnic groups are the Fula and Balanta (about 25 per cent each), Mandinga (about 15 per cent) and Manjaco and Papel (about 10 per cent each). There are at least thirteen different languages. The largest common language is Creole (kriol), which is found all over the country. The official language is Portuguese, spoken only by about 10 per cent of the population. French is common among educated people and in the market-places. Most Guineans embrace what could be called animist religions and philosophies of life, about 40 per cent are Moslem and a few per cent Christian. All these percentages are approximate, as estimates are hard to make.

Rice and maize are the most important foods. Fish is a significant source of protein and there is an abundant supply of fruit and vegetables most of the year. Agriculture is the absolutely dominant sector in the economy. Exports come from agriculture and consist mostly of cashew-nuts, palm oil and groundnuts. Timber and fish are exported too. Since May 1997, Guinea-Bissau has been part of the French-dominated currency union Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA).

The level of life in Guinea-Bissau is low according to all statistical measures. In the UNDP’s Human Development Index for the year 2000, based upon figures available in 1998, Guinea-Bissau is ranked at 169 of a total of 174 countries. This means that the average life expectancy at birth was 45 years; adult literacy was 37 per cent; school attendance 34 per cent; and average per capita purchasing power just below one fifth of the average for all ‘developing countries’. There is nothing to indicate any improvement since then.

Guinea-Bissau’s international debt is very high and its dependence upon
assistance is extreme. Half of the country’s GNP is reported to have been made up of official assistance in 1998. The real rate is likely to have deteriorated since then, due to the war and near collapse of large parts of the formal economy. For many years Sweden was the largest donor of official assistance, but its bilateral inputs have been sharply reduced in recent years. Sweden’s embassy in the country was closed at the end of 1999, while a new Swedish embassy for several West African countries was opened in Dakar, the capital of neighbouring Senegal, in 2000. The most active remaining donors in Guinea-Bissau are Portugal and the European Union. France also retains its embassy and remains an interested donor.

Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, after eleven years of decolonisation war against Portugal. The country is divided into nine administrative regions. Until 1994 it was ruled by the only party allowed, the former liberation movement, PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde). After democratic parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994 a political multi-party system began to function and some economic progress started to take place.

The last few years of the 1990s turned violent in the country. Although the regime had been democratically legal since 1994, it was hardly legitimate. Civil and regional war erupted in June 1998, breaking the peace that had lasted since 1974. In spite of being supported by troops from the neighbouring countries Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, the president was forced to abdicate in May 1999. Under the leadership of a transitional government the country returned to constitutional democracy by way of general elections in November 1999 and January 2000.
Map


Imbali, Faustino (ed.). Os efeitos sócio-económicos do programa de ajustamento estrutural na Guiné-Bissau, INEP, Bissau, 1993.


Kovsted, Jens & Tarp, Finn. Guinea-Bissau: War, Reconstruction and Reform in Historical and Analytical Perspective, Institute of Economics, Copenhagen University, Copenhagen, 6.4.1999.


Acknowledgements

This study draws partly on my own work dating as far back in time as the early nineteen-seventies. More particularly it is a direct continuation of my report on democratisation in Guinea-Bissau published in 1996 (in Portuguese in 1997). That study contains a detailed preface where debts of personal gratitude to a number of people, mainly in Guinea-Bissau and Sweden, are carefully and sincerely acknowledged. All mentioned there are gratefully held in mind here as well. Most of them are furthermore listed also in this book, in section viii of the References. For these reasons, I will limit myself here to naming a smaller number of people who most specifically and decisively contributed to making this particular study possible.

From the second half of 1997 until June 1999, Ulla Andrén was Sweden’s chargée d’affaires in Guinea-Bissau. In that country she is widely remembered with affection and admiration for her efforts – ceaseless, constructive and courageous – in support of peace in Guinea-Bissau and in the region. Very special thanks are due to her for inviting me to carry out the work now presented and for supporting it wholeheartedly all through. Those thanks are extended to include Rolf Folkesson who has been my counterpart at Sida, at its division for democracy support. His insights and interest have decisively facilitated my efforts. In mid 1999 Roger Gartoft, now Sweden’s ambassador in Angola, succeeded Ulla Andrén as chargé d’affaires in Bissau. His specific task there was to oversee the closing of the Swedish Embassy. In the process he also continued the Embassy’s support of my project, for which I thank him most sincerely, as well as all the other employees of the Embassy.

While constraining myself, with difficulty, as explained above, there are still at the very least three persons in Guinea-Bissau whose long-lasting support has to be explicitly acknowledged at this point. These are Bill Turpin, now Swedish Consul in Bissau, in whose hospitable house in Bissau I stayed in December 1999 and January 2000 and who straightforwardly, as always, opened not only his house but also his wide network of contacts to me, and continues to supply me with newspapers and comments from Bissau; Saleimane Turé, Kandjadja, whose trust and friendship make my work in that village possible; and Samba Seck, ravi/Guinea-Bissau, who unconditionally shares his organisation’s facilities with me in recognition of a shared commitment.

Dakar, the capital of Senegal, is an important passage-point for trav-
ellers from Europe to Guinea-Bissau, especially when war makes direct access to the airport in Bissau difficult, as was the case in 1998 and 1999. Most sincere thanks are due to Christer Holmgren, in charge at that time of the temporary office in Dakar (necessary because of the war in Bissau) of the Bandim Health Project, and Leif Ståhl, Swedish consul in Senegal, for the generous and helpful ways in which they facilitated my stopovers in Dakar.

Anne Sisask is the editor of the series Sidastudies. Working together with an editor as committed, demanding and supportive as she is has been a privilege and a pleasure. Her incisive suggestions have spurred and challenged me to improve the text.
Lars Rudebeck, professor of political science, is an interdisciplinarily oriented teacher and researcher at the Unit of Development Studies, Uppsala University. His work is in the field of ‘politics and development’ with a specific theoretical focus on democratisation. He has been studying problems of political development in the so-called third world ever since the early 1960s, including his own field work in Mexico, Tunisia, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. His publications include a number of books, articles and reports in many different languages. As Rudebeck has followed Guinea-Bissau closely since 1970, his work on that country has, in his own words, turned into a kind of long-term ‘dia-chronic case study’.

In his work, Rudebeck’s concern has been with the transition from anti-colonial liberation movement to juridical independence and subsequent post-colonial transformations. What happens in these historical processes to the social basis of state power, to political culture, to the internal structuring of the political system, to the policies resulting from the exercise of state power, and to the ways in which these four levels of societal reality are linked to each other – all of this seen also in its international context? What are the implications for ‘development’ and ‘democracy’?

Other lines of work are on Nordic third world policies and the relevance of the classical sociologist Max Weber’s thinking on development to current research concerns with modernisation and democratisation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Acção Democrática/Democratic Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIFA/PALOP</td>
<td>Associacão de Investigação e Formação Orientadas para Acção de Natureza Participativa das Populações nos Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa/Association for Research and Education, Oriented towards Popular Participation in the African Countries in which Portuguese is the Official Language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Aliança Socialista Guineense/Guinean Socialist Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTERNAG</td>
<td>Alternativa Guineense/Associação Guineense de Estudos e Alternativas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Assembleia Nacional Popular/National Assembly, i.e. Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAO</td>
<td>Banco da África Occidental/Bank of West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECRON</td>
<td>Celula das ong Nacionais e Estrangeiras para a Gestão da Crise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDEAO</td>
<td>Communautée Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, English abbreviation ECOWAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>Communautée Financière Africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>Comissão Nacional das Eleições/National Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>“Peace-monitoring group”, i.e. the military branch of ECOWAS/CEDEAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States, French abbreviation CEDEAO</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
EU European Union

FCG-SD Fórum Cívico Guineense-Social Democracia/
Guinean Civic Forum-Social Democracy

FD Frente Democrática/Democratic Front

FDS Frente Democrática Social/Democratic Social Front

FLING Frente da Libertação Nacional da Guiné/
Guinea’s National Liberation Front

INEP Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa/
National Institute for Studies and Research

LGDH Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos/
Guinean League for Human Rights

LIPE Liga Guinense de Protecção e Desenvolvimento
Ecológico/Guinean League for Ecological
Protection and Development

Mude Movimento para a Unidade e Democracia/
Movement for Unity and Democracy

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation, i.e. voluntary
organisation – ong in Portuguese, French, etc.

OAU Organization of African Unity

PAIGC Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e
Cabo Verde/African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde

PAICV Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde/
African party for the Independence of Cape Verde

PCD Partido da Convergência Democrática/
Party for Democratic Convergence

PCN Partido da Convenção Nacional/
Party for a Pact on National Unity
PDP  Partido Democrático do Progresso/
Democratic Party for Progress

PRGB/MB  Partido da Resistência da Guiné-Bissau –
Movimento Bá-Fatá/Guinea-Bissau’s Resistance
Party – Bá-Fatá-movement

PRD  Partido para a Renovação e Desenvolvimento/
Party for Renewal and Development

PRP  Partido da Renovação e Progresso/
Party for Renewal and Progress

PRS  Partido da Renovação Social/
Party for Social Renewal

FSD  Partido Social Democrata/Social Democratic Party

PUSD  Partido Unido Social Democrata/
United Social Democratic Party

RADI  Résau Africain pour le Développement Intégré/
African Network for Integrated Development

RGB/MB  the same as PRGB/MB, often merely RGB

SINAPROF  Sindicato Nacional dos Professores/
National Trade Union of Teachers

UM  União para a Mudança/Union for Change

UN  United Nations

UNDP  União Nacional para o Desenvolvimento e
Progresso/National Union for Development and
Progress

UNDP  United Nations Development Programme

UNTG  União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Guineenses/
National Union of Guinean Workers
Previous issues in the Sida studies series:

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No 2  Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation for Poverty Reduction, Andrea Cornwall, Art. nr. D 0718

No 3  Discussing Women’s Empowerment – Theory and Practice, Art. nr. D 0738
In his study of recent developments in Guinea-Bissau, Lars Rudebeck seeks to investigate how democratic rule emerges and functions in real life. His analysis extends far beyond the multi-party system and election procedures as he discusses contrasts in people’s perceptions of democracy. He assesses their access to influential structures, the roles of civil and political society, of the military, and of international assistance and argues that complex power structures need to be addressed if democracy is to be consolidated.